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Introduction
winds of change
If  there’s a book the South Sudanese cannot remove from their lives, it’s 
the Bible. . . .  [T] here are books that are very close to the heart of South 
Sudanese  because of our suffering. So if the Bible then is made up of stories 
of suffering, 50  percent of it, the other 50  percent of the stories is the glory 
that follows suffering. That’s our story. Maybe we are not enjoying the glory 
now, but we know it’s coming.
—Joseph Taban, July 12, 2012
On February 3, 1960, Harold Macmillan stood before the Parliament of South 
Africa.  After a month touring some of Britain’s African colonies, the British 
prime minister opined to the mps that a “wind of change is blowing through 
this continent and  whether we like it or not, this growth of national con-
sciousness is a po liti cal fact.”1 While British-controlled Somalia and Nigeria 
each obtained in de pen dence in 1960, they  were not the first in sub- Saharan 
Africa to wrest  free from Her Majesty’s encumbrance  after World War II. 
Though Ghana had entered the community of sovereign nations in 1957, 
Pan- Africanism’s shining black star was not the first to achieve in de pen dence 
 either. That distinction went to Sudan— formerly the Anglo- Egyptian 
Condominium— which became in de pen dent in 1956.2
Seven months  after Macmillan’s speech, the Anglican bishop of the 
Sudan referenced other winds of change. In Oliver Allison’s address to 
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the Sudan Church Association, he remarked, “We . . .  are living  under a mil-
itary regime . . .  and the Sudan is a polite police State. The winds of change 
around and within the Sudan are sometimes not cool refreshing breezes 
but winds of gale force. The Church is not alone in being the prey of all 
sorts of forces.”3 Just months before Sudan became in de pen dent, the con-
dominium had been almost ripped apart when southern Sudanese soldiers 
at Torit rejected  orders to be transferred to the North. They mutinied, and 
hundreds  were killed in the ensuing vio lence. The newly in de pen dent Su-
danese government attempted to unite the country by promoting Arabism 
and Islam in South Sudan, a region with lengthy experience with Christian 
missionary work during the colonial era. With the government takeover 
of mission schools, the elimination of Sunday as a weekly holiday, and re-
strictions placed on mission work, life for Christians and Christian workers 
in South Sudan was becoming increasingly precarious by the time Allison 
made his remarks. In time a full- scale civil war broke out, and the govern-
ment expelled hundreds of missionaries from the country.4
More than a half- century  after Allison’s speech, another wind of change 
blew through the country.  After de cades of civil war, 98.3  percent of partici-
pants voted for in de pen dence in a January 2011 referendum.5 As one man 
remarked before the results  were unveiled, “The Northerners have made 
us their slaves for a long time, and we are ready to show them that we can 
lead ourselves.”6 This reference to slavery was no mere rhetorical device; 
rather, it was rooted in real history. During the nineteenth  century, Sudan’s 
economy was based in part on the slave trade, an enterprise that practically 
depopulated some areas of the South. To be sure, the Sudanese slave trade 
was not novel; Egyptian traders had previously taken enslaved persons from 
the Funj kingdom. Slavery, according to Jok Madut Jok, was never abolished 
during the Anglo- Egyptian colonial period or by the in de pen dent minority 
Arab regimes.7
On July 9, 2011, South Sudan celebrated its in de pen dence as the world’s 
newest nation. More than just a po liti cal occasion, in de pen dence was also 
a religious moment. Christian leaders argued that a prophecy concerning 
Cush from the book of Isaiah had foretold South Sudan’s in de pen dence, and 
a draft of the national anthem referred to the country as Cush, Eden, and 
a land of milk and honey. In February 2012 the Sudan Tribune reported that 
South Sudanese Christians had proposed to Vice President Riek Machar a 
pilgrimage to Mount Zion to further fulfill Isaiah’s prophecy (the Cushites, 
in the prophet’s vision, pre sent gifts to God on Mount Zion  after their suf-
fering).8 I was in the capital city of Juba when the country celebrated its 
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first anniversary of in de pen dence. Then a doctoral student working on 
a cata loging proj ect at the South Sudan National Archives, I was  eager to 
attend commemoration festivities at All Saints Cathedral. As I sat among 
a throng of attendees,  under enormous ornate cloths shielding us from the 
midday sun, the acting governor spoke. He shared that  after John Garang’s 
death in 2005, “God in his mercy [gave] us a Joshua with unique talent and 
wisdom who took us through the days of difficulty in the administration 
of . . .  South Sudan.”9 Garang had created the Sudan  People’s Liberation 
movement (splm), the South’s dominant po liti cal movement and civil-
ian organ ization. The splm paralleled the Sudan  People’s Liberation Army 
(splA), the southern rebel force that had fought against the northern- based 
Sudanese government in the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005).  After 
Garang’s death, Salva Kiir Mayardit—or Joshua— became the new splA 
commander and  future president.10 Another speaker alluded to the Hebrew 
captivity in Egypt by thanking God for giving them in de pen dence, leading 
His  children across the river, and ending their slavery.11 It appeared impos-
sible to divorce southern nationalism from biblical vocabulary.
*  *  *
With the Sudanese state’s long history of Islamization policies, it is not 
surprising that the relationship between religion and po liti cal action in 
Sudan has been the focus of  great inquiry.12 The Sudanese state has at-
tempted to fashion the country as an Islamic state on several occasions, 
but—as Jok Madut Jok has noted— the presence of a significant population 
of non- Muslims made such attempts highly problematic and destructive.13 
Despite the prominence of biblical invocations leading up to and through 
in de pen dence, no book- length study focuses on the historical genealogy of 
such religiously infused po liti cal thought in South Sudan. This study shows 
that modern uses of the Bible are merely the latest iterations in a longer his-
tory of religious nationalism. Throughout the second half of the twentieth 
 century and into the twenty- first, Sudanese thinkers transformed Christian 
thought and theology into spaces where racial identities obtained potent 
spiritual power. Southern Sudanese used the Bible to provide a lexicon for 
re sis tance, a vehicle for defining friends and enemies, and a script for po liti-
cal and often seditious actions in their quest for self- determination and sov-
ereignty. While the po liti cal imagination has not been exclusively Christian, 
some southern thinkers used the Christian Bible to forge a  union between 
theology and nationalism. By  doing so, they blurred the lines between secular 
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and sacred in the genealogy of their nation’s po liti cal thought. Rather than 
approaching the history of South Sudanese nationalism as mere po liti cal 
history, I show that it is— for many  people— a spiritual chronicle. In this 
vein, Chosen  Peoples supports Lamin Sanneh’s view that religious thought is 
deeply connected with the roots of the secular state.14
Beginning with the end of the Mahdist War (1898) and continuing 
through the early years of in de pen dence, Chosen  Peoples investigates the 
ways in which Christian worldviews, orga nizational work, and theology 
informed the ideological construction of the South Sudanese nation- state. 
The Bible provided a critical lexicon of re sis tance and communal identity 
formation and was a source with which to levy spiritual critiques against 
the Arab Other. Blackness became an identity marker  adopted by southern-
ers of vari ous ethnicities, resulting in a unique case in African Chris tian ity 
whereby a liberatory, nationalist Christian thought was aimed against non-
white and non- Christian co- citizens.
The prevailing context of the strug les against Sudanese governments 
meant that race (blackness) and religion (Chris tian ity) became dominant 
identities that southerners of diff er ent ethnicities used to distinguish them-
selves from an  enemy that was often framed as Arab and Muslim. Rather 
than separating race and religion as coexisting ele ments, I pre sent theology 
as a crucible of race, a space where racial differences and be hav iors  were 
defined. Southerners envisioned themselves as a chosen  people destined for 
liberation, while Arabs and Muslims  were likened to oppressors in the bib-
lical tradition of Babylon, Egypt, and the Philistines. With the end of the 
Second Sudanese Civil War (2005) and peace with the traditional northern 
 enemy, however, ethnicity has superseded race as the more po liti cally sa-
lient and impor tant identifier in South Sudan’s po liti cal arena. This real ity 
is critical to understanding the pre sent conflict as a violent referendum on 
the strengths and limitations of deploying race, religion, and ethnicity as 
instruments in the construction of a pluralistic democracy.
The racial and religious identity politics at play in this narrative— namely 
Arabness and Africanness, Christianness and Muslimness—is particularly 
fascinating when Christian and/or Western nationalism is understood to 
be about anti- Islamization. Samuel Moyn notes that since “the 1940s . . . 
Christian  human rights have been not so much about the inclusion of the 
other as about policing the borders and bound aries on which threatening 
enemies loom.” While communism was once feared as the epitome of secu-
larism (and was the target of religious strug le), Moyn contends that the 
Muslim has replaced the communist in Eu rope’s con temporary imagination 
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(and particularly with re spect to religious liberty).15 While the religious 
 nationalism in this study was created and articulated against the backdrop 
of state attempts to fashion Sudan as an Islamic nation, some figures levied 
their critiques against the state, certain individuals, or a par tic u lar brand 
of Islam rather than that religion writ large. Furthermore, the use of scrip-
ture  after the twentieth- century civil wars and into South Sudanese in de-
pen dence shows that southerners injected biblical language and spiritual 
thought into public forums long  after Islamizing Sudanese governments 
(based in the northern city of Khartoum) ceased to be the target of their 
animus. I caution against a  limited view of South Sudanese religious nation-
alism as one based exclusively in anti- Islamization. This notwithstanding, 
 there is room to consider the connections between the rhe toric deployed 
against Arabs and Muslims in this study and discourses concerning Islam 
and the war on terror.16
Theological knowledge production in South Sudan was not the exclusive 
domain of clergy; rather, a tapestry of thinkers contributed. Rather than fo-
cusing on a specific subset of  people or communities in the traditional vein 
of Sudanese anthropology, I follow in the path of Jonathon Glassman’s work 
on Tanzania and Daniel Magaziner’s in South Africa by examining a range 
of figures, including refugees, soldiers, politicians, students, and clerics, who 
placed themselves into biblical archetypes.17 Using circulating print media 
written by a diversity of authors allows for an examination of religious and 
po liti cal thought that extends beyond ethnicity and  toward a more regional 
and international scope. Building on Steven Feierman’s formative study 
of anthropology and history in Tanzania, I focus on the intellectual  labor 
performed by South Sudanese writers.18 Intellectuals used print media to 
interpret their circumstances, define enemies, script action, and define the 
 future through a theological framework— one that conflated spiritual liber-
ation with material po liti cal reformation and revolution. Although vari ous 
Sudanese regimes attempted to create an Islamic state, it is also imperative 
to recognize the ways in which  people in South Sudan— while at war against 
Khartoum— used religion for their own po liti cal purposes.
And yet,  after entering “the promised land” of in de pen dence, ethnic con-
flict threatened the nation that religious nationalism envisioned. Division 
and enmity between southern factions persisted following the end of the 
Second Sudanese Civil War, and  matters came to a head in December 2013, 
when vio lence broke out between members of the presidential guard. This 
action precipitated vio lence throughout the new South Sudanese nation 
between forces loyal to President Kiir (of Dinka ethnicity, Sudan’s largest 
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ethnic group) and former Vice President Riek Machar (of Nuer ethnicity, 
the South’s second largest ethnic group). Tens of thousands perished in the 
conflict, which lasted  until 2018.19 Thus, this study  can’t simply offer a new 
way of understanding religion’s role in South Sudanese po liti cal imaginings; 
it must also consider ethnicity’s po liti cal relevance in this narrative of reli-
giously infused politics.
diasporic connections: Black politics and theology
This book is significantly informed by ideas that emerged from two other 
contexts in which blacks  were socially and po liti cally marginalized: South 
Africa and the United States. Desmond Tutu was pre sent at the In de pen-
dence Day ceremonies at All Saints Cathedral that summer day in July 2012. 
His presence encouraged me to search for the fusion of religious and po-
litical rhe toric in South Sudan. Minister of Information Barnaba Marial 
Benjamin addressed the former archbishop by saying that he (Tutu) had 
broken racial barriers, and that God had brought him to “your  people.” 
Tutu offered congratulatory remarks, pleas for peace, and concluded with 
a blessing in Xhosa.20 It was a fraught diasporic moment that linked black 
South Africa’s strug le against white oppression with the South Sudanese 
fight against Khartoum governments that had tried to create an Arab and 
Islamic state.
Francis Deng once noted similarities between the Sudan and South 
Africa: “The Sudan has much in common with South Africa  under apart-
heid. . . .  In South Africa, apartheid excluded non- Whites. In the Sudan, 
Arabism both excludes, in the sense that it discriminates against  those who 
are not Arabized or Islamized, and includes, in the sense that it fosters as-
similation, which condescendingly implies rejection of or disregard for the 
non- Arab and non- Muslim ele ments.”21 The efflorescence of religiously in-
fused po liti cal rhe toric on South Sudanese in de pen dence echoed the  union 
between religion and politics during the antiapartheid strug le. White 
Dutch Reformed clergyman Beyers Naudé founded Pro Veritate in 1962. 
Published in Afrikaans and En glish, it brought together Christians across 
racial and denominational lines who  were opposed to apartheid. Along 
with the Christian Institute of Southern Africa, Pro Veritate is credited with 
facilitating the creation of the 1967 Black Theology Conference and the 
black consciousness movement.22 Daniel Magaziner writes that South Afri-
can students, clergy, and activists “donned the prophet’s mantle and spoke 
historical truths to the power of apartheid law” between 1968 and 1977.23 In 
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1985 a group of laypeople and clergy (including Tutu) produced the Kairos 
Document, a theological treatise designed to develop a biblical model that 
would lead to action. The document argued that scripture condemns states 
that fail in their God- given duty and referenced Rome, described in the book 
of Revelation as Satan’s servant, as an example. The Kairos authors argued 
that when regimes become morally illegitimate, theological teaching com-
pels Christians to remove them rather than compromise. God liberated the 
oppressed, and immoral states are not allowed to rule forever.24
As Tutu’s appearance at the in de pen dence ceremony linked South Af-
rica’s experience with South Sudan’s, the publication of an essay written by 
James Cone in Pro Veritate linked black theology with Christian antiapart-
heid opposition. Black theology was a term first used in the United States 
among a small cadre of African American theologians led by Cone during 
the second half of the 1960s. Cone’s first book, Black Theology and Black Power, 
was published in 1969.25 “Black Theology and African Theology”—an essay 
Cone co- authored with Gayraud Wilmore— notes that faith is the encoun-
ter between the divine and  human in the historical context of oppression. 
The enslaved community recognizes that its deliverance is the divine’s work 
in history and, therefore, knowing God is “to know the actuality of oppres-
sion and the certainty of liberation.”26 They add that God’s liberating acts 
directly inform his  people’s position and responsibility: “He is the Liberator 
par excellence, who reveals not only who God is and what he is  doing, but 
also who we are and what we are called to do about  human degradation. . . . 
The  free man in Christ is the man who rebels against false authorities by 
reducing them to their proper status.”27
Theologian John Mbiti was critical of race’s infusion into theology. He 
criticized black theology and stated that in reading it, “one becomes sated 
by color consciousness. It is necessary to remind oneself that racial color is 
not a theological concept in the Scriptures.”28 Importantly, Mbiti acknowl-
edged that southern Africa was to a  limited extent similar to the American 
context that produced black theology.29 His critique of black theology and 
nod to southern Africa’s similarities to the United States open the door 
for one to consider how African thinkers elsewhere theologized their racial 
oppression.
To be sure, the decision within South Sudan to use Chris tian ity to com-
pete with race—or northern Arabism— has been recognized. During the 
height of the Second Civil War, Francis Deng noted, “the elite circles of 
the Christian South are promoting the idea that Chris tian ity should be con-
sciously cultivated as a pivotal ele ment in southern identity. Chris tian ity,” 
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Deng continued, “in combination with such other ele ments as En glish 
and vernacular languages, is the modern model competing with the Arab- 
Islamic model in the north.”30 He also acknowledged the role of Christian 
education in creating an antinorthern nationalist sentiment.31 This study 
goes beyond the acknowl edgment of Chris tian ity’s politicization in South 
Sudan by investigating the discursive pro cesses by which this took place. 
Chosen  Peoples is interested in the manner in which southern nationhood 
was articulated through a biblical lens. By approaching religious thought 
as a space where racial and po liti cal subjectivities  were fashioned and har-
nessed for revolutionary means, my study takes a new approach to South 
Sudanese social history. Rather than approaching race and religion— the 
two ele ments most often used to distinguish North and South Sudan—as 
separate entities, I analyze religion as a space where race was expressed, 
defined, and animated with power. South Sudan is an African context in 
which racial and spiritual identities  were combined to argue for po liti cal lib-
eration in an environment that was often understood to be made up of Arab 
rulers and black ruled. While resembling black theology and the ideology 
expressed in the Kairos document, the South Sudanese variation was aimed 
against nonwhite and non- Christian co- citizens (in contrast to South 
Africa). The religious thought  under focus in this study, furthermore, was 
often articulated within the context of civil wars and preceded the creation 
of a new nation- state.
Beyond the north- south divide
This study does not aim to perpetuate the general conceptual division 
of Sudan into an Arab Muslim North and a black, Christian, indigenous 
theistic South. Douglas Johnson, Cherry Leonardi, Peter Woodward, and 
Richard Gray have tackled the North- South binary in vari ous ways.32 The 
terms Arab, African, and black are too malleable to be used to argue for firm 
regional distinctions. Arabism in North Sudan is contested and varied, with 
“Arabs” commonly identified with the Khartoum government, eco nom-
ically marginalized Arab nomads, and Arabs who live within the South and 
have long coexisted with southerners. Amal Fadlalla writes that “construc-
tions of ‘Arabism’ are constantly negotiated, debated, and in ven ted among 
many Muslim groups, including Darfurians.” She concludes that the ques-
tion of one’s Arabness or non- Arabness is “complexly determined by ethnic 
and racial categories that take into account regionality and skin tone, as well 
as other bodily attributes.”33
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Nor should Arab be used interchangeably with Islam. The notion of an 
Islam noir—an Africanized variety of Islam that was somehow diluted from 
au then tic Islam and infused with traditional African beliefs and practices— 
emerged in French West Africa during the early twentieth  century. The 
colonial French administration was suspicious of Islam  after its role in 
mobilizing anticolonial re sis tance in Algeria. The administration kept Mus-
lim clerics  under surveillance, with files synthesized by Paul Marty, who 
directed French West Africa’s Office of Muslim Affairs in the early twen-
tieth  century.  These files comprised a series of studies on Islam in French 
West African colonies, studies that contributed to the conceptual formu-
lation of Islam noir’s existence.34 Robert Launay sugests that though the 
French may have been comforted by the idea that they did not have to 
worry about Islamic danger, the idea of Islam noir had damaging conse-
quences for anthropology’s study of Islam in French West Africa: “Once 
‘African Islam’ could be reduced to its component parts— Arab Islam and 
African ‘fetishism’— then the study of Islam could be properly left to Orien-
talists, leaving to anthropologists the task of decoding more ‘authentically’ 
African beliefs and practices.”35 Rhetorical distancing between Africa and 
Islam is evident in Sudan, where an Arab- Muslim North is distinguished 
from a black African South. Against the historical backdrop of Islam noir, 
Rudolph Ware notes that Islamic studies have traditionally marginalized 
Africa, despite its deep Islamic history and African Muslims’ demographic 
strength. The racial ele ments of this tendency are transparent in the ac-
tions of colonial administrator Marty, who was “routinely appealing to the 
logic of race . . .  tapping deeply held ste reo types of black civilizational and 
intellectual inferiority.”36
The division of Sudan into two regions comes with an implicit assertion 
that the South is a uniform entity. It is not. Juba- born journalist and author 
Steve Paterno once shared with me that a sense of nationhood did not exist 
 until the onset of colonialism. “Other wise,” he continued, “South Sudanese 
 were simply tribes, which . . . to some [extent] still exist  today as most can-
not [grasp] the idea of nationhood but rather fall to their tribes or clan so as 
they belong.” Paterno added that “the thought of nationhood is for the most 
part confined within the elites, the so- called educated class.  These basically 
compose of military, politicians, [and] clergy.”37 Jok Madut Jok asserts this 
sentiment in his War and Slavery in Sudan:
Southerners . . .  have always referred to themselves in terms of their eth-
nic nationalities. . . .  Most rural Southerners have linked themselves to 
10 Introduction
 these cultural and ethnic roots and do not even reach the level of the 
state when talking about their world. They do not identify with a polity 
called Sudan, nor is  there any consciousness or po liti cal decision to be 
part of Africa. The history of the effort to identify with Africa is recent 
and is confined to the literate. It grew out of the history of unfriendly 
contact with Northerners.38
Throughout the twentieth  century, the Sudanese state— along with its po-
liti cal and military opponents— strug led to establish governmental legiti-
macy. Cherry Leonardi notes that experiences of war, military government, 
aid, urbanization, local government, and national politics each si mul ta-
neously harden and dismantle local identities.39
This book does not ignore  these realities and makes no attempt to argue 
that Chris tian ity, blackness, or “southernness” have so enmeshed them-
selves in the South that they have replaced or eliminated the effects, utility, 
or meanings of ethnicity. Nor do I attempt to say that all or most southerners, 
regardless of their ethnicities, ascribe to the religious and racial liberation-
ist thought that rests at the forefront of this analy sis. Rather, Chosen  Peoples 
shows the ways in which literate elites encouraged indigenous cultures, dis-
couraged “tribalism,” posited a shared racial identity, and articulated south-
ern separatism and communal identity through the mediums of Christian 
work and thought. If nationalism, as Paterno and Jok put forth, has primar-
ily been the work of the literate elite, it is still impor tant to understand how 
their racial and religious imaginings informed their revolutionary po liti cal 
work and vision.
During the Anglo- Egyptian period, colonial officials sought to shield 
the South from Arab- Islamic influences and encourage the continuance 
of indigenous cultures and languages. This was done in vari ous ways but 
primarily through linguistic work; education was conducted in vernacular 
languages, missionaries produced vernacular dictionaries, and vernacular 
newspapers  were produced. In this vein, the Christian proj ect not only 
sponsored African or southern self- identification but also invited  people 
to see themselves as constituents of smaller, ethnic communities. What 
followed was a tension between the ethnic identities encouraged and but-
tressed by missionaries (and Africans), an emerging southern conscious-
ness that was grounded in a shared history of slavery, African rather than 
Arab identification, and po liti cal marginalization. In response to specific 
historical circumstances like midcentury Sudanization, Arabization, and 
Islamization, race became a way of thinking about self and community that 
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superseded  others. With changing times, however, race has lost the salience 
that it had when it was used to distinguish South from North. Given the in-
timate connection that religion has had with race in Sudan (embodied most 
often in the division between an Arab Muslim North and a black Christian 
South), one must consider the ways in which Christians in South Sudan— 
whether Euro- American or African— have used their faith to inform their 
approach and use of racial and ethnic identities for po liti cal purposes.
Ethnicity’s historical realities, debates, and power in the South demand a 
disavowal of the North- South polarization and an honest recognition of the 
ways in which the terms southern, black, and African— potent and pervasive 
as they are— become tenuous when used to describe every one throughout 
the region. This study escapes the North- South polarization by showing how 
ethnic identities in South Sudan continued to be significant in discursive 
and social spaces that swirled with competing social, racial, religious, and 
national identities. I employ the North rather than Arab- Islamic North in my 
effort to detach the racial and cultural term Arab from Islam. I use the South to 
describe the collective regions of Upper Nile, Bahr el- Ghazal, and Equatoria.
race and religion in Modern sudan
In 2004, Makau Mutua stated that “race— not religion—is the fundamental 
fault line in Sudan, though religion has certainly added fuel to the fire in 
the south. Indeed, since in de pen dence from the British in 1956, the demon 
of Sudan has been race.”40 Some have noted that several historical  factors 
inform the importance of Arabism (and race more generally) in the North. 
Arab-African antagonism can be traced to the Turco- Egyptian period, when 
Arab nomads allied with the Egyptian army and government to mount 
raids to find slaves for military and domestic use.41 Northerners crafted ra-
cial ideologies favoring Arabs over Africans, defining who could be  free and 
who could be enslaved, as some developed genealogies that allowed them 
to claim Arab descent.  These stipulations  were racially defined, as Arab an-
cestry defined freedom while  those with darker skin or who adhered to in-
digenous beliefs  were connected with servitude. Amir Idris has maintained 
that racialized states transformed the cultural identities of Arab Muslim 
North and African Christian indigenous religious South into po liti cal iden-
tities through precolonial slavery, colonial indirect rule, and postcolonial 
state- sponsored Arabization and Islamization. Arabism and Islam became 
foundational to the northern- based nationalism of the postcolonial Suda-
nese state.42
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How, then, did race inform South Sudanese understandings of the 
po liti cal circumstances that they had to confront, circumstances largely 
precipitated by Eu ro pean and Arab actors? This study employs a conceptu-
alization of race most closely aligned with the work of Christopher Lee, who 
notes that “race is understood to be a marker, as well as a phenomenological 
schema— a structure of thought for explaining the world. Race is irreduc-
ible to any single context or explanation— what Ann Laura Stoler has called 
its polyvalent mobility— with each of the aforementioned issues carry ing 
historical and pedagogical significance.”43 For many in South Sudan, race— 
principally Arab and black/African— marked ruler and ruled, favored and 
marginalized, and, in the spiritual sense, oppressor and oppressed.44 This 
study not only shows how racial and religious rhe toric was often blurred 
but also explores how Sudanese Christians acted as racial architects, fash-
ioning race through a crucible that allied racial with spiritual identity and 
difference. By looking at the role of African Christians in the formation of 
racial thought, my focus differs from  those who have looked to the role of 
missions in this regard. Derek Chang once went so far as to note that the 
mission proj ect “made race” through a language of religion, culture, nation, 
and transformation, and  because of the perceived centrality of the colonial 
state in the history of race and racism, scholars have noted ways in which 
missions  were involved in the construction and implementation of racial 
and ethnic proj ects.45 While missionaries  were involved in maintaining 
ethnic bound aries, my study shows that Sudanese Christians, long  after the 
condominium period, employed biblical idioms and theology when describ-
ing ele ments of a racial conflict. They  were racial and religious thinkers 
outside the mission context.
In this vein, Chosen  Peoples builds on studies that have discussed indig-
enous thinkers fashioning racial thought before, during, and  after the colo-
nial period. Africans  were innovative in their understanding and navigation 
of colonial rule’s racially fraught environment. Rather than merely receiv-
ing imposed ideas, be hav iors, and vocabularies from the colonial state, they 
had precolonial practices of organ ization and self- identification and  were 
able to transform racial ideologies during and  after the colonial period for 
their own purposes.46 I examine South Sudanese thinkers who blended racial 
and religious thought to articulate solidarity and distinction from North 
Sudanese. While colonialism played a role in institutionalizing and policing 
the Arab-African divide, I am most concerned with southerners and their 
differing responses to northerners, Arabs, Islam, and the prospect of po liti cal 
unity with or separation from the North.
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Given my argument that southern nationalist thinkers largely perceived 
the liberation strug le as a racial conflict, the current explosion of ethnic 
politics demands serious consideration of ethnicity’s role in the interplay 
between race, religion, and politics in South Sudan. The potency of ethnic 
identity in the South amid a shared black identity sugests a limit to race’s 
ability to bind distinct cultural communities or implies that  people believe 
that ethnicity addresses certain questions, situations, or prob lems that race 
does not. In Citizen and Subject, Mahmood Mamdani makes the following 
inquiries concerning the nature of anticolonial nationalism and the roles of 
ethnicity and racial domination:
Rather than just uniting diverse ethnic groups in a common predicament, 
was not racial domination actually mediated through a variety of ethni-
cally or ga nized local powers? If so, is it not too  simple even if tempting 
to think of the anticolonial (nationalist) strug le as just a one- sided re-
pudiation of ethnicity rather than also a series of ethnic revolts against 
so many ethnically or ga nized and centrally reinforced local powers . . . 
was not ethnicity a dimension of both power and re sis tance, of both the 
prob lem and the solution?47
In one sense, South Sudanese ethnicities are vestiges of colonial power— the 
condominium government and missionaries  were determined to maintain 
indigenous cultures in the South, which explained their encouragement of 
vernacular language use in classrooms and for “Native Administration.”48 
In another sense, southern ethnicities are symbols of state resistance— 
the rebel splA relied on indigenous chiefs to or ga nize provisions and enlist 
young men and boys into its forces during the Second Civil War, and eth-
nicity played a key role in South Sudan’s postin de pen dence conflict (one 
headlined by the Dinka and Nuer).49
*  *  *
“Even if implausible to some,” writes David M. Gordon, “the spirits of the 
invisible world— including ancestors, nature spirits, God, the Holy Spirit, 
Jesus, and Satan— hold implications for realms of  human agency.” Rather 
than setting out to write a history of institutionalized religion in his In-
visible Agents: Spirits in a Central African History, Gordon frames his text as a 
history of the spirits understood to have influenced this world.50 While this 
study is not principally concerned with ancestors or nature spirits, Chosen 
 Peoples supports Gordon’s assertion concerning the spiritual implications 
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of  human agency and is not an orga nizational Church history. Rather, it 
is concerned with how South Sudanese understood Sudan’s fractious post-
colonial history as a spiritual chronicle: one in which  people represented 
God as an agent working on southerners’ behalf, portrayed Satan as work-
ing  behind the scenes, and invoked biblical pre ce dents to fit con temporary 
history. From the perspective of many South Sudanese Christians,  there was 
no clean demarcation between the natu ral and super natural in the quest for 
po liti cal liberation.
How did southerners use biblical language when describing themselves 
and their northern neighbors before 2011? How did they use theology to 
define and augment their efforts to achieve self- determination and sepa-
ration? Although R. O. Collins and Lilian Sanderson write about missions 
and education in their general histories of condominium- era Sudan,  these 
questions are largely unaddressed in  those studies. While Collins invites 
readers into the social environment that was Christian mission education, 
Chris tian ity and missions  were only ele ments, not the primary foci, of his 
condominium-focused monographs. His Shadows in the Grass, furthermore, 
concludes with 1956, eliminating the space to explore the mission proj ect’s 
postcondominium impact. Conversely, Lilian Sanderson’s voluminous study 
concerns both the condominium and early in de pen dence eras, but— like 
Collins— does not discuss exactly how southerners used the Bible for their 
own identity politics or sociopo liti cal action.51 Chosen  Peoples is unique in 
its chronology (beginning in the late nineteenth  century and ending in the 
twenty- first  century) and in its primary focus on how biblical literacy and 
faith informed sociopo liti cal action. I am interested in how southerners 
used their faith as a po liti cal technology. Beth Coleman once encouraged a 
contemplation of race as technology, an idea that shifted from biological 
and ge ne tic systems that dominated race’s definition  toward questions of 
technological agency (or the ways by which external devices help us navi-
gate the world).52 I propose that South Sudanese Christians put their religion 
to practical sociopo liti cal uses within the contexts of colonialism, in de pen-
dence, and civil wars.
Richard Gray once noted that religion in Africa has long been under-
stood to have po liti cal ele ments; it can legitimate the status quo, possess 
a prophetic dimension, provide a base from which to levy attacks against 
 those in power, and legitimate revolution.53 The Bible could be used to 
provide templates for action that Africans could implement in their par-
tic u lar contexts. David Chidester and Elizabeth Elbourne highlight how 
Africans wielded agency by reinterpreting the Bible to incorporate it with 
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established beliefs, using Chris tian ity to move within and against colonial 
regimes.54 Kikuyu readers and converts in colonial  Kenya supplied a gram-
mar and vocabulary for new popu lar politics; young  people, by identifying 
with biblical subjects,  were equipped to articulate anticolonial sentiments.55 
I continue in this vein of confirming the Bible’s dissident po liti cal utility in 
Africa by investigating how southerners used Chris tian ity to define them-
selves in relation to the North, criticize the government, script  futures, and 
forge new identities.
Scholarship on southern po liti cal and social history has taken disparate 
approaches to religion’s role in the conflicts between North and South 
Sudan. Rolandsen notes that anthropological studies on Sudan tend to 
focus on the local scene, following in Edward Evans- Pritchard’s footsteps. 
As studies from the Second Civil War explore how the conflict has affected 
local socie ties, much work on southern religious life and change during that 
war is consequently localized.56 Nonetheless,  there is a way to examine re-
ligious change at the local or ethnic level and link it to orga nizational uses 
of theology and the Bible at a wider, regional level. This study moves in this 
direction by focusing on the ways in which religious thought was and con-
tinues to be articulated by a host of actors in a range of print spaces. Rather 
than limiting my focus to a specific community or ethnic group, the actors 
in my study include mission students, clergy, politicians, and  others from a 
wide range of ethnicities.
arguMent
Chris tian ity was essential to the southern re sis tance strug le. A wide swath 
of South Sudanese actors employed Christian discourses, meta phors, and 
imageries in vari ous ways. Christian discourse was used to define the Arab 
Other and black/African Us; Chris tian ity was envisioned as a bond that 
could unify disparate ethnicities; songs and poems with biblical mes-
sages appeared outside devotional contexts within public, circulating 
print media. Christian print discourse not only provided a lexicon that en-
couraged an  imagined understanding of a South Sudanese nation but 
also, by positioning God as a God of the black and southern oppressed, 
Sudanese writers claimed him as being uniquely theirs and themselves as 
especially his.
And yet, without being confined to the Arab Muslim North versus black 
Christian South paradigm, religious thought has also been employed to ad-
dress interethnic relations among southerners. Within the last ten years, 
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the leaders of Sudan’s Catholic and Anglican communities have publicly 
stated that God created diversity and ethnicities.57 Taken together, the 
theologies presented in this study have broader relevance for discussions 
concerning the role of religion in po liti cal action and identity formation, 
the role of religion in the public sphere, and the use of religious thought to 
encourage inclusion and distinction.
*  *  *
“Religious identity,” wrote Lamin Sanneh, “is one form of self- understanding 
among many, such as gender, class, or race, and where religion cuts across 
multiple forms of identity, as it does in Sudan, it can be a mobilizing force 
for good or for ill.”58 Francis Deng notes that religion has “become a sym-
bol of identity of power sharing, even of the management control of our 
resources, and certainly, of the culture that gives us our sense of who we 
are and to whom we relate . . . in the world. . . .  It has become the symbolic 
embodiment of all  these other issues we talk about.”59 Building off Sanneh, 
Deng, and Gray, this study offers an intimate look into just how Sudanese 
and non- Sudanese figures marshaled Chris tian ity to create and cut across 
identities, mobilize southerners in their wars against the North, and gov-
ern interethnic relationships. During each of the civil wars, South Sudanese 
lay and ecclesiastical thinkers used the Bible to find historical pre ce dents 
for their circumstances and a lexicon for re sis tance. In using the Bible to 
provide a script for liberation, they came to see themselves as a “chosen 
 people” destined for liberation like Old Testament Israel. While North Suda-
nese  were repeatedly— directly and indirectly— positioned with the biblical 
Egyptians, Babylonians, and other enemies of Israel, southerners crafted 
biblical oppressor- oppressed parallels along racial lines, resulting in the de-
monization of Arabs and the sacralization of black Africans.
The South Sudanese po liti cal strug le would have been diff er ent without 
Chris tian ity’s injection in several ways. First, an impor tant ele ment of the 
strug le’s righ teous moral positioning would have been lost. It is one  thing 
for a group to claim that its politics are superior to  those of another group; 
it is diff er ent when the group claims that its opponent is on the wrong side 
of a spiritual  battle between good and evil. As Joseph Taban’s quotation at 
the beginning of this chapter conveys, southerners gravitated to the Bible 
 because of its message of forthcoming glory. The Bible provided scripts at 
vari ous moments of the strug le that could provide hope when the outcome 
was uncertain.
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The concept of chosenness at the core of this study speaks to Chris tian ity’s 
importance for politics. Vari ous scholars have shown how modern national-
ist movements  adopted the idea of God’s chosenness (first experienced by 
the biblical Israelites). Chosenness has underscored and justified po liti cal 
actions and provided a spark for po liti cal and national liberation.60 South 
Sudanese appropriations of biblical Israel during the twentieth- century 
civil wars supports the idea that adopting a sense of chosenness remains a 
 viable po liti cal stratagem. And yet, South Sudan is a secular state (although, 
as Noah Salomon has written, the meaning of religious freedom in the new 
nation is debatable).61 Nevertheless, this study echoes Sanneh by contend-
ing that religious thought is enmeshed with the roots of the world’s newest 
secular state. This real ity speaks to the continued power and potential of re-
ligious discourse in the po liti cal sphere in South Sudan, Africa, and beyond.
This study’s relevance for studies of religion and politics beyond Sudan 
is illustrated by its engagement with certain biger questions. Ruth Mar-
shall posed impor tant queries in her study on Pentecostalism in Nigeria: 
Can religious revival be understood primarily as a response to material cri-
ses, a response to crisis in moral or symbolic regimes, or some combination 
of both? Why should solutions to crisis be sought in the religious theater? 
Marshall contends that if we invoke situations of material crises like social 
exclusion to explain religious revival, we see such movements in terms of 
their functionality—as modes of po liti cal combat or languages to translate 
and understand the real, among  others. While she acknowledges that reli-
gious movements can meet  these functions, Marshall asserts that they are 
insufficient as an explanation for con temporary religious revival and its po-
liti cal meaning.62 “Born- again Chris tian ity operates in Nigeria within a ter-
ribly crowded religious field. What sort of inquiry  will enable us to under-
stand why this par tic u lar form of religious practice develops  here and now, 
and uncover the secret of its remarkable success? What question(s) is Jesus 
 really the answer to?”63 My study asks similar questions for the Sudanese 
context. Why did this brand of po liti cal theology develop during this time 
of Sudanese/South Sudanese history?64 Was it a response to Islamizing gov-
ernment incursions or something  else? What did (and does) theology offer 
to southerners as a solution to experiences of war, exile, and racial- religious 
oppression?
It is my hope that this book can widen our understanding of how os-
tensibly secular spaces can be charged with impor tant religious meaning. 
During the Enlightenment, violent wars and dynastic strug les waged in 
religion’s name contributed to a shift of religion from the public to the 
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private sphere. One argument for this need rested in the belief that religion 
lives in the domain of passion and faith, a space in which rational argument 
and interest- guided action could not nor should have a place.65 During the 
1980s, however, religion entered the public sphere in several ways; reasons 
 behind this phenomenon included Iran’s Islamic revolution, Poland’s soli-
darity movement, and Protestant fundamentalism as an American po liti cal 
force.66 When discussing the Sudanese government’s efforts to create an 
Islamic state, Abdullahi A. An- Naʾim argues that whenever mono the istic 
creeds are conflated with government, they make citizens of their adherents 
but subjects of  those who do not follow that faith. Furthermore, efforts to 
make such creeds the basis of a civil order have resulted in vio lence through-
out history— more recently, in Sudan.67 Is the  union of religious and po liti-
cal thought the friend,  enemy, outgrowth, or foundation of secular states? 
Do religious proj ects and rhe toric carry empty dreams for forging national 
community or, conversely, have a legitimate—if not necessary— role in fos-
tering healthy, socially pluralistic states?
On the latter of  those questions, the religious discourse concerning eth-
nicities and ethnic conflict in this study has wider resonance beyond Sudan 
and Africa. How should one reconcile one priest’s comment that  there  were 
no longer ethnic separations between Dinka or Nuer— now all  were one in 
Christ— with another by the archbishop of Juba that tribes  were “gifts of 
God”?68 What does it mean when God is used in one breath to argue for 
cultural unity and, in another, for cultural diversity? Such a question has 
par tic u lar meaning in global contexts where interracial or interethnic rela-
tions are or have been fraught; the multiracial American church’s engage-
ment with the Black Lives  Matter movement pre sents an in ter est ing point 
of contrast, as  those who claim that “all lives  matter” based on humanity’s 
sharing God’s same image and likeness could run up against  those who high-
light God’s creative work in fashioning distinct tribes, tongues, and  peoples. 
Thus, the question of when one can or should reference God or scripture in 
encouraging unity, diversity, sameness, or difference has broader relevance 
way beyond South Sudan’s borders. Furthermore, the decision made by 
some condominium mission officials to pose ethnic conflict as a spiritual 
prob lem can be placed in conversation with other contexts in which certain 
social ills like racism, economic in equality, or war have been described or 
condemned in spiritual terms.69
Fi nally, one of this study’s most significant interventions in the field of 
Sudanese religious history is my contention that South Sudanese religious 
nationalism was essentially gendered. “One impor tant conceptual prob-
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lem,” write Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval- Davis, “concerns the danger of 
reifying the ‘nation’ and the ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ group, by treating them as to-
tally in de pen dent and separate and not considering how they intersect with 
other modes of differentiation such as class and gender.”70 To be sure, the 
connection between gender and Sudanese nationalism is evident. In North 
Sudan, the Anglo- Egyptian administration introduced modern education 
to develop government administrators and  those who could run the cotton 
schemes. The male educated class led Sudan’s nationalist movement (and, 
along with sectarian leaders, led the postcolonial state), and mostly male 
elites from Central and North Sudan dominated the military regimes and 
demo cratic governments that have ruled the country since 1956.  These dom-
inant groups defined the nation’s identity as Arab and Islamic, and— given 
that condominium administrators defined the public sphere as male— the 
ruling social group was exclusively composed of men. Nada Ali notes that 
while much has been written on how condominium rule created regional 
disparities in the country, few have focused on colonialism’s gender- specific 
impact on Sudanese  women and men. She contends that the politics and re-
sis tance discourses of Sudanese and South Sudanese  women’s organ izations 
in exile (particularly in Egypt and  Kenya in the 1990s and early 2000s) offer 
the chance to examine how intersections of gender and other identities 
shape  women’s and men’s experiences of oppression and re sis tance.71
This study of religious thought is largely about men— men who taught at 
an elite mission school and their male pupils; men who wanted to halt the 
spread of Islam up the Nile by creating a military regiment; men who fash-
ioned a liberatory theology in exile during the 1960s; men who expressed 
a martial theology in the splA newspaper in the 1990s; male soldiers, cler-
ics, refugees, students, and a host of other intellectuals who infused reli-
gion into their racial and regional politics. The rich— though heavi ly male- 
authored— print media contained in the archives I visited over the course of 
this research informs this male focus and, by association, the gendered na-
ture of the thought examined  here. As predominantly male contexts must 
not mean the absence of gender, this book shows that masculinity courses 
throughout this study, from the militaristic uniform and sporting activities 
encouraged at the all- male Nugent School (including the Boy Scouts) to 
the par tic u lar biblical figures and narratives that writers referenced and the 
specific groups tabbed for the purposely un- Islamic Equatorial Corps.
Citing Judith Butler as inspiration, Alicia Decker writes that she sees 
gender “not only as an intentional act that illuminates the agency of social 
actors but also as a performative act that creates identity.”72 In her study 
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of  women, gender, and militarism in Idi Amin’s Uganda, Decker contends 
that new constructions of masculinity and femininity emerged from mili-
taristic practice and acknowledges that militarism is particularly common 
within socie ties that have experienced military coups.73 This book pivots 
from Decker by looking at how gender informed religious thought and per-
for mance just north of Uganda, in a South Sudan that has been rife with 
military conflict for the better part of the last half- century. My argument 
that religious thought was a crucible through which racial identity was de-
fined is coupled with my contention that militarism cannot be separated 
from the development and substance of southern religious nationalism. 
The real ity that many of the religiously infused po liti cal views expressed in 
circulating print media  were not only classed (elite) and raced (black) but 
also gendered reflects the exclusive nature of who possessed power, public 
platforms, and privileges.
chapter Breakdown
In the early twentieth  century— the infancy of the condominium period— 
the Church Missionary Society (Cms) established mission schools in South 
Sudan. Of all the educational institutions it founded, the Nugent School 
stood out from the rest. Chapter 1, “The Nugent School and the Ethno- 
Religious Politics of Mission Education,” provides insight into the life and 
legacy of the Nugent School. The school illustrates several impor tant ele-
ments of the South Sudanese mission enterprise that relate to the broader 
narrative of Christian and ethnic politics in the region. First, it was founded 
to assist in halting the spread of Islam up the Nile. Second, efforts  were 
made at the school to uphold ethnic identities. Third, the presence of eth-
nic conflict  there and at other mission sites highlighted the tension be-
tween efforts to protect diverse social identities and encourage a common 
Christian identity. This dynamic leads to the fourth and final point: the 
idea that ethnic conflict was a spiritual prob lem that Chris tian ity could 
(and should) conquer.
On August 18, 1955, the Equatorial Corps at Torit staged a mutiny. The 
Torit mutiny was a defining moment in South Sudanese self- determination, 
an event that has been commonly, albeit inaccurately, used to mark the 
beginning of the First Civil War. Using sources that include private corre-
spondences, unpublished memoirs, interviews, and court documentation, 
chapter 2 discusses the  causes, conduct, and consequences of the Torit 
mutiny. The mutiny was not only an emancipatory action to prevent the 
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history of past enslavement from repeating itself; it was also a moment in 
which members of the corps— a unit created against the backdrop of the 
Egyptian Army’s presence and Islamizing tendencies— rejected an order to 
be sent North and replaced by northern soldiers. While Christian feeling 
was not the primary impetus  behind the mutiny, Governor General Reginald 
Wingate had created the corps in an attempt to eliminate the military’s Is-
lamic culture. This sentiment is essential for understanding the mutiny as a 
moment when colonial religious visions had violent, separatist consequences, 
resulting in a widening chasm between North and South and closer  union 
between a diversity of southerners.
Chapter 3, “Liberation War,” examines the liberatory religious thought 
that emerged during the First Sudanese Civil War. Building off of Cone’s 
black theology and the Kairos document, the chapter explores the ways in 
which southern activists infused spirituality into the language of racial re-
sis tance, an impor tant development in the evolution of South Sudanese po-
liti cal thought. In addition to understanding their strug le against the state 
as a racial conflict pitting Africans against Arabs, activists also understood it 
as a spiritual contest. In this vein, figures like soldier Joseph Lagu and priest 
Paolino Dogale conceptualized southerners as a community defined not 
only by their racial and cultural identity but also by their favorable posi-
tion in a narrative of oppression and liberation.  These streams of thought 
encouraged the idea of an  imagined community united by race, politics, 
and spiritual experience; they also provide a lens into how southerners under-
stood their history and national identity at a moment of  great trial.74
Situated during the Second Sudanese Civil War, chapter 4 shows how 
editors and contributors to the SPLM/SPLA Update— the splm’s official 
newspaper medium— were creative intellectuals who sought to or ga nize a 
unifying account of events amid internal splits and factionalism. The Bible 
provided a foundation from which  people divided by language, politics, and 
ethnicity could envision themselves as sharing a common heritage through 
the lens of the ancient (and biblical) Kingdom of Cush. The chapter uses 
the Update, a propaganda form whose content had not been seriously exam-
ined  until my 2015 article of the same name, as a means to examine the roles 
of Chris tian ity and theology in splm/A ideology and politics.75 In  doing so, 
it shows the central role that the South Sudanese diaspora had in defining 
the conflict in spiritual terms.
Chapter 5, “The Troubled Promised Land,” is bookended by the end of 
the Second Civil War (2005) and the end of in de pen dent South Sudan’s 
internal conflict (2018). Less than three years into in de pen dence, South 
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Sudan found itself embroiled in an internal conflict drawn along ethnic 
lines. What became of the liberation theology that was supposed to reach its 
poetic conclusion with po liti cal sovereignty? While the conflict debunked 
any notion that southerners felt a sense of pan- Christian solidarity strong 
enough to subsume ethnicity or prevent ethnic tension, it also produced a 
dynamic crucible of religious thought. While the 2005–18 period was dis-
tinct for the efflorescence of ideas that appeared online, the notion that 
intergroup fighting was a spiritual “evil” and that uniting  under God was 
the solution to this prob lem recalled a similar train of thought conveyed 
during the condominium era. Though the traditional  enemy from the North 
was absent, religious thought still functioned as a po liti cal technology de-
spite the changed scope of who and what constituted us and them, good 
and evil, heroes and villains.
The conclusion reexamines the argument and offers implications of how 
the history presented confirms and challenges understandings of South 
Sudan’s liberation strug le, the role po liti cal theology may have for the 
nation moving forward, and how this narrative may shed light on religion’s 
role in the public sphere internationally.
1
The Nugent School and the  
Ethno- Religious Politics  
of Mission Education
O Lord Jesu Christ, Son of the Living God, Who art the brightness of the 
 Father’s glory, and the express image of His Person; the chief corner- stone 
hewn from the mountain without hands . . .  Strengthen this stone about 
to be laid in Thy Name; and . . .  be, we beseech Thee, the beginning, the 
increase, and the consummation of this our work, which is undertaken to 
the glory of Thy Name, Who, with the  Father, and the Holy Ghost liveth 
and reigneth, ever one God, world without end. Amen.
— Llewellyn Gwynne, February 7, 1904
Llewellyn Henry Gwynne was born in South Wales on June 11, 1863. His 
 father, Richard, was a village schoolmaster. According to his  sister, Llewellyn 
was ever the  family bad boy and mischief maker. Of superior build, Gwynne 
excelled at sports. Following ordination in 1886, Gwynne held a curacy at 
St. Chad’s, Derby, and stayed in that position  until 1890. Particularly profi-
cient at football, he played routinely for Derby County’s Association foot-
ball team and was the team’s only amateur. The team was one of  England’s 
best eleven at the time, and Gwynne played in an fA Cup semifinal match. 
Following his curacy at Derby, he served as curate at St. Andrews (Notting-
ham) and vicar of Nottingham’s Emmanuel Church.1
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Thousands of miles away from  England’s churches and football fields, 
epochal events  were taking place in the Sudan. In 1885, forces loyal to the 
Sudanese Mahdi killed Britain’s Charles Gordon during the Siege of Khar-
toum.  After an epic campaign, Herbert Kitchener led an Anglo- Egyptian 
army to the scene of the crime, ready for vengeance. On September 2, 1898, 
Kitchener’s forces bombarded Omdurman. By the end of the after noon, the 
Mahdist force commanded by the Khalifa Abdullahi had been decimated. 
A young war correspondent named Winston Churchill wrote that “thus 
ended the  battle of Omdurman— the most signal triumph ever gained by 
the arms of science over barbarians. Within the space of five hours the 
strongest and best- armed savage army yet arrayed against a modern Eu ro pean 
Power had been destroyed . . .  with hardly any difficulty.”2
A meeting was held at Exeter Hall the following May, where the hon-
orary secretary of the Church Missionary Society alluded to the possibility 
of evangelizing the Sudan in the near  future. “The words,” according to 
W. H. T. Gairdner, “came with a thrill which  those who do not remember 
the events of  those former years can hardly understand.”3 The honorary 
secretary shared that it was hoped that a party would be able to go up the 
Nile from Cairo in the autumn “to occupy some places in the equatorial 
provinces of the Eastern Sudan. The Committee anticipate that, in answer 
to many prayers, the existing interdict on missionary work among the 
Mohammedans of the Upper Nile  will shortly be removed.”4 Llewellyn 
Gwynne set sail for Sudan as a Cms missionary on November 3, 1899. He 
arrived in Khartoum just before the dawn of the new  century.5
Weeks  after Gordon’s death, the Church Missionary Society in London 
proposed the Gordon Memorial Mission to Sudan.6 The proj ect aimed to 
“perpetuate Gordon’s memory . . .  through the direct proclamation of 
the Gospel of Jesus Christ to all the races inhabiting the upper basin of the 
Nile.”7 The postwar Sudanese—or Anglo- Egyptian— government insisted 
that for a time no mission station be established north of the tenth parallel 
or in any other part or district that it recognized as Muslim. Kitchener denied 
Gwynne the right to perform mission work in the North, and Gwynne min-
istered instead to British soldiers and the small population of British civil-
ians in Khartoum. In 1904, Lord Cromer— Egypt’s consul general and chief 
architect of the new condominium— wrote to the Cms, inviting the society 
to extend its work into South Sudan.  After an appeal by the Cms Committee, 
a Gwynne- led party of six men was sent out in October 1905.8
Rev. Archibald Shaw was one of the men who departed with Gwynne. 
In his diary of October 17, 1905, Shaw notes that they left from London’s 
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Charing Cross Station at 9 Am: “A number of  people  were on the platform 
to see us off, among my own friends being . . .  Miss Nugent . . .  The train 
started suddenly & quite unexpectedly . . .  there was an undignified rush 
for the carriage, one by one we  were hauled in, and midst  great laughter & 
cheering, we  were fi nally started on our way.”9 Gwynne’s party sailed up the 
Nile and founded the Gordon Memorial Mission at Malek, in South Sudan. 
While Gwynne did not stay  there for long—he returned to Khartoum and 
was made its first bishop three years  later— one of the most impor tant ele-
ments of the work in South Sudan was a school named for one of his well- 
wishers at Charing Cross: the Sophia Nugent School.10
*  *  *
In the aftermath of the Mahdist War, the Anglo- Egyptian condominium 
government wanted to transform South Sudan into a buffer zone that could 
stem the spread of Arabism and Islam up the Nile. Against this backdrop, 
missionaries entered South Sudan. The Cms quickly established mission 
stations and schools, and in 1920 the most impor tant school of them all— 
the Nugent School— was founded. This chapter provides insights into the 
life and legacy of the Nugent School and the sociopo liti cal environment in 
which it operated.
Francis Deng notes that Christian education in the South fostered a 
new sense of identity that transcended ethnic loyalties and created a deep 
anti- North nationalist sentiment. He quotes politician and intellectual 
Bona Malwal, who remarked, “Southerners, at least  those who are edu-
cated, have come to live together in schools, have worked together and 
have shared some po liti cal objectives for which tribal differences  were 
played down to give an appearance of unity.” Malwal further stated that 
differences with the North “ were conceived as differences with Arabs, 
and  were therefore differences with an outsider.”11 Despite the notion that 
southerners downplayed ethnic differences in  favor of a unified anti- Arab 
sentiment, Christian missions  were involved in reinforcing ethnic identi-
ties and occasionally became sites of ethnic conflict. This real ity show-
cased an enduring question in South Sudanese society— the appropriate 
role of the church and Chris tian ity in transcending or reinforcing ethnic 
identity.
To this end, examining the Nugent School is illustrative of several impor-
tant ele ments of the South Sudanese mission enterprise. First, it was founded 
to assist in halting the spread of Islam up the Nile, a proj ect that was religiously 
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antagonistic, linguistically En glish, and gendered to produce masculine 
Christian “warriors.” Second, efforts  were made at the school to uphold eth-
nic identities. And yet, the presence of ethnic conflict at the Nugent School 
and other mission sites highlighted the tension between efforts to protect 
diverse social identities on one hand and a common Christian identity on 
the other. This dynamic leads to the final point: the expressed thought that 
ethnic conflict was a spiritual prob lem that Chris tian ity could (and should) 
conquer. Articulated in this chapter by mostly white mission officials, Su-
danese actors echoed similar ideas de cades  later in the Second Sudanese 
Civil War and South Sudan’s internal conflict of the 2010s. Thus, the con-
dominium era represented an early and impor tant moment where state and 
church/mission officials discussed the relationship between religious and 
social identity. Was Chris tian ity ultimately compatible with or antithetical 
to ethnicity? For several Christian officials, it was the very salve to ethnic 
conflict.
Before the British
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Islam became increas-
ingly allied to Sudanese po liti cal power. Po liti cal systems with nominal 
Islamic allegiance  were established in regions like Sinnar and Darfur, and a 
bevy of po liti cal shifts and socioeconomic conditions spurred the adoption 
of Arabic and Islamic culture in northern and western Sudan.12 Although 
the influx of Arabism and Islam did not eliminate the North’s linguistic, 
cultural, and ethnic diversity, a cultural unity was established in a man-
ner that was not replicated in the South. In addition to the fact that most 
northern Muslims claimed patrilineal descent from notable Arab ances-
tors, “in sharp contrast to Southern Sudan, it was comprehended within a 
single religious and cultural framework. Most  people north of the 13th par-
allel had by the 19th  century become Muslims.”13 In the early nineteenth 
 century, South Sudan had social and po liti cal systems ranging from the 
Shilluk and Azande kingdoms to the more egalitarian Nuer and Dinka 
structures. In a general sense, Nilotics— the Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk— 
compose the main group of southerners, along with other ethnic groups 
such as the Azande, Bari, and Latuko. Although many languages  were spo-
ken and religions practiced,  there is reason to believe that  these conditions 
did not result in ethnic isolation; on the contrary, groups had frequent con-
tact with one another.14
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Catholics largely executed pre- Mahdiya Christian missionary work in 
Sudan. In 1846 Pope Gregory XVI created the Vicariate Apostolic of Cen-
tral Africa, and Jesuit missionaries began working in the South in 1850. By 
1860, however, the Jesuits  were compelled to leave their Holy Cross and 
Gondokoro stations in part  because the Bari would only tolerate missionar-
ies if they proved to be sufficient trading partners in firearms and allies in 
war.15 The British and Foreign Bible Society started working in the country 
in 1866, but this proved to be a brief venture that resumed  after more than 
thirty years of inactivity. While only a small number of Muslims  were con-
verted during this initial period of mission work, the greatest impact was 
the establishment of a tangible Christian presence in Sudan (particularly 
among non- Muslim groups). The rise of Mahdism brought a violent end to 
this period of mission work.16
Bahr el- Ghazal, with its proximity to Kurdufan and Darfur (the epicen-
ter of the Mahdist rebellion), was the first South Sudanese province affected 
by the revolt. Mahdist agents could encourage groups of  people to revolt by 
capitalizing on lengthy widespread disgruntlement with the government. 
The Dinka, Nuer, and Shilluk felt no ties with the Arabs and joined the 
rebellion not for religious reasons or amity with northerners but rather to cast 
off an unpop u lar, oppressive government. During Emin Bey’s administration, 
Rumbek reverted to its role as the nucleus of raiding activity in the area, 
and Egyptian authorities exported ivory, tamarind, and Dinka “conscripts” 
to Khartoum through Mashraʿ al- Rek into 1883. The revolt of the Agar 
Dinka was the first disturbance in Equatoria linked with Mahdist influence. 
The Agar Dinka, encouraged by the successful uprising of Dinka groups in 
Bahr el- Ghazal and angry at raids that the mam’ur of Rumbek had made on 
them for slaves and  cattle, attacked the Rumbek garrison in July 1883 and 
destroyed the station. Throughout 1884–85, as Egyptian garrisons  were cut 
off from Khartoum, more southerners rebelled against the government.17
In his study of prophecy and Mahdism in the Upper Nile, Douglas John-
son examined Dinka and Nuer experiences with par tic u lar reference to sup-
posed links between Islam and African prophets. Johnson notes that the 
Dinka  were able to incorporate key names and figures from Sudanese Mus-
lim belief and practice into their own experience; one nineteenth- century 
Dinka hymn referenced the name Mahdi and integrated him into the order 
of divinities to whom the Dinka already prayed. “The Dinka and Nuer of 
the nineteenth  century,” he writes, “ were confirmed in their belief in the va-
lidity of their own religious life. The impact of the Mahdiyya on the Nilotic 
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heartland of the Upper Nile was far from benign. On the contrary, it left a 
legacy of conflict and confrontation.”18
 after the Mahdi
The British and Egyptian governments signed what became known as the 
Condominium Agreement in 1899. During the early stages, Egypt was for all 
intents and purposes a British protectorate and could not act unilaterally. 
While the Egyptian ruler could appoint the governor general, it would be 
done on the British government’s recommendation. The British, in effect, 
controlled the Sudan. Messianic movements in North Sudan continued 
to manifest but  were forcefully squelched. In southern Sudan, the British 
reopened the Nile channel and started to establish their control. While 
Mahdism no longer threatened the condominium by the 1920s, southerners 
tried to retain their in de pen dence, and groups like the Azande, Nuer, and 
Dinka levied armed re sis tance. The Nuer and Dinka  were led by prophets 
that claimed direct revelation from divinities. To appease Muslims and dis-
courage nationalistic fervor, the government restricted Christian mission-
ary activity to the South, where  there was a sparse Muslim population. The 
administration saw the utility of sending them South, where it encouraged 
mission organ izations to start mission schools and allowed them the right 
to evangelize.19
*  *  *
The Roman Catholics, Church Missionary Society, and United Presbyte-
rian Mission (also known as the American Mission)  were the most promi-
nent mission organ izations in southern Sudan during the condominium 
period. In 1904 a mission sphere of influence system was  adopted to re-
duce competition. Spaces of operation  were designated to each mission: 
the Roman Catholics worked along the White Nile’s western bank, with 
headquarters at Lul; the Cms operated in the Bahr el- Ghazal district and 
 were headquartered at Malek; the Sobat watershed was given to the Ameri-
cans, with their first station at Doleib Hill. The Lado Enclave became open 
for all missions. While mission work entailed Bible translation, education, 
medicine, and industrial work, evangelization was the overarching and 
unifying ele ment.20
The 1914–19 Annual Report for Egypt and the Sudan stated that though 
the Cms had established two or three district schools in Mongalla Province, 
The Nugent School and the Ethno- Religious Politics of Mission Education 29
it had not yet opened its central school, which had been planned for several 
years.21 One January 1918 report on Mongalla noted that
the need of a boarding school where the lads who  will in the  future be 
the chiefs and subordinate officials  under the Government can get an 
elementary education is very urgent, and C.M.S. has de cided to open 
one with the approval and support of the Government. . . .  This should 
prove a  great missionary opening; to give  these boys a Christian educa-
tion should influence the  whole district.22
encouraging chris tian ity
In 1919, Rev. C. A. Lea- Wilson was sent to launch a high school for the sons 
of chiefs and headmen. The Nugent School opened in the Bari village of 
Juba in 1920. Friends of the deceased Sophia Nugent contributed funds for 
the original building of Gordon Memorial Mission’s first boys’ high school. 
Sophia Nugent of Ken sington, with her two  sisters, had supported the Gor-
don Memorial Sudan Mission in the South for many years. Construction 
work began in January 1920 and comprised the building of a dwelling  house, 
school, church, workshop, and about twelve huts for boys. By August, ten 
circular huts each capable of housing four to five boys had been built.23 A 
1928 conference de cided to move the school to Loka in January 1929, and 
the move was made the following year. Located 3,000 feet above sea level 
and sixty miles from Rejaf, Loka contains a massive twin- peaked mountain 
that reaches a thousand feet high. Initially occupying temporary spaces, 
the new buildings— a hall, four classrooms, dorms, teachers’  houses, and a Eu-
ro pean house— were completed and occupied in 1933. Numerous improve-
ments and extensions  were subsequently made.24
“The school  will be quite an En glish one,” said Lea- Wilson. “En glish  will 
be the only language spoken, and all teaching  will be in En glish. The only 
other language pos si ble would be Arabic, but that would involve the danger 
of paving the way for Islam. The Government are moreover encouraging us 
to teach En glish.”25 Lea- Wilson’s statement concerning the dangers of Ara-
bic and the preference for En glish pointed to the school’s central mission. 
According to one Nugent School pamphlet, the institution was purposed 
to continue—in English— the education of male students who  were selected 
from each of the mission station schools. The ultimate vision was multi-
faceted: supplying the schools with teachers, building a Sudanese ministry, 
educating the sons of chiefs and other indigenous leaders, and providing 
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government departments with superior Sudanese assistants.26 More than 
 these aims, however, Lea- Wilson noted that the school was founded in an 
effort to confront Islam and stated as much before the New Alliance Club 
on December 8, 1922:
We  were sent  there three years ago . . .  so that we might do what is an in-
tensely impor tant  thing— try to forestall Islam. The Government is greatly 
hampered by the fact that in the Southern Sudan they have no educated 
 people, and they have to get officers for the troops and clerks for the Gov-
ernment officers from Khartoum, all of whom are Moslems. So the Govern-
ment asked us to start educational work in the Bari village of Juba, and 
they have given over all the educational work into C.M.S. Hands.27
In another instance he clothed this aim in martial Crusade- like imagery: 
“We hope to send out a flow of Christian young men, who  will carry the 
ideals of Christ wherever they go, & occupy posts some of which are at pres-
ent filled by Moslems. By such means  will we help to Christianize this part 
of Africa.”28
The school’s Christian mission was executed in several ways. The entire 
school met for prayers at 6 Am and 6 pm, and each morning’s work began 
with scripture. A short prayer preceded each class. Aside from prayers and 
scripture, the school’s Christian foundation was emblazoned on the school 
badge: a red Maltese cross.29 The origins of the eight- pointed Maltese 
cross have been long debated. The Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of 
St. John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta was founded in 1048 as a mo-
nastic order that ran a hospital to treat Christian pilgrims in the Holy Land. 
At the peak of its power, Rome commanded the order with the military 
responsibility to defend Christians from the local Muslim population. The 
cross is famously connected with the knights of Malta, with some believing 
that it did not appear  until  after a failed 1565 Turkish siege of Malta. Its eight 
points represent the Beatitudes, while the four arms  were believed to repre-
sent the virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice.30
The se lection of the Maltese cross as the school badge is particularly en-
lightening given that, as Heather Sharkey notes, some Britons in Sudan— 
particularly Cms missionaries— invoked crusader discourses during the turn 
of the  century. Anthropologist Janice Boddy writes that British officials 
in Sudan deemed themselves to be “knight administrators” and equated 
Chris tian ity with civilization.31 Although it is unclear  whether Lea- Wilson 
knew about the history of the Maltese knights, his comments following his 
acknowl edgment of the Maltese cross clearly took on a Chris tian ity versus 
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Islam tone: “We should not be ashamed of the Cross of Christ, particularly 
in this country which is  going to be Moslem  unless we bestir ourselves. We 
had to put the letters ‘J.H.S.’ under neath the Cross (Juba High School) and 
our hope is that one day  these boys  will realise that  those letters stand also 
for ‘Jesus the Saviour of the World.’ ”32
The Nugent School was home to religious organ izations that carried 
martial symbolism. According to Steven Wöndu, who entered the Loka 
Intermediate School in 1963, the Boys’ Brigade had been one of the Nugent 
School’s attractions during the condominium era. William Alexander Smith 
conceived of the idea for the brigade in Glasgow in 1883. While Wöndu 
described the Brigade in Scotland as “a zealous or even militant religious 
movement,” he continued that “its main appeal to us was the uniform, the 
marching band, and badges.”33  There was also the Crusader Bible class. Re-
vived at the Nugent School in 1948, the Crusader Bible class was voluntary 
and held on Sunday after noons. Boys could write letters or read Sunday 
books, and attendance was noted for growing each week. By May 1949  there 
 were reportedly 110–15 attendees each Sunday.34
In addition to the Crusaders, the Boy Scouts also had a presence at 
the school. When Helena Parry gave a picture of Thursdays—or “Club 
 after noon”— she described the scouts as spending time on the grass beyond 
the quad,  either playing or sitting  under the trees  doing patrol work. “They 
are all smart and clean as Scouts should be— they [wear] a white cotton neck-
erchief edged with their patrol colour, and this with their badge and shoul-
der tapes and ribbons, transforms their white school uniforms into ‘Scout 
uniform.’ ”35 Southern Sudan’s first- ever scoutmasters’ training course took 
place at Loka over the 1948 Christmas holiday. It was a diverse group of 
attendees, with Eu ro pe ans, Africans, and  those from vari ous Christian and 
non- Christian backgrounds.36 J. I. Parry recalled, “We sang carols in En-
glish, Italian, Zande, Dinka, Moru, yes, even Welsh! But apart from that we 
do rejoice that Scouting in the Southern Sudan should have started with a 
Course which proved from the start the real ity of the Scout Brotherhood of 
Nations based on Christian brotherhood.”37
General Sir Robert Baden- Powell conceived scouting to reduce Edwar-
dian class tensions and improve the quality of potential military recruits. 
Transplanted to Africa by British administrators, missionaries, and  others, 
colonial youth experts worked with scout officials and looked to promote 
docile masculinity. “Baden- Powell and the found ers of Scouting,” writes 
Timothy Parsons, “ were consciously aware that they  were promoting a spe-
cific form of masculinity over a range of less desirable masculine identities. 
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In their eyes, manliness meant physical courage, patriotism, stoicism, chiv-
alry, and sexual continence.” In the scout uniform— modeled on that of the 
South African Constabulary, a paramilitary force Baden- Powell raised and 
commanded following the Anglo– South African War—he tried to create 
a strong socializing instrument that would become an attractive recruit-
ing device, establish the scout’s elite status, and blur class distinctions. In 
colonial Africa, where Western styles of dress conveyed respectability and 
sophistication, the scout uniform had greater impact. While the scout uni-
form brought prestige, membership was relatively low; by the 1950s, all of 
Anglophone Africa boasted approximately one hundred thousand regis-
tered African Boy Scouts.38
The real ity of scouting at the Nugent School illuminates several ele ments 
of that institution’s work. To begin, it illustrated the elite nature of the 
Nugent School, within not only South Sudan but British Africa. The scout 
uniform (along with the Nugent uniform) can be read as a visual symbol 
of social unity, the sublimation of potentially distinct ethnicities  under an 
alternative, more ecumenical identity. Fi nally,  there was the gender dynamic 
at play that was inseparable from con temporary religious politics. Scouting 
exposed students to a par tic u lar model of masculinity, one linked to martial 
identity through the uniform.  Whether through the scout uniform or the 
Nugent School’s appropriation of the Maltese cross, this gender proj ect was 
conducted in a Christian educational setting. Given the increasingly martial 
tone that missionary rhe toric took  after World War II— one framing Chris-
tian work in Sudan as a race against time against an ensuing Arab Muslim 
takeover— the Nugent School became, in a sense, an impor tant locus in the 
“war against Islam” as a site that prepared Christian “soldiers.”39
Comments from Ian Watts in 1949 illustrate this paradigm. Watts noted 
that Nugent School boys would no longer go to Ugandan Christian institu-
tions to continue their education but instead went to the new government 
secondary school in Dinka country and then to Khartoum’s Gordon College. 
In addition to this change, more southern officials  were being sent north to 
receive more training for higher government posts. Watts saw the spiritual 
potentialities that  were being opened up: “What a chance  there is for them,” 
he wrote, “to take the Gospel of Jesus Christ to Islam, and what a challenge to 
us to send boys out from this School who  will be convinced, enthusiastic and 
knowledgeable Christians with a personal faith in the living Christ which  will 
lead them to witness fearlessly in life and speech, cost what it may!”40
The gendered— and uneven— mission enterprise in South Sudan during 
the condominium era is also evident in the demographics and nature of 
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girls’ education. At the outbreak of World War I, the Catholics— whom Rob-
ert Collins termed “the most agressive” of the three Christian missionary 
socie ties working in the South— had 557 boys in nine elementary schools and 
246 girls in four elementary schools (statistics, he claimed, that  were clearly 
inflated).41 While boys  were taught a craft like carpentry or bricklaying (or 
given clerical training), girls  were taught needlework and  music. Collins else-
where noted that girls’ education in the South was not central to the South’s 
educational development. In March 1939 the government and Cms appointed 
a commission, composed of a Miss N. E. Ainley and Mrs. M. C. Warburton, 
to examine, report, and make recommendations on southern girls’ educa-
tion. The report was apparently not too encouraging: indigenous customs 
and older missionaries’ prejudices posed obstacles. Ainley and Warburton 
ultimately concluded that given the lack of resources, education should be 
closely incorporated with the life girls would lead in southern socie ties.42
*  *  *
Linguistic work— a crucial ele ment of South Sudanese education— was the 
work of cultural translation. Lamin Sanneh and Andrew Walls have noted 
that Protestant missionaries’ evangelistic strategy was built on the premise 
that missionaries build on, rather than supplant, the old religion. Driven 
by Paul’s discourse on the “Unknown God” in Acts 17, “Protestant mis-
sionaries set out to identify, name, and preach about unknown Gods . . . 
they established the architecture of the old religion and related the new 
Christian religion to the vernacular vocabulary.”43 The Dinka had a story of 
the founding of their religious belief and practice that corresponded with 
certain ele ments of Christ’s birth, his early  career, and the authority that 
the apostles inherited at his Crucifixion. Understandings of a high god, 
sin, sacrifice, blood redemption, and God’s forgiveness  were also central to 
Dinka religion.44 Nhialic became the Dinka word missionaries translated as 
“God.” The term is often used to refer to the Dinka “supreme being” and 
comes from a form of nhial, which refers to “sky,” “above,” or “up.” Nhialic is 
considered to be just and all- powerful, with similar attributes to the Chris-
tian God. Dinka accepted Nhialic as the creator of all worldly  things and a 
universal being capable of providing blessing and suffering.45
Francis Deng contends that Christian missions’ primary objective among 
the Dinka was seen in traditional terms as the pursuit of wei, which in its verb 
form means “to breathe,” and as a noun, “breath,” and requires supreme 
moral and physical well- being. The premise was that the Dinka, before 
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Catholic education,  were immersed in darkness or emptiness that was 
hazardous to wei. Catholic teachings  were guaranteed to provide the solu-
tion and path to salvation. Dinka ideas of wei, which focused particularly 
on personal and collective well- being in this world,  were combined to entail 
a new idea that joined the Dinka understanding of health with the Christian 
princi ple of ultimate survival in the spiritual sense.46
encouraging ethnicity
The first students  were admitted to the Nugent School in July 1920. The 
first four boys arrived in August, and approximately forty boys  were en-
rolled by October. While the Bari  were most heavi ly represented, the early 
student body was a diverse lot; in November 1920 the school had Acholis, 
Madis, Dinka, Nyangwara, Kuku, and one Lotuho.47 At one point thirty- six 
languages and dialects  were spoken at the school. In late 1920, Lea- Wilson 
reported that each student understood  either Bari, Acholi, or Dinka. En glish 
was taught through  these languages and some Arabic, which was used as 
 little as pos si ble and was hoped, at some point, to be dropped completely. By 
1922 the director of education in Khartoum supported the Nugent School’s 
efforts to teach En glish.48 The move to Loka did not change the school’s 
diverse demographic. According to one 1949 description,
 There are the tall, slim, jet black Dinka and Nuer boys, whose tribes are 
 great  cattle  owners . . .  there are the Zande boys, short and stocky, and 
lighter coloured, whose parents live a predominantly agricultural life . . . 
we have the sturdily- built Moru boys from the Lui district, while the boys 
from the many Bari speaking tribes around the Juba area are variable in 
size . . .  and their  people are both pastoral and agricultural. So the pupils 
in our School differ very widely in race, language, customs, background 
and outlook.49
 After attending village school for two years and primary school for three, 
about five boys from each ethnic area  were chosen each year to attend Loka 
to be trained to lead their communities as agriculturalists, teachers, admin-
istrators, and the like.50
The 1928 Rejaf Language Conference spurred several impor tant develop-
ments. The conference supported the introduction of vernacular languages 
in elementary schools. Six languages— Bari, Dinka, Nuer, Lotuho, Shilluk, 
and Zande— were chosen to be used in southern vernacular education. 
J. G. Matthew, secretary for education and health (among other areas), 
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announced that En glish would replace Arabic as the South’s official lan-
guage, while southern colloquial Arabic was rejected in  favor of En glish and 
local vernaculars as administrative languages.51 Insulating the South from 
the proliferation of Arabic was part of the government’s stated plan in Janu-
ary 1930 to “build up a series of self contained racial or tribal units with 
structure and organisation based . . .  upon indigenous customs, traditional 
usage and beliefs.”52 That month the civil secretary wrote a memorandum 
that explained the “Southern Policy,” which aimed to restrict the number 
of northern and Arab traders and administrators in the South. The ultimate 
purpose in  doing so was to encourage the development of an indigenous 
administration and leadership in the South, dividing Sudan into northern 
and southern administrative principalities (native administration was in 
fact applied in the northern provinces  earlier than in the South). Although 
the continued work of Muslim and Arab traders and British reliance on 
northern/Egyptian officials mitigated the policy’s effectiveness, southern 
education shifted  toward the use of vernacular languages and En glish as 
mediums of instruction within a Christian framework.53
One of the most intriguing areas in which religious and linguistic proj-
ects merged was in the area of naming. By June 1933 A. G. Hickson, resident 
inspector of education for the southern provinces, had noticed that the 
Wau Catholic Mission was using the En glish forms of Christian names “as 
far as pos si ble.” Opining that he did not like many of the Christian names 
that Catholic converts  were given, Hickson continued that “they must, 
by Mission rule, [be] given saints’ names many of which are strange to us.” 
Not  limited to the Catholic purview, Cms converts chose a biblical name 
of their liking; however, the Cms apparently prioritized the vernaculariza-
tion of Christian names. Hickson opined that the Italian (Catholic) Mission 
should vernacularize the spelling of Christian names as the Cms did and 
avoid adopting the En glish forms. Insisting that official correspondences 
list indigenous and Christian names, he questioned the utility of addressing 
“Southern employees by their christian names to the exclusion of their na-
tive names.”54 According to this school of thought, conversion to Chris tian-
ity did not have to mean disavowal of one’s cultural heritage.
*  *  *
Competition was one way unity was encouraged at the diverse Nugent 
School. In J. B. de Saram’s 1945 report from the school, he noted his per-
ception that competing  there was beneficial for fostering unity. De Saram 
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wrote that for twenty- five years, Moru had competed against Dinka and 
Nuer against Zande, resulting in members of  those groups liking and under-
standing one another and forming strong friendships. This kind of rapport, 
he concluded, laid the foundation for mutual trust and understanding across 
tribes.55  There  were sports and  house/inter house competitions, and activities 
like the  Table Games Club and Debating Club. On one occasion the school 
was divided into “tribal groups” and a game or ga nized with the goal of making an 
illustrated primer in  every vernacular language.56 On occasion the situation 
devolved into fighting. Interethnic football was or ga nized along  house lines 
“between pupils as diff er ent as Greeks and Icelanders,” but  these matches 
had to be temporarily abandoned  because of their ferocity.57
The training of indigenous teachers was seen as a crucial ele ment in en-
suring students’ connections with their community and culture. Hickson 
noted that  children should be taught to value and enrich their heritage 
rather than to despise it, and that this could not be done if teachers had lost 
touch with their  people.58 The Catholic Messenger was an educational fort-
nightly newspaper that was published near Wau, in Bahr el- Ghazal. Founded 
in 1932, its ethnographic agenda can be gleaned from titles of articles that 
appeared in the 1930s and 1940s:
Fr. S. Santandrea, “Southern Sudan Folklore— The Bongo in the Central 
District (Wau) of the B.G.P.” (June 1934)
Fr. E. Mason, “Southern Sudan Folklore— A Shilluk Fable” (Feb.– Mar. 1937)
Jerome Bidai, “Tribal Investigation— To the Zande Readers” (Mar. 1942)
Fr. C. Brogini, “The Belanda” (May 1946)
Joseph Ayok, “Dinka Education” (Dec. 1947)
Mathew L. Jambite, “Notes on Moru Customs” (Sept. 1948)59
*  *  *
In a May 1946 article, “The Controversy over the Belanda,” E. Mason discussed 
the Belanda language and race: “The two Belandas do not belong to one race; 
they belong to entirely diff er ent racial groups: the Sudanic and the Nilotic.”60 
He continued to explain that the Bviri language was akin to the Ndogo but 
still retained words revealing their Bor origin. The name used for God (or 
Spirit) was Joki (similar to the Luo- Shilluk Juok) rather than the Ndogo equiv-
alent Mbiri, which is closer to the Zande Mbori. In 1946 Mason invited African 
readers to provide input on a controversy over  whether the Bor belonged to 
the Nilotic race and  others to the Sudanic, Ndogo- speaking race. Messenger’s 
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ethnic- centric focus was coupled with other missionaries’ devotion to the 
study of South Sudanese history, religion,  music, and traditions.61
Dictionaries produced during the condominium era not only  were mis-
sionary attempts to transform vernaculars into conduits for Christian rev-
elation but also provide insight into how missionaries sought to fashion 
po liti cal subjectivities.62 Perhaps the most illustrative dictionary during the 
condominium period was  Father J. Kigen’s 1948 Nuer- English Dictionary. A 
missionary for the St. Joseph’s Society for Foreign Missions, Kigen’s defini-
tions provide a compelling view into the way one missionary text sought to 
define ethnic, racial, and po liti cal identities. Defining rool as “country,” he 
used ethnic lands (Rool Naath, TƐat = Nuer, Shilluk country) as illustrative 
examples. Mulki signified “Arab,” and Kigen often included Arabs in defini-
tions connoting difference and oppression. For example, with LƐƐiƐ (“dis-
avow,” “disown,” or “do not mix”) came the phrase “the Arabs and the Nuer 
 don’t mix,” and with PƐƐiƐ (to rob, plunder, take by force, carry off ) came 
“the Turks draged away the Nuer by force in times gone by.”63 The Dinka 
also occupy a noteworthy place in Kigen’s illustrative examples.  Under the 
very definition of Dinka (Jaŋ) came the phrase Cì jin a jaŋ (You are not a 
Dinka), an unabashed declaration of Nuer- Dinka difference. This presump-
tion of difference was reinforced in the illustration given for the genealogical 
term LoƆth (race, descent, generation, group), which referred to the Dinka 
race. In the description for PƐƐiƐ (to rob, plunder, take by force) the dictio -
nary includes the descriptive phrase “my  cattle  were stolen by Dinka.” Dinka 
 were further placed in an antagonistic position in the description of the 
word Mud, the noun for “spear” (and a war spear in par tic u lar), among other 
definitions. Kigen’s dictionary paired this term with the associated phrase 
“they went to war with the Dinka.”64 Nuer readers, then, would have been 
exposed to associations of Arabs and Dinka in definitional descriptions of 
social/racial difference and predatory be hav ior. Kigen’s dictionary was a 
pedagogical resource that defined ethnicities and behaviors. Rather than 
trying to denounce or minimize the importance of ethnic identities, Kig-
gen’s text went  to great lengths to express a calculated understanding and 
confirmation of them.
ethnic conflict, spiritual solution
Despite the effort to cultivate unity,  there  were tangible markers of division 
at the Nugent School. John Parry, Cms teacher at Yambio, wrote a letter 
from Loka intimating that lack of a lingua franca was an obstacle to achieving 
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social cohesion among the student body. He noted that their knowledge 
of En glish was not strong enough to bind them together as a social unit, 
leading them to revert to vernaculars once they left the classroom. He also 
decried the fact that they did not mix and instead broke off to eat, talk, 
and make friends within their own ethnic groups.65 Headmaster G. F. Earl 
opined that ethnic strife at the school was rooted not in the student body 
but rather in the makeup of the faculty. In 1945 the Sudanese staff consisted 
of four Moru, one Madi, and one Kakwa, and Earl attributed the imbalanced 
composition of Moru as “a big disadvantage” during a Dinka- Moru fight, 
“which might have been averted entirely had  there been a Dinka teacher.” 
He continued that the Nuer, who used to be implicated in almost  every in-
terethnic fight,  were peaceful throughout the year, and that when the afore-
mentioned fight occurred, they acted as peaceful patrols  until the tension 
subsided. He attributed their pacific change to a teacher from Nasir, leading 
him to conclude that “clearly the solution to the periodic Nilotic outbreaks 
of fighting is the presence on the staff of respected leaders of their own 
tribes. Efforts should be made to recruit a properly balanced staff as soon as 
the teachers are available.”66 According to a 1948 report from Ian Watts, the 
school’s ethnic diversity meant that conflict was not altogether surprising. 
“This year,” he wrote, “all lived, worked and played together in peace. This 
in itself is remarkable and has not always been true. Tribal divisions and 
even fights in the school have in the past been serious, but we can thank 
God that this year has been a happy and successful one.”67 The following 
year, however, John Parry expressed that helping the boys become Sudanese 
rather than members of tight- knit tribal entities was a big prob lem. This had 
to be overcome, he continued, so that they could be challenged to do more 
for their own  people (as co- nationals).68
One quarrel between boys of diff er ent ethnicities— though not at Loka— 
sheds light on how spirituality was injected into conversations concerning 
ethnic conflict. Writing from Obel in June 1954, Rev. W. B. Adair noted that 
a fight that had occurred “in spite of the fact that all older boys are living in 
four ‘color’ groups irrespective of tribes . . .  the  matter is not entirely settled 
 after 8 days.” The fight, according to Adair, could have been avoided if a 
teacher had not been drinking. Adair sustained a cut to his leg in his attempt 
to pry a spear from one of the combatants.69 The following month, an un-
named writer wrote to Reverend Adair and expressed regret over the inci-
dent. Conveying the hope that peace had been restored, the writer added 
that “if they can learn to live together harmoniously, it  will be a real witness 
to the influence of Christ in their lives.”70
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Another fight occurred at Akot in November 1948, compelling another 
statement linking spirituality with fighting. Oliver Allison was at the center 
of the events and provided a detailed account of the scrum. The son of an 
En glish clergyman, Allison was ordained in 1932 and,  after joining the Cms, 
arrived in Sudan in 1938. Accepting an assignment in Juba, he had by 1947 
been appointed assistant bishop in the Sudan.71 Allison recounted that he 
had traveled to Akot, where he had heard that  there had been issues with 
the head teacher. One of the Bor Dinka teachers in training had married 
a  woman that the other teacher—an Agar Dinka— had himself wanted to 
marry. Conscious of an “under lying unrest” on his arrival, Allison woke up 
on a Saturday morning and prepared for a confirmation ser vice. It did not 
happen. “On the eve ning  after prayers,” he wrote, “the spiritual germs of 
evil got the better of the situation, and the devil entered into the head- 
teacher.” The head teacher had words with a Bor teacher, which led to a tus-
sle.  Later on he tried to start a massive brawl by leading the Agar schoolboys 
and  others he could find against the Bor. Allison and  others  were informed 
in time to prevent the quarrel and took actions, with the assistance of some 
teachers and  others, to prevent another incident. The following morning, 
Allison de cided to have a meeting “of all the Christians on the station” in 
an attempt to put  things in order before deciding  whether to continue with 
the confirmation and other ser vices. “All seemed quiet,” he wrote,
 until shortly before the time due the unmistakable clash of clubs was 
heard. By the time we had arrived on the scene a serious fight had devel-
oped, and  there was even a threat of spears being used. Young teachers 
and  others who  were normally peaceful and happy . . .  were “seeing red” 
and blood was beginning to flow. In the providence of God we  were able 
to intervene and stop the fighting, but not before the ring- leader had a 
fractured skull and other bad wounds.
Rather than holding the confirmation, Allison had to rush to the nearest 
hospital with  those who had sustained the worst injuries. “If only as a result 
the Christians can be led to see the sin and folly of such actions,” he opined, 
“and the disgrace that they bring to the Christian Church, good may yet 
come out of it. Such events are not a good advertisement of the need of the 
full Gospel of salvation for  these  people, and of the futility of a nominal 
adherence to the Christian faith.”72
Fifteen teachers and teacher trainees  were thrown in prison. “ Those who 
assembled in March, 1949,” wrote J. B. de Saram, “came very much with their 
tails between their legs, but not all of them.” Before the term had completed 
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a month, two teachers  were once again involved in a fight. Each was imme-
diately terminated.  After outlining the trou bles that Akot had experienced, 
de Saram framed the recent disturbances through a spiritual lens. “The start-
ing point of a religious revival is a sense of sin,” he wrote. “The Abalokole 
movement in East Africa calls it being ‘broken’— broken in spirit. . . .  You 
must be ‘broken’ before anything can happen. Well, we felt pretty ‘broken’ 
at Akot.” Noting that remorse was not enough nor the same as a sense of sin, 
de Saram wrote, “We began, therefore, by realising that Akot’s sad plight was 
due to sin. Hatreds and feuds may be part and parcel of normal Dinka life, 
but for a Christian they are sins.”73
Allison’s and de Saram’s framing of the Akot clash in spiritual terms was 
echoed in some sense at the Nugent School. Parry sugested that only 
Christ’s power could deal with the situations they had encountered at Loka, 
and that the economic, po liti cal, and moral instruction the boys received 
would be for naught if their hearts  were not surrendered to Christ.74 De 
Saram described an incident in which a Nuer chief, having compiled an ex-
cellent rec ord in school, became the target of a vengeful Dinka. The Dinka 
eventually brought charges against him in Teacher’s Court, and the chief 
was found guilty on one count and punished. Nonetheless, “the Nuer,  after 
his beating, asked to remain  behind, knelt down, and prayed for the Dinka, 
that he might not hate him but win him for Christ.”75
The spiritualization of the aforementioned intergroup conflicts marked 
an impor tant development. For Allison, the fighting was not rooted in jeal-
ousy but, rather, could be traced to “spiritual germs of evil” and the dev il’s 
influence on the head teacher. Conversely, providence, according to Allison, 
was responsible for allowing them to stop a fight. Similar to Allison’s conten-
tions, for de Saram the conflict was not just wrong but sinful. The solution was 
deep repentance and a “true” adherence to the faith. De Saram’s description 
of the Nuer chief ’s desire to convert his Dinka accuser further highlights 
the positioning of Chris tian ity as a solution to conflict. Taken together, 
Allison’s and de Saram’s letters position ethnic conflict as a spiritual dilemma 
that Chris tian ity could conquer.
While  there is no indication that  those men believed that ethnicity itself 
was a prob lem that had to be done away with, the Messenger newspaper pub-
lished an article— adapted from Ruru Gene— that presented Chris tian ity as 
a community of belonging that should replace ethnicity. Tacisio Migido, a 
teacher at the Mupoi Normal School, wrote, “You should leave charms alto-
gether. Pagans  will find some excuse in their utter ignorance. . . .  But what 
reasonable excuse can a Christian have? The custom of your tribe? . . .  now 
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your new tribe is chris tian ity, and  unless you are born again . . .  you  will not 
be able to enter Heaven.”76  There is the inference that one’s ethnicity is as 
exchangeable as religion; just as one can convert into or out of Chris tian-
ity, one can just as easily join or leave an ethnicity. Despite his use of the 
terms pagan and charms, tribe is not employed as antithetical to Chris tian-
ity; rather, Chris tian ity—as a community of belonging—is itself understood 
as being tribal. Thus, while Migido establishes an understanding that one 
must depart from the ignorance of pagans and charms and be born again, 
he does not associate Chris tian ity as a progression from being “ethnic” or 
“tribal”; on the contrary, he positions Chris tian ity itself as a tribe.
*  *  *
C. A. Lea- Wilson and Ian Watts would have been thrilled at the trajectories 
of Nugent alumni. Paulo Logali, who in 1926 became one of the first three 
Bari boys to be baptized, was a student at the Nugent School before its 
move to Loka. A devout Christian, Logali was a founding member of the 
South Sudan Workers Association (sswA). Created to represent the inter-
est of southern government employees, it was the first active southern 
organ ization and became a po liti cal committee in the early 1950s. Joining 
Logali in cofounding the sswA was fellow Nugent alum Benjamin Lwoki, 
who in 1948 was appointed as a member of the legislative assembly.77 Alum 
Joseph Lagu led the rebel Anyanya military force during the First Suda-
nese Civil War, and his po liti cal vision, leadership, and military strategies 
have been noted as being “clearly . . .  influenced by his Christian faith.”78 
Lagu, Logali, and Lwoki  were joined by other alumni who would go on 
to have a major impact, including (but not  limited to) administrator and 
politician Bullen Alier, mp Dak Dei, mp and Liberal Party member Jon 
Majak, and Agrey Jaden— the president of the South Sudan provisional 
government.79
The Nugent School, founded with the hope of stymieing Islam’s per-
colation up the Nile, became a space in which to produce English- speaking, 
masculine, Christian students. Through the encouragement and codifica-
tion of several vernacular languages, athletic and nonathletic competition, 
and the ethnographic nature of the Catholic Messenger newspaper, mission 
and state authorities made efforts at the school and elsewhere to uphold 
ethnic identities, reflecting a broader condominium push to protect the 
South from Arabism. And yet, the real ity of ethnic conflict highlighted the 
tension between efforts to encourage indigenous identities and a common 
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Chris tian ity. Some concluded that ethnic conflict was a spiritual prob lem 
that an au then tic Chris tian ity could overcome.
 There are three reasons why the school (and the mission enterprise in 
which it operated) is foundational in the narrative of Christian and ethnic 
politics in South Sudan. First, it provides an early illustration of the con-
verging agendas that state and mission actors had for the Sudanese: namely, 
maintain one social identity (ethnicity) while encouraging a religious iden-
tity (Chris tian ity) and resisting a racial culture (Arabic, Arab culture) and 
religion (Islam). At a time when Islam was viewed with antagonism, the 
 matter of  whether Chris tian ity and ethnicity  were compatible with each 
other was clear, at least to some: “yes.” One of the most compelling theo-
logical ideas to emerge during the post-2011 years— even  after the region had 
witnessed ethnically driven vio lence, and the traditional Arab and Islamic 
 enemy from the North had been removed— was the notion that God had 
created ethnicities and that they should be celebrated. This con temporary 
thought must be placed in the same genealogy with mission and state actions 
to uphold ethnicity during the condominium era and, as such, testifies to the 
notion that  there have long been Christians in the Sudan that have not 
viewed ethnicity as a prob lem. While it might be fair to question  whether 
the Nugent School failed as a multiethnic site given that ethnic rivalries 
persisted,  doing so would risk giving missions perhaps too much credit if 
the opposite  were true. If  there  were no fights at the school or other mission 
sites, what would it mean to attribute such peace primarily to the mission-
aries rather than the pupils themselves?
The second reason why the condominium- era mission enterprise is so 
significant when examining the interplay of religious and ethnic politics was 
the effort by Allison and  others to spiritualize the roots of ethnic solidar-
ity and discord. While conflict was “sin,” amity reflected au then tic Chris-
tian  influence. This injection of the spiritual into examinations of intra- 
Sudanese relations is significant considering that for much of the twentieth 
 century, such spiritualization was done within the context of North- South 
relations. The chapters concerning the First and Second Civil Wars discuss 
the liberatory theologies that framed vari ous Sudanese regimes as biblical/
spiritual evils, while positioning southerners as neo- Israelites destined for 
freedom. That white mission officials like Allison framed interethnic rela-
tions during the condominium necessitates an expanded understanding 
of po liti cal theology in South Sudan from one restricted to interracial and 
interreligious relations to an interethnic one as well. Sudanese figures like 
Thomas Attiyah continued to insert theology into discussions about south-
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ern ethnicities during the Second Civil War and post-2011 southern conflict, 
illustrating that for all that can be said about the spiritualization of the 
Arab Islamic North versus black Christian South rhe toric during the civil 
wars,  there is a tradition of clothing interethnic relations in spiritual terms 
for an even longer period. This real ity can be used to argue that ethnicity, 
more than race or religion, has been the more stubborn bone of contention 
in the South.
Fi nally, the Nugent School illustrates the gendered and martial nature 
of the Christian proj ect in Sudan. Emblazoned with the Maltese cross and 
afforded access to the Boy Scouts, Crusader Bible classes, and the Boys’ 
Brigade, Nugent students  were surrounded by military idioms. Vari ous Su-
danese intellectuals during the twentieth- century civil wars spiritualized 
 those conflicts by referencing relevant biblical passages, invoking a provi-
dential God, and at times demonizing Arabs and the government. The fact 
that vari ous Sudanese regimes attempted to forge the country into an Islamic 
state further encouraged the notion that the conflicts  were inherently reli-
gious. And yet, de cades before any southern Sudanese Christian Anyanya 
member or splA soldier picked up a gun to fight an Islamizing government, 
Nugent School founder C. A. Wilson “hope[d] to send out a flow of Christian 
young men, who  will carry the ideals of Christ wherever they go, & occupy 
posts some of which are at pre sent filled by Moslems.” It would not be inac-
curate to state that the  union of Chris tian ity and militarism among south-
erners in the twentieth  century can be traced to the Nugent School.
The Nugent School was not the only condominium- era institution 
created to “forestall Islam.” The school was joined by the Equatorial Corps, 
the military unit at the center of the South’s most famous rebellion and the 
subject of the next chapter.
2
The Equatorial Corps  
and the Torit Mutiny
No man is sure of his life, the individual is at the mercy of the state, 
murdering replaces justice. . . .  That any force on earth can shake the 
foundations of this pyramid of power and corruption, of  human misery 
and slavery, seems inconceivable. But thirty years before this day, a miracle 
occurred. On the Roman cross in Judea, a Man died to make men  free, 
to spread the Gospel of love and redemption. Soon that  humble cross is 
destined to replace the proud ea gles that now top the victorious Roman 
standards. This is the story of that immortal conflict.
— Quo Vadis, 1951
Starring Robert Taylor and Deborah Kerr, the 1951 epic film Quo Vadis 
focuses on a Roman general, Marcus Vinicius, and a Christian  woman, 
Lygia, during Nero’s reign. Marcus, who embodies Roman power and pa-
ganism, falls in love with Lygia, a member of the suppressed Christian 
community. When Nero blames Christians for kindling the  Great Fire 
of Rome, the  matter of religious allegiance becomes an issue of the first 
magnitude.1
Although the movie had debuted more than two years  earlier, Quo Vadis 
headlined the April 13, 1954, edition of the Sudanese daily newspaper Morn-
ing View. Despite the film’s long- awaited release in the Sudan, the newspaper 
reported that the Ministry of the Interior had banned the film. To add in-
sult to injury, the writer reported that to their knowledge, the film had not 
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been barred anywhere  else. Nevertheless, the ministry justified its prohibi-
tion amid speculation that its grisly portrayals of Christians being cruci-
fied, burned alive, and gored by ravenous lions could have a provocative 
influence among Sudanese audiences: “The Ministry of the Interior,” the 
article stated, “has been advised by the censor . . .  that the facts of the film 
are presented in such a manner as to be unacceptable . . .  and may well have 
some inciting effects.”2
The following year the Sudanese government had a far more serious 
prob lem on its hands— the mutiny of the Equatorial Corps at Torit. The 
Torit Mutiny of August 18, 1955, is the kairotic moment of South Sudanese 
nationalism and has been commonly used to mark the beginning of the 
First Sudanese Civil War.3 While some may have considered Quo Vadis and 
its pre sen ta tion of history to be insignificant in the wake of the mutiny, 
history’s relevance to con temporary po liti cal action was undeniable. With 
historical narratives providing templates for action and impor tant back-
drops to the po liti cal milieu, the sociopo liti cal developments of the time 
could appear like scenes in a larger drama. As Oliver Allison stated in a 1949 
edition of the Sudan Diocesan Review,
All the Sudan’s a stage, and all the men and  women in it players.  Whether 
we like it or not . . .  we are actors and not merely passive witnesses on 
the Sudan stage at this par tic u lar moment in its story. The plot is 
developing rapidly and  whether the drama that is being staged  will 
develop into a tragedy, a comedy, or a triumph . . .  is hard for us to 
judge.4
For many in the coming years, Sudan became a stage on which dramas 
from Sudanese and biblical history  were reenacted or threatened to do so. 
The mutiny became one such occasion, when mutineers looked to defend 
themselves from another chapter of “subjugation” from the North, a history 
embedded in slavery.
The Torit Mutiny was more than an emancipatory action to prevent this 
history from repeating itself; rather, it was also a moment in which members 
of the Equatorial Corps— which was established amid the Egyptian Army’s 
presence and Islamizing tendencies—refused to be transferred and replaced 
by northern soldiers. Although Christian sentiment was not the mutiny’s 
main catalyst, the British who created the corps saw Chris tian ity as an ele-
ment of protecting the South from Islam. This sentiment is essential for 
understanding the mutiny as a moment when  colonial religious visions had 
violent, separatist, material consequences that actualized in a widening 
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chasm between North and South and a closer  union between a diversity of 
southerners.
the equatorial corps: religious origins
In many re spects, the June 1910 transfer of the Lado Enclave spurred the 
formation of the Equatorial Corps. Although Charles Gordon had made 
Lado the capital of Equatoria, the Mahdiya effectively isolated it. Mahdists 
prevented steamers from reaching the town, and by the time Mahdist forces 
entered Lado in 1888, the town was empty.  After the Congo  Free State 
became a personal possession of Belgium’s King Leopold II, he annexed 
almost half of the southern territory from the Western Nile bank to the 
Congo. In May 1890 the British recognized Leopold’s authority over the 
enclave in exchange for certain trading rights, but in accordance with a 
subsequent agreement between the two countries, the Lado Enclave was 
set to be transferred to the Sudan government on Leopold’s death. On 
June 10, 1910— following his death— the enclave was incorporated into the 
condominium.5
Reginald Wingate did not want to see Islam in the enclave. Wingate 
began his position as Sudan’s governor general on December 23, 1899, and 
served in that capacity for over sixteen years. He enjoyed a close relationship 
with Catholic bishop Franz Geyer and in late 1904 urged him to begin work 
in Wau, a South Sudanese center for the Egyptian Army and a site with a 
Muslim presence.6 H. Karl W. Kumm, who  after studying Islam’s spread in 
Nigeria played a key role in founding the Sudan United Mission, opined 
that the British government assisted Islam’s transmission among “pagans” 
in Bahr el- Ghazal through the military. Though the military was recruited 
from non- Christian, non- Muslim communities, once the men enlisted, 
they  were forced to swear allegiance to the Khedive, received circumcision, 
and  were made Muslims.7 Other Islamic ele ments permeated military struc-
ture: Friday was the day of rest, soldiers’  children  were educated by a Mus-
lim malam, and the Koran was taught.8 Rev. Archibald Shaw wrote in his 
diary from the Cms station at Malek, “It is sad to think that by taking the 
country  under Anglo Egyptian rule we have already begun to force Moham-
medanism on the  people.” Shaw cited several pieces of evidence to support 
his claim, including the facts that five hundred Muslim soldiers and ju nior 
officials had been brought into the country, 150 “natives” had been recruited 
into Sudanese battalions, and the Koran formed the basis of schooling 
in the Sudanese battalions. “It is time our hands  were strengthened with 
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recruits. . . .  At pre sent the natives can only conclude that Mohammedan-
ism is the religion of  England.”9
On March 1, 1911, Wingate wrote a letter to Eldon Gorst, consul general of 
Egypt from 1907 to 1911. Writing about the Lado Enclave, Wingate shared 
that when the condominium had first come into possession of the region 
the previous June, “ there was a considerable influx of recruits which we 
much required to make up the strength of the XIVth Sudanese.” But for 
some unknown reason, he continued, the supply of recruits had virtually 
dis appeared. Wingate opined,
that the system which prevails in Sudanese Battalions, of turning all 
recruits into Moslems . . .  has something to do with it, and this leads 
me to the consideration of the desirability of . . .  replacing our Regular 
Troops by some Territorial system . . .  reor ga ni za tion would afford of 
getting rid of the Moslemizing influence in the shape of Egyptian 
Officers and fanatical Sudanese N.C.O.’s, and very gradually dropping 
the Moslem conditions which prevail in all Sudanese Battalions of the 
Egyptian Army.10
Wingate’s proposal to create a non- Muslim military unit was a radical one, 
given Islam’s centrality in military culture. Religious impulses aside, locally 
recruited troops offered several advantages; they would be less expensive, 
speak the language of their stationed district, and know the country better 
than outsiders. As Equatoria province bordered Uganda,  Kenya, Ethiopia, 
and the Congo, it was also in the administration’s interests to secure the 
South’s borders.11
In three years’ time the local recruitment policy had been implemented 
in Yambio and Tembura, where another com pany took over in 1915. The 
administration’s socializing objectives  were clearly reflected in the corps’s 
cultural and linguistic makeup. The unit comprised southern troops and 
used En glish as the language of command. Chris tian ity was encouraged, 
and Islam practically forbidden.12 When the last batch of northern troops 
departed from Mongalla on December 7, 1917, the governor reported that 
he had “removed the more fanatical, super religious Muslim soldiers, jal-
laba (peddlers) and riff- raffs . . .  hoping that the authorities . . .  will see that 
they  don’t return and . . .  keep any old soldiers in Omdurman and generally 
northern [ people] from . . .  settling anywhere in the province.” His plea to 
successor C. S. Northcote included an unambiguous reminder of why it was 
necessary to keep northern merchants out: “if a Jehad [sic] is ever started in 
the Sudan and northern Africa, it would be a  great  thing if the countries 
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south of the sudd  were  free from it and if we could link up with Uganda 
which is practically entirely Christian and so have an anti- Islam buffer.”13
the equatorial corps
The Equatorial Corps was initially created as part of the Egyptian Army and a 
pro cess in which regular army units  were replaced by locally recruited units. 
The Western Arab Corps replaced the Camel Corps, the mounted infan-
try replaced the cavalry, and the Eastern Arab Corps was recruited among 
Kassala’s Beja. Following the White Flag Mutiny of 1924, all Sudanese units 
 were detached from the Egyptian Army and combined in the Sudan Defence 
Force.
The Equatorial Corps  were headquartered in Torit, in eastern Equatoria’s 
Latuholand. While the corps was distributed throughout the South, Torit 
was a prudent location  because of its easy accessibility to East Africa and 
the Lotuho reputation for their military acumen. They had resisted British 
rule in the early twentieth  century, and  after their re sis tance, ethnographic 
studies indicated their enthusiasm for joining the army. To balance the vast 
number of  people and warrior traditions of the Nilotic Dinka, Nuer, and 
Shilluk, the British recruited most of the corps from the Lotuho and other 
small eastern Equatorian ethnic groups. The corps and police  were gener-
ally recruited from the Lotuho of Equatoria, the Jur of Bahr el- Ghazal, and 
the Madi, Moru, and Zande.14
The recruitment of members from the aforementioned ethnicities points 
to the connection between religious and gender politics. Farther south in 
Uganda, military recruitment was linked to martial ste reo types about mas-
culinity and often involved recruits from Lado. In the newly established 
colonial army, the British divided the Ugandan contingent into an African 
battalion and an Indian battalion. The African battalion initially had a 
Sudanese majority. Ethnicity formed the basis of recruitment, with British 
officers preferring soldiers from groups perceived to have “natu ral” military 
qualities. According to Timothy Parsons, a recruit’s value was determined 
solely by his ethnic origins.15 In Sudan during the nineteenth  century, raid-
ing patterns followed  those first established by eastern kingdoms. The Ethi-
opian borderlands, Nuba hills, and lands along the Bahr al- Arab became the 
first sources for army slaves. Areas that  were attacked had a long history of 
de pen dency on state peripheries, and Douglas Johnson has noted that the 
combination of marginality and de pen dency made them perfect reservoirs 
for “martial races.”16
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The nineteenth- century martial race ideology purported that some groups 
of men  were culturally or biologically predisposed to military prowess.17 
Within the martial race paradigm, initial de pen dency was used to encour-
age martial characteristics and fidelity to new masters. Once brought into 
armies, their ethnic and martial peculiarity  was encouraged and empha-
sized, giving them a “vehicle for gaining re spect, legitimacy and protection 
in the larger social order of which they are now, albeit reluctantly, a part.” 
Thus, argues Johnson,  peoples on the Sudanese slave frontier became part 
of a “martial race,” which was identified and maintained by a succession of 
states.18
The British believed that developing strong ethnic imbalances in the 
army would encourage more po liti cally reliable organ izations, and that 
 people would be attracted by opportunities that the army provided. In its 
early years the corps played an active role in subduing several ethnicities: 
corps artillery was credited with subduing the Lokoya and Lotuho; the corps 
was largely responsible for pacifying the Nuer and Dinka in Upper Nile and 
Bahr el- Ghazal provinces; and district commissioner Jack H. Driberg led his 
Equatorial Corps (which included Acholi soldiers from Uganda) against the 
Didinga and Toposa. In 1925, Egyptian mamurs and battalions  were with-
drawn, and the old Sudanese battalions disbanded, while the responsibility for 
South Sudan’s security was given— under British directions—to the Equato-
rial Corps and the police. With a British recruitment policy that resulted in 
an ethnically and territorially divided army, Ahmed El Awad Mohammed 
has noted, “Each area developed its own politico- military entity.”19
The aforementioned ethnic dimensions and martial ste reo types can-
not be divorced from the religious politics at work in the corps’ formation 
(namely, protecting the South from Islam). While the Nugent School staff 
may have sought to encourage among their students a martial, Christian 
consciousness, the Equatorial Corps was a diff er ent expression of the same 
proj ect— a cadre of South Sudanese men purposed to confront the spread 
of Islam.
*  *  *
Torit County’s Catholic mission was situated in a mountainous region that 
belonged to Chief Lotila. Fr. Fanti made the first attempt to perform mis-
sion work among Acholi soldiers stationed at Torit, and when Bro. Faustin 
 Cosner arrived at Torit, he immediately set about the work of teaching some 
Sudanese government soldiers in carpentry. By the early 1920s,  there  were 
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at least a few Catholics in the corps barracks. Protestant missions also 
targeted southern soldiers. At around the same time the Catholic mission 
in Torit was getting off the ground, Rev. Archibald Shaw requested prayer 
for a military school in the Lotuho district and at Loka for soldiers in the 
new companies.20 In his address before the Alliance Club on December 8, 
1922, Shaw provided an unambiguous explanation as to why his mission was 
concerned with fostering a connection with the corps:
We have been anxious to start schools for the garrison Companies of 
Equatorial troops which have replaced the Moslem Sudanese troops. . . . 
The Government . . .  de cided to allow Christian schools to be started for 
the Equatorial Companies. . . .  It  will be a  great  thing if we have a Christian 
soldiery in the Southern Sudan. If the soldiers are Christians it  will make 
a  great difference in the Government centres, which at pre sent are centres 
of Mohammedanism.21
Insulating the South from the proliferation of Arabic was part of the 
government’s stated plan in January 1930 to “build up a series of self con-
tained racial or tribal units with structure and organisation based, to what-
ever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, 
upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.”22 By that point 
En glish command words had already been introduced into the Equatorial 
Corps and provincial police forces, but Khartoum’s Civil Secretary’s Office 
stated that more was required. More specifically, it was sugested that in-
creased effort be made in ensuring that men used En glish as their primary 
mode of communication exclusive of Arabic, which would mean opening 
English- language classes— for which mission schools  were cited as desired 
instructors— and efforts by authorities to ensure that men used En glish 
when local vernaculars could not be used.23 As a compelling aside, southern 
governors  were informed in 1931 that while En glish teachers for Equatorial 
troops could be recruited from mission schools, they  were mandated only 
to teach English— evangelism would have to occur outside their linguistic 
duties.24
By 1949, Torit consistently had about nine hundred soldiers.25 In a letter 
dated August 28, 1954, C. M. Lamb— the acting district commissioner and 
commander of the Equatorial Corps at Torit— alluded to the importance of 
religious life for soldiers stationed  there. Lamb noted that it appeared that 
the soldiers did not like the new site allocated for the Protestant church 
 because “it is too far from the lines.” While he believed it unlikely that per-
mission would be granted to build the church in the military zone, Lamb 
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was shocked at how strongly the soldiers felt about the issue. They appeared 
to look at the church “as being provided solely for their use. I think this 
idea has prob ably grown up due to the [fact] that when it was first built the 
soldiers of the Equatoria[l] Corps  were the only Protestants in Torit and also 
 because they now form the bulk of the congregation.”26
growing unrest
A series of major developments had occurred since the Southern Policy was 
instituted in 1930. Egyptian and Sudanese nationalism claims ruled national-
ist politics from the 1920s through the 1940s. Sudanese journalism emerged 
as a force that was  free from government control; the issue of  whether  there 
was a distinct Sudanese culture (given the country’s historical links to the 
Arab world, Islam, and equatorial African cultures) was debated; and, in 
North Sudan, an educated class or ga nized for an effective nationalist move-
ment. In 1938, gradu ates of Gordon College founded the Gradu ates General 
Congress (or Gradu ates Congress, for short). Meanwhile, British policies— 
particularly the 1933 Closed Districts Ordinance— isolated the South.27
In 1942 the Gradu ates Congress petitioned the British for self- government 
but was rejected. The rejection created a split within the congress. Activists 
like Ismail al- Azhari demanded a policy of noncooperation with the British 
and, consequently, became allied with Egyptian nationalism and Nile Val-
ley unity. On the other side  were moderates who mistrusted Egyptian aims 
and believed that in de pen dence might be more quickly realized by working 
with the British. In 1944 the British tried to control po liti cal developments 
by creating the North Sudan Advisory Council. Two po liti cal parties  were 
or ga nized to contest the first elections for the council; al- Azhari’s Ashiqqa 
Party called for in de pen dence with close Egyptian ties, while the Umma 
Party supported total in de pen dence.  After Egypt’s 1946 effort to assert its 
sovereignty over Sudan, Britain reversed course and conceded Sudan’s right 
to self- determination and government. Sudan was offered  union with Egypt 
or national in de pen dence.28 At the 1947 Juba Conference, northern and 
southern attendees agreed on the princi ple of national unity and southern 
involvement in the legislative assembly.29
In 1948 the legislative assembly, an elected body that included northern 
and southern representatives, was formed. The following year, representa-
tives from Sudan, Egypt, and Britain drafted a new constitution that pro-
vided  limited autonomy for a united Sudan. The Self- Government Statute 
was enacted in 1952, providing for self- government  after an indefinite period. 
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The following year, an Anglo- Egyptian agreement was signed that defined 
the steps  toward self- government and self- determination. Northern parties 
made a deal with Egypt that removed provisions from the Self- Government 
Statute. The provisions removed from the 1953 agreement  were  those that 
southerners believed  were necessary to protect their interests in the period 
leading to self- determination. Following this exclusion, the Liberal Party 
was formed and ran in the 1953 elections. Despite its intention to attract 
members from other parts of Sudan, the Liberal Party’s leadership was 
exclusively southern.30
The 1954 creation of the first all- Sudanese cabinet  under al- Azhari’s 
pro- Egyptian National Union Party (nup) accelerated southern po liti cal 
thinking  toward self- determination and federalism. As self- government 
became virtually assured, federation emerged as a condition for southern 
participation in self- determination for a united Sudan. Northern leaders 
resisted any concession to southern demands. In August 1955 parliament 
approved a motion for self- determination, and Sudan became in de pen dent 
on January 1, 1956.31
*  *  *
Following World War II, southern officials and mission employees formed 
the Southern Intellectuals Organisation. While they initially saw an alli-
ance with the North Sudanese– composed Gradu ates Congress as the best 
path to Sudanese in de pen dence, Leonardi writes that the almost complete 
exclusion of southerners during Sudanization in the 1950s fueled a growing 
sense of southern grievances and po liti cal identity.32 A group of educated 
southerners formed the Southern Party just before the 1953 elections.33 In 
1954 the Southern Party changed its name to the Liberal Party to avoid 
northern suspicion that the word Southern implied separation. The party 
aimed to secure self- government for the South and fought for equal pay for 
equally qualified  people from the North and South in similar positions. At 
its 1954 meeting, its delegates condemned the uneven results of Sudaniza-
tion and called for national federation.34
As early as October 1954— the same month Sudanization results  were 
announced— Marko Rume and Daniel Tongun began holding discussions 
about the possibility of organ izing a widespread rebellion throughout the 
South. Rume was introduced to politics at the Nugent School and  later 
worked as a secretary in the Liberal Party. Born in 1923, Daniel Tongun was 
a student- teacher at the Nugent School in the early 1940s and became 
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po liti cally active as a government official working in Juba. According to 
Tongun,  there was a general consensus among Equatorial Corps troops in 
the South that if the region was marginalized in discussions about their 
 po liti cal aspirations, they would refuse to be transferred up north.35 Indeed, 
Lt. Col. W. B. E. Brown recalled that when the order to Sudanize all British ap-
pointments in the corps was received in the  middle of June 1954, the hand-
over generated a sense of foreboding: “The news of our impending depar-
ture and handover to Northern Sudanese officers caused  great shock and 
dismay among the troops. When I told my Sol Talim, he at first refused to 
believe it. Eventually having accepted the news he said:— ‘ there  will be war 
down  here.’ ”36 Rume, assigned to the Equatorial Corps as a cashier, concep-
tualized the mutiny with Tongun.37
In 1955, Saturlino Oboyo of the corps at Torit or ga nized an insurrectional 
plot. Oboyo, president of the Liberal Party’s Equatorial Corps’s branch, 
had spread rumors that northern troops  were planning to come South 
with murderous intentions. In a preemptive move, he tried to or ga nize a 
mas sacre of northern officers within the corps. Despite his successful re-
cruitment of noncommissioned officers into the plot, the conspiracy was 
uncovered on August 6. Oboyo was arrested, and his correspondence and 
list of coconspirators discovered. In response to the conspiracy northern 
troops  were quickly flown down to Juba. On August 8, amid concerns that 
southern soldiers  were full of anti- northern enmity, the military affirmed 
its  earlier decision to transfer some southern troops to the North and re-
place them with northern units. Consistent with this order, the No. 2 Com-
pany of the Equatorial Corps at Torit was ordered to move to Khartoum on 
Thursday, August 18. Contrary to the practice of allowing troops’ families 
to move with them, the soldiers  were ordered to move without their fami-
lies or ammunition. This exceptional stipulation exacerbated concerns that 
the unarmed soldiers could be killed by northern troops on their arrival in 
Khartoum and that their families would be at the mercy of the newly trans-
ferred northern troops.38
Mutiny
Rev. Elizabeth Noel, who at the time of our interview was president of the 
Episcopal Church of Sudan  Mothers’ Union, had been seven or eight years 
old in Torit when the mutiny broke out. Her  father, who served in the army 
for eigh teen years, was taking tea that morning. According to her account, 
the order to leave families  behind may have provided the critical spark to the 
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ensuing conflagration: “The chief commander was talking that all  people 
should get ready to go to Khartoum. And then one of the soldiers said, 
‘Okay, but why can we go without our  family, our property, the arms?’ The 
chief commander said, ‘No, shut up’ . . .  then  after . . .  one of the captains 
shoot one of the soldiers. Immediately and suddenly,  things bursted up.”39 
The soldiers’ fear of leaving their families  behind may have been historically 
rooted. During the Turco- Egyptian period, battalions transferring from one 
garrison to another often left their wives and families  behind. Taking over 
the wives of the garrison that they  were relieving, marriages routinely oc-
curred between incoming conquering Sudanese battalions and the wives 
of the defeated slave garrisons (or formerly enslaved women).40 If the casus 
belli was indeed Torit soldiers’ concern over what the incoming troops 
would do with their wives, the mutiny should be principally read as a mas-
culine defense of the domestic sphere.
On the morning of August 18, troops in the No. 2 Com pany mutinied. 
Race, in addition to the pos si ble aforementioned gender dynamic, was also 
at the epicenter of the vio lence. Engineer Alberto Marino inferred that a racial 
slur combined with anti- Muslim angst ignited the uproar. Marino, who was 
in Wau that eve ning, asked his substitute  whether he had heard of what 
had taken place in Torit. The substitute shared that the tumult had begun 
when an Arab officer insulted an el derly black sergeant- major, Latada, by 
calling him a slave. According to the substitute, this was the worst insult a 
Muslim could hurl on a southern Negro.41  After the aspersion, an unspeci-
fied shooter fired a pistol, and the unnamed Arab who had spoken the slur 
fell dead.  After the killing, “Negro lieutenants, nearly all Christians, joined 
Latada leading the insurrection. . . .  Latada was very brief in his speech, 
‘The hour of vengeance against the Moslems has come, do you understand? 
It is war to the end.’ ”42  After rejecting  orders to embark on trucks to Juba 
and be transported to Khartoum, the Torit troops attacked North Suda-
nese officers. Breaking into the armory to gain arms and ammunition, they 
killed northern officers and committed arson and looting. Shooting began 
in Equatoria and spread quickly, with mutinies occurring in Juba, Yei, Ter-
rakeka, Tali Post, Rokon, Kajo Keji, and as far away as Yambio and Meridi. 
The first wave of vio lence left 361 northerners and 75 southerners dead. 
Order was restored by September.43
Anti- Arab animus was pre sent in the maelstrom. On August 19, Ismal 
Gemaa of the Forestry Department drove to Tambechi and “told the vil-
lagers that the Mondokoro [Arab] Army killed their relatives in Juba [and] 
they should kill all the . . .  Mondokoro in the area.”  After he conveyed this 
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message, forest ranger Mohamed Abdel Karim was killed.44 Anti- Arab sen-
timent was also exemplified by an episode in which a  woman’s husband 
and ten- year- old  daughter  were killed in her presence.  After their deaths, 
some  people directed vitriol  toward the new  widow by shouting, “Kill her 
as she would be giving birth to more Mondokoros.”45 Jonathon Glassman 
has noted that vio lence against  women is a calculated trademark of racial 
and ethnic vio lence, as acts like disembowelment and rape are understood 
as attacks on the  enemy’s ability to reproduce and an assault on the  enemy’s 
manhood.46 By targeting  those capable of producing more members of the 
race, the aforementioned anecdote sugests an ele ment of racial cleansing 
from the war’s first clash.
Religious identity was also a murderous motivation in the vio lence. On 
August 20 a Lotuho man named Airo Ogwana, a muezzin at Torit mosque, 
speared a northerner to death near Torit’s veterinary offices. He was under-
stood as being a Muslim and thus more associated with the northerners 
 under attack. Court documents state that when antinorthern vio lence 
commenced, Ogwana “participated by killing one to prove to his  people that 
he was still a Southerner with no sympathy  towards his [associates] . . .  in the 
Mosque.”47 His defense was that “he was frightened by the mutineers who 
told him that  unless he killed a Northerner his loyalty to the South would 
not be proved” was insufficient to prevent Chief Justice Abu Rannat and the 
governor general from confirming his death sentence.48 That the Muslim 
Lotuho Ogwana killed to prove his southernness illustrates that, even at the 
war’s inception, the question of just “how Southern” a Muslim was or could 
be was debatable and could pre sent an identity crisis of sorts. That the court 
documents stated that Ogwana was ethnically Lotuho—an identity shared 
with many of the principal mutineers in Torit’s Equatorial Corps— did not 
appear to prove or reinforce his southernness in the eyes of  those who report-
edly threatened his life. In this instance, then, Ogwana’s Muslim identity 
superseded his Lotuho ethnicity, revealing the ethnic and religious politics 
at play during the mutiny. Ogwana’s attempt to ensure his ac cep tance as a 
southerner by taking a northerner’s life was a sanguinary rite of passage.
Alexis Mbali Yangu includes another instance of religion’s role in the tu-
mult in his book The Nile Turns Red. Arab troops found some Christian boys 
wearing crucifixes around their necks. The young men  were arrested and 
fastened to trees for execution. One of the soldiers asked his officer why 
the boys  were not blindfolded, to which the officer responded by taking out 
his pocketknife, extracting their eyes, and giving  orders for their death by 
shooting.49 To be sure,  there is reason to question the veracity of this episode; 
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how was this story transmitted to Yangu if the witnesses  were blinded and 
subsequently executed?  There is a long tradition of martyrology in Christian 
lit er a ture, and though his text was not evangelical, Yangu— a se nior figure in 
the liberation movement during his exile (when he wrote the book)— would 
have found benefit in framing the soldiers in a persecuting light.50
Gabriel Dwatuka was the focus of another incident. A Zande born in 
the Tombura district, he was ordained a priest in 1953. Dwatuka, who had 
saved northern officers’ lives and their families, was in Maridi during the 
disturbances. One day,  after completing morning Mass, five soldiers ar-
rested the priest. Wanted for routine questioning in connection with a civil 
disturbance, the soldiers ridiculed Dwatuka as he was led into the prison 
courtyard. He was stripped, spat on, and hit in the face with his own rosary 
with such force that the necklace broke. The officer in charge then whipped 
Dwatuka, and  after being led to his cell, his plight went from bad to worse.51 
 There a rope was tied around his neck and fixed to the win dow bars so that 
he could barely touch the ground with his toes.  After the officer beat him 
all over his body, soldiers roped the bleeding Dwatuka to the floor. The of-
ficer continued to beat him to the point of exhaustion. “Then,” as Dwatuka 
was quoted two years  later, “they kicked me with their shoes in the mouth 
and on the head and told me to repeat the Mohammedan credo. . . .  I  didn’t 
and only gurgled in agony.” Revived with kicks, he was again lashed and 
draged into a large room. Refusing to proclaim Mohammed, Dwatuka was 
whipped in the throat and lashed again before other prisoners. Through 
the intervention of the Verona  Fathers’ Monsignor Domenico Ferrara, he 
was released the following day.52
Presbyterian missionary Marian Farquhar, who was stationed at Nasir 
when the mutiny occurred, referenced a power ful sermon made amid the 
trou bles. Born in Iowa, she had attended Missouri’s Tarkio College and 
taken seminary courses in Connecticut and New York. In 1945 the Board 
of Foreign Missions of the United Presbyterian Church of North Amer i ca 
assigned her to southern Sudan, and within four years she was headmistress 
of a government boarding school in Nasir (located among the Nuer, near 
the Ethiopian border).53 Farquhar noted that though trou ble in Malakal had 
only lasted a day, many Nuer fled home to Nasir, 140 miles away. “Then 
came word,” she continued, “that two boats  were coming up with northern 
soldiers to ‘subdue’ us. Specifically to disarm our unit of southerners. And 
our unit was  going to refuse to give up their arms.” The northern soldiers 
 were set to arrive on  either Sunday eve ning or Monday morning. A large 
crowd gathered at church, no doubt sensing the drama of the moment. A 
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man named Rial preached that eve ning and borrowed from John 14:9 in ad-
dressing his audience. “Am I  going to be one of  those,” he asked, “who says to 
Him, ‘How can we know the way?’ I have lived  here for many years and heard 
this word many many times . . .  but has it become tRuth in my heart? Or 
 will He say to me as He did to Philip, ‘Have I been so long time with you and 
yet you have not known me, Rial?’ ” That night the first boat came in, quietly. 
Monday, according to Farquhar, “was one of the strangest I have ever lived.” 
Only four out of thirty- one girls came to school, along with one teacher. “no 
one was anywhere and you heard no noises of any kind. . . .  Breathlessly the 
few faithful- at- work  were saying, ‘Wait. . . .  Wait  until they ask for the key to 
the guns and you’ll hear the shooting.’ ” However, no shooting came. “We had 
a good District Commissioner, a northerner, and he handled the situation 
veRy well, and the  people in time came to trust us.”54
 After the governor general told mutineers to surrender, terms  were 
offered, and the army entered Torit with scant opposition. Many who sur-
rendered  were executed, and  others  were imprisoned despite many  people’s 
expectation that their cases would be heard. Many  were packed into boats 
and carried to diff er ent prisons in the North.55 “ These supreme  trials,” wrote 
Yangu, “ were the cause of an unpre ce dented unity among the Southern 
tribes.”56 And yet, writes Scopas Pogo, interethnic rivalries persisted  because 
 earlier officials had not attempted to encourage ethnic groups to move 
across territorial spaces. To this end, he posits that southern ethnicities did 
not have a shared position concerning an in de pen dent South by the time 
of the mutiny.57
Made over a de cade  after the mutiny, Yangu’s comment was a romantic 
attempt to frame the mutiny as something that it was not: unified. Pres-
byterian missionary Dorothy Rankin shared her feeling in November 1955 
that “the  people in our area, the school boys who have been in school in the 
South, seemed to have a rather detached attitude  toward the situation. 
As if they  don’t exactly classify themselves with  those who started the 
trou ble— one way or the other.”58 The conduct of the Torit Mutiny illus-
trated that  there was no pervasive social or po liti cal ideology uniting south-
erners at the time. The plan to mutiny at Torit was conceived primarily 
by Latuko soldiers, and though some soldiers from ethnic groups from the 
Nile’s East Bank participated in the operation, the Latuko  were more ac-
tive. Soldiers stationed at Wau and Malakal  were not initially part of the 
plan to revolt, and though news of the mutiny quickly reached Equatorial 
soldiers at  those two locations, it was thought to be a prob lem between the 
Latuko and Arabs. No vio lence was reported in Bahr el- Ghazal province, 
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and in Wau the southern garrison  there— along with police and prison 
wardens— remained loyal to the government and maintained order. Part of 
a local conspiracy among some soldiers, the mutiny had very  little planning 
for a general revolt. Other mutinies that occurred in the army, police, and 
prison ser vice (across the South)  were made in response to news from Torit 
and did not comprise a single coordinated uprising. While some mutineers 
wanted to delay the British exit and  others wanted  union with Egypt, no 
one was calling for southern separation yet. Equatoria— where most of the 
mutineers  were based and originated— was most devastated by the vio lence, 
while in Upper Nile and Bahr el- Ghazal, the Nilotic Dinka and Nuer did 
not hold Equatorian police and soldiers in warm regard.59
the legacy of slavery
Although the mutiny entailed the aforementioned racial, religious, and 
ethnic ele ments, it also brought forward the history of Sudanese slavery. 
R. O. Collins once noted that the Sudanese slave trade was as ancient as 
recorded history. It is probable that Muhammad Ali, longtime Ottoman 
ruler of Egypt during the first half of the nineteenth  century, wanted to add 
Sudan to his dominions principally  because of slaves. In the early 1820s, he re-
sorted to building a new army by gathering slaves from Sudan. During Turco- 
Egyptian rule (1821–85), the Turks turned to the recruitment of military slaves 
from South and Central Sudan. The Shilluk, Dinka, and Nuba  were targeted 
as the three principal ethnic groups.60 The slave trade became massive when 
the Egyptian government opened the Bahr el- Ghazal and Equatoria prov-
inces. The trade was initially in ivory; traders, often in league with a local 
chief, raided neighboring tribes for grain and  cattle to trade for tusks. Prison-
ers taken in  these raids became enslaved to the merchants, and the traders’ 
zaribas became staging posts for slaves bound for the North.61
By the mid-1840s a significant amount of ivory was flowing from South 
Sudan to the North, and by the following de cade thousands of southern-
ers  were being transported to Khartoum and Cairo. Private slave armies led 
by ivory and slave merchants began to appear in the South by the 1850s, 
and soldiers from  these armies and the Egyptian Army went on to form the 
nucleus of Mahdist forces in the late nineteenth  century. Lacking compa-
rable access to firearms, vulnerable southern groups  were unable to provide 
meaningful re sis tance to the traders’ raids. The Dinka  were the most valued 
slaves during the Turco- Egyptian period, with constant penetration into 
their northwest Dinkaland villages. John Dunn once noted that the Sudan 
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garrison’s soldiers  were among the best in the army. In 1863 they totaled 
seven thousand regulars and five thousand irregulars.62
Western nations began to apply pressure on Egyptian and Ottoman rulers 
to eliminate the slave trade in the Upper Nile.  Under Khedive Ismail— who 
had a public relations campaign with western Europe— a suppression effort 
was made in response to British pressure. Ismail ended large government- 
sponsored raids and ordered selective intervention against the slave trade. 
Ottoman rulers sought help from Eu ro pe ans like Samuel Baker and Charles 
Gordon to bring order and establish legitimate trade.  These men had  little 
success. In the 1860s and 1870s  there  were an estimated five to six thousand 
slave traders in the South.63
Upon General Kitchener’s appointment as the Anglo- Egyptian Sudan’s 
first governor general, he instructed his provincial governors to move cau-
tiously concerning slavery:
Slavery is not recognized in the Sudan, but as long as ser vice is willingly 
rendered by servants to masters it is unnecessary to interfere in the con-
ditions existing between them. . . .  I leave it to your discretion to adopt 
the best methods of gradually eradicating the habit of depending upon 
the slave  labour which has so long been part of the religious creed and 
customs of this country, and which it is impossible to remove at once 
without  doing  great vio lence to the feelings and injuring the prosperity 
of the inhabitants. Without proclaiming any intention of abruptly  doing 
away with all slave- holding, much can be done in the way of discourag-
ing it and teaching the  people to get on without it.
Wingate and Cromer shared Kitchener’s views. More than merely believing 
that the social and economic situation demanded the toleration of domes-
tic slavery, they feared that their interference could lead to a resurgence of 
fanatical Islam.64
Slavery’s enduring impact on southern Sudanese attitudes  toward north-
erners in the years leading up to the mutiny was evidenced in several ways. 
Andrew Wieu, a Dinka from Upper Nile province, stated that the Brit-
ish “kept reminding them [southerners] of the Mahdi, the slavery, and all 
that. They . . .  said they came to help the southerners out of slavery . . .  this 
fanned something in the minds of southerners. Therefore,  there remained 
some hatred.”65 In April 1947, southern staff in Aweil wrote a statement 
claiming that it was too early for southerners to join with northerners “in 
any form of Community or Parliament.” Asserting that northerners would not 
properly look  after southern  matters, the staff referenced the early history of 
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slavery by noting that “most Northerners . . .  still have the habit of saying 
‘Habbid’ [abid, or slave] to their southern employees or  those who may have 
some contact with them.”66 An Arab soldier’s use of the term abid  toward a 
southern soldier was, at least according to Marino’s account, the very spark 
that ignited the mutiny. The salience of slavery in the mutiny was inferred 
by another observer, who directly identified it as a primary impetus  behind 
the maelstrom:
It seemed as though the  whole Southern Corps was on a man hunt. Their 
hear[t]s  were so filled with bitterness and hatred  toward all the northerners. 
Vengeance, not only for pre sent grievances but that which has been stored 
up down through the past half  century, was now  running wild. . . .  Many 
of the tribesmen of Central Africa have the proverbial “elephant’s memory,” 
especially when it comes to the Arab atrocities of 50 years ago. Even the 
youth of  today know of relatives who had suffered at their hands.67
According to Scopas Pogo, the Kuku viewed rebellion as an attempt to wrest 
 free of Arab subjugation.68 One story emerged about an old  woman who, 
when rebel escapees had come to Kajo- Kajo with news of the uprising, left 
her  house and called together “her  children.” Saying that they should run 
for safety, she spontaneously sang the following words:
The Turks came in my days
The Kuturiya came in my days. Many invaders of Kuku came in
my days
And found me still alive.
I am too tired to run.
All the fighting has come in my days . . .
Let my  children run.69
The  woman’s mention of the “Turks,” which no doubt referred to the history 
of external predation dating back to the nineteenth  century, evinced the 
enduring impact of that period on southern conceptions of the North. For 
this Kuku  woman, the mutiny was an occasion to recall past abuses by out-
siders and to place the rebellion in the same genealogy.
*  *  *
“For a complete month,” said Benjamin Odomiyanf Loful, “we  were car-
ried out from the prison  every night to a foothill, some three miles outside 
Juba Township.” At that location, said the mutiny survivor, “we  were bru-
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tally beaten, abused, and humiliated. The Arab officers trod on us while we 
 were on the ground tied up, legs and hands in heavy iron chains.  There they 
screamed at us in order to make us say that the Northern Arabs  were our 
masters and we Southerners  were slaves.” According to Loful, several died 
inside the cells as a result of the ever- increasing punishments.70
Many of  those imprisoned  after the mutiny  were  housed at locations 
with connections to the history of Sudanese slavery, establishing a stronger 
association between that legacy and the events of 1955. Situated on a coral 
island off the Red Sea coast, Suakin was at one point an impor tant mer-
chant harbor that connected the Nile region and the hinterland savannahs 
with neighboring Egypt, Ethiopia, and Arabia and with regions as far east 
as China. Beginning in the fifteenth  century, it became Africa’s most impor-
tant Red Sea harbor. In the seventeenth  century, however, it declined as a 
result of navigation around the African continent. Largely in ruins at the 
beginning of the nineteenth  century, Suakin entered a new period of pros-
perity with the extension of Egyptian influence to the Upper Nile district. 
The introduction of steamers in the 1860s enhanced access to the equatorial 
regions, and trading in slaves and ivory became the bedrock of Suakin’s suc-
cess. Slave ships transported South Sudanese from Suakin to the Arabian 
Peninsula, and  after the Egyptian slave market closed in the 1870s, Sua-
kin became the hub of this traffic. The island’s fortunes ebbed and flowed 
during the Mahdist and early condominium years, and  after World War I, 
the development of Port Sudan hastened. Suakin’s population declined to 
roughly six thousand by 1929.71
Emedio Tafeng— who received a ten- year sentence  after the mutiny— 
spent seven years in the prisons off the Red Sea, in the old port of Suakin. Of 
Lotuho ethnicity, the Torit- born Tafeng was recruited into the army in 1930. 
Trained at Sudan’s Military College, he served as a sergeant in the Ethio-
pian campaign in World War II and was known at the time as the country’s 
best marksman. Among the first southerners to achieve the rank of second 
lieutenant, Tafeng was sent to Juba by se nior northern officers during the 
disarmament of the Equatorial Corps to collect the salaries for August 1955. 
Believed to have been one of the ringleaders  behind the plot, he was arrested 
in Juba and imprisoned  there without charge. His time in prison not only 
is said to have strengthened his  will to fight for South Sudan’s liberation 
but also had a spiritual influence. It was in prison that Tafeng converted to 
Chris tian ity and received the Christian name Emedio (Emilio).72
Tafeng’s conversion, along with comments made by Allison in his memoir, 
sugest that prison may have been a thriving spiritual space for incarcerated 
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ex- mutineers. Bishop Allison rec ords that one of the most memorable con-
firmation ser vices he could recall was held in a large Suakin prison, where 
men who had been confined  after the mutiny and uprising  were held. The 
commissioner of prisons granted Allison special permission to hold ser vices 
 there during his annual visits to Port Sudan. On one occasion, 120 men 
belonging to four ethnicities  were baptized at Suakin’s harbor entrance. On 
Easter Monday 1958,  those who had been baptized  were presented to Allison 
for confirmation and Holy Communion. Following the ser vice, the prison 
governor remarked with astonishment that he could not “understand how 
 these men could have committed any crime. I have never known prisoners 
[to] behave so well. They are always singing and often reading their Bibles 
and praying together.” He allowed vernacular New Testaments, prayer books, 
hymn books, and other Christian lit er a ture to be distributed.73
Like Suakin sixty kilo meters to the south, Port Sudan had connections 
to slavery. Construction of the port started in 1905, and the first ships began 
using it two years  later. Rather than hindering the economic recovery that 
was largely predicated on enslaved persons, the condominium government 
had ignored slavery’s pervasive endurance  until  after World War I. Red Sea 
province officials acknowledged that nomads who temporarily settled in 
Port Sudan brought their “servants” with them, and runaway enslaved per-
sons who sought official help  were typically placed in the care of sheikhs. 
 Those without jobs resorted to crime and prostitution. Between Novem-
ber 1924 and May 1925, nearly 1,800 enslaved and ex- enslaved refugees from 
Jidda arrived in Port Sudan and Suakin as a result of the Saudi force’s 
increasing control on the Hijaz. The League of Nations condemned the 
condominium’s feeble position on slavery, and in response, the government 
ordered that an asylum for manumitted persons be built at Port Sudan.74 
Following the mutiny, Lotuho soldiers of the Equatorial Corps  were among 
 those confined in Port Sudan. Jacob Sebit translated and transcribed lyr ics 
that the soldiers sang in prison:
Iyati hohoi Port Sudan
Laduri Lotuho odihi naye
Laduri Lotuho odihi naye
Etongo hohoi iko Arabi togele
Ettu adi edou tubana
Take us to Port Sudan
Sons of Latuka endure death
Sons of Latuka endure death
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We stay separate from the Arabs
The heavens  will amalgamate us (×2)75
Rumbek, along with Suakin and Port Sudan, was another location with 
connections to slavery where South Sudanese  were jailed  after the mutiny. 
 After Mehmed Said, the Ottoman ruler of Egypt from 1854 to 1863, abolished 
government raids, private merchants quickly assumed control of the slave 
trade. Slave and ivory traders established zaribas across large parts of South 
Sudan and fortified enclosures that  were used, among other purposes, as tem-
porary holding camps from which to launch slave raids. At least one zariba was 
located in Rumbek in the days of nineteenth- century Italian soldier Romolo 
Gessi, and in one instance, Emin Pasha released 567 slaves from Rumbek in 
a single day. Alexis Yangu connected the experience of his post- mutiny im-
prisonment at Rumbek to the history of Arab slavery. Yangu was one of three 
South Sudanese recruited into Juba’s police force in 1946 and served in western 
Bahr el- Ghazal for nearly a de cade. In 1955 he was dismissed from the force 
 after being accused of involvement in po liti cal activities. Arrested in Wau, he 
was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment  there in May 1956 (this was com-
muted to six months).76 According to Yangu, all prisoners in Bahr el- Ghazal 
who did not receive death sentences  were gathered in Rumbek prison  after 
mutiny- related  trials  were completed. He described his prison experience:
In all, we  were 1,114 prisoners crammed like sardines in small barracks. . . . 
In the dark we recalled all the horrible episodes of Arab barbarism of 
which we had heard or read. . . .  I looked at all  these tortures [in the prison] 
with the eyes of a 33- year- old whose  father was once captured in an Arab 
slave raid. I was brought up in the traditional Arab slave- raid history, 
and I was optimistic about a better  future for the Southern Sudanese 
 people.77
the coMMission of enquiry
On August 18— the day the mutiny began— the Sudanese Parliament voted 
unanimously to accelerate the in de pen dence pro cess, and on August 30 
it approved a mea sure mandating that Sudan should determine its po liti-
cal  future through a plebiscite. On December 19 the legislative assembly 
and senate unanimously approved the resolution declaring Sudan’s in de-
pen dence. Though southern mps had been reluctant to vote for the In de-
pen dence Resolution without the guarantee that the nation’s constitution 
would be a federal one, the assembly resolved that federation for the southern 
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provinces would receive full consideration. On January 1, 1956, the Republic 
of the Sudan became in de pen dent.78
A Commission of Enquiry was formed with the responsibility of iden-
tifying the mutiny’s  causes. The three- member committee was established 
 under Judge Tawfiq Cotran, a Palestinian Christian who served as a police 
magistrate in Khartoum. Northern Sudanese Khalifa Mahjoub, a general 
man ag er in the Equatoria Scheme Board, also worked on the commission. 
The third member and sole southern representative was chief and mp Lolik 
Lado. Considered a model government chief, the illiterate Lado had pur-
chased grain for the Sudan Defence Force in Juba during World War II and 
was recognized by private traders as a broker. He participated in the 1947 
Juba Conference, where he famously opined that southerners’ dilemma was 
akin to a girl who, being asked to marry a young man, needed to know more 
about her suitor before consenting.79
While the commission was instructed to carry out its investigation in 
Juba and in any areas Cotran deemed appropriate, it was restricted from 
looking into the mutiny’s po liti cal or social aspects. Meetings and hearings 
 were to be public or secret based on circumstance. With the defense min-
ister’s approval, the commission was authorized to appoint two advisers.80 
Southern politicians contributed  little evidence to the commission, though 
much of it was— according to Peter Woodward— contradictory. Neverthe-
less, the commission gathered evidence that included letters along the lines 
of one written by Chief Lako Logono to the governor of Equatoria, which 
stated, “If the Northerners and the Egyptians want to join with the South 
let them bring our grand fathers and grand mothers, and all our brethren 
whom they carried as slaves long ago, then we can link with them.”81 The 
commission submitted its report on February 18, 1956, and the government 
published the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the mutiny in October.82 
The commission concluded that five foundational ele ments  were  behind 
the disturbances:
1. Northerners and southerners had  little in common.
2. For historical reasons, southerners regarded northerners as foes.
3.  The British policy encouraging southerners to “pro gress on African 
and Negroid lines” prevented northerners and southerners from 
knowing each other. Missionaries favored and influenced this policy.
4.  The North had progressed far ahead of the South, creating “a feel-
ing in the underdeveloped  people . . .  that they are being cheated, 
exploited and dominated.”
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5.  These  factors discouraged a feeling of common citizenship; “the aver-
age Southerner is becoming po liti cally conscious, but this po liti cal 
consciousness . . .  is regional and not national.”83
Given the government’s religious policies in the coming years, it is impor-
tant to note that the report’s section on “Education and Religion” stated 
that religious differences had not played a part in the disturbances. On the 
contrary, it found “that the real trou ble in the South is po liti cal and not 
religious. . . .  In the extensive disturbances that took place in Equatoria, 
Christians, Pagans, as well as Muslims, took part . . .  some of the leaders of 
the anti- northern propagandists are southern moslims [sic].” The report also 
stated that the slave trade was not a contributing ele ment: “the historical 
fact of the slave trade was used by diff er ent  people for diff er ent purposes.”84
Despite the commission’s findings regarding slavery’s relevance, Sudan 
ambassador E. Chapman- Andrews noted in his reflections on the commis-
sion’s report that memories of the slave trade had long been a source of 
antinorthern resentment in the South. He hinted at the Southern Policy’s 
necessity in a milieu where this animus was so strong: “Southerners  were 
so suspicious of the North and had such indelible memories of the slave 
trade that it was essential to keep them apart. . . .  The slave trade . . .  must 
be regarded as a major cause of trou ble between Arab and Negro.”85 Daniel 
Tongun, who was arrested and imprisoned in Juba  after the mutiny, alluded 
to the historical roots of southern antipathy in his exhaustive testimony: 
“We  don’t like you. My plan would have been to order the Southern Suda-
nese soldiers to capture the airstrips . . .  the steamer, and then declare our 
intention to secede from you [northerners] . . .  we cannot forget the atroci-
ties that you committed against our ancestors.”86
*  *  *
The Equatorial Corps was a distinctly South Sudanese, multiethnic mili-
tary force that was birthed out of the British concern for protecting the 
South from Islam. While arguably the most “southern” of condominium 
institutions, it was heavi ly and intentionally divided along ethnic lines. The 
religious crucible from which the Equatorial Corps emerged and the eth-
nic politics that drove its recruitment each manifested themselves in Au-
gust 1955. Just months  after the mutiny had ended, Sudan entered in de pen-
dence in January 1956 as a fractured nation. In one personal account of the 
mutiny, a missionary opined that “the Sudan is engulfed in the birth- pangs 
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similar to  those that have been experience[d] by other nations of the world 
and history is repeating itself.”87 In 1957, President Abdallah Khalil noted, 
“We thought we could take in de pen dence, but we discovered that we must 
build it.”88 In the coming years, several Sudanese regimes attempted to build 
the divided country  under the banners of Arabism and Islam. Thousands of 
southerners fled, fought, protested, and died resisting Khartoum’s agenda. 
South Sudan’s  labor of liberation proved difficult indeed.
More than simply representing a significant point in South Sudan’s mili-
tary strug le against Khartoum, the Torit Mutiny is an impor tant moment 
in the genealogy of southern Christian nationalism. As mutineers looked 
to protect themselves from another instance of northern “subjugation,” 
the mutiny foreshadowed the way in which history— whether Sudanese or 
biblical— would be used to inspire and comfort southerners during the en-
suing civil wars against the government. While it would be inaccurate to 
claim that Chris tian ity was the primary engine driving the vio lence, the re-
ligious vision that inspired the British to create the corps in the early twen-
tieth  century should not be ignored when assessing the mutiny. Created as 
an ele ment of protecting the South from Islam, the Equatorial Corps and 
Cms Nugent School were two ele ments of the same anti- Islamic vision. 
Thus, the mutiny was a moment when  earlier religious visions had violent, 
material consequences.
*  *  *
In a Le Figaro piece published in 1966, three Christian guerrillas informed 
correspondent Jean- Marie Garraud that “our strug le is not a religious 
one. . . .  Although it is for the Arabs, who have raised the banner of a Holy 
War against us and want to convert us to Islamism. . . .  We are nationalists, 
we  don’t want to become Arabs. For centuries they have hunted us down 
in order to make slaves of us.”89 Despite their sentiment that this was not a 
religious war, many  were indeed translating the events of the First Sudanese 
Civil War in theological terms.  Those years would see more than Sudanese 
state efforts to Islamize the new nation; rather, the period also saw south-
erners using their faith and scripture for their own designs. It is to  these 
religious ideations that we now turn.
3
Liberation War
Our inheritance has been turned over to strangers,
Our home to foreigners.
We have become orphans, fatherless,
Our  mothers are  widows.
With our lives at gun point we are cruelly beaten with fire,  
we are weary, we are given no rest.
Arabs rule over us;  there is none to deliver us from their hands.
Our skin is hot as an oven with the burning heat of famine.
 Women are vanis hing in the South, virgins in the towns of the South.
Southerners are just shot dead, young men are compelled to murder their 
 brothers, and boys stager  under loads of wood.
The joy of our hearts has ceased; our dancing has been turned to moarning 
[sic].
The crown has fallen from our head; woe to us, for we have sinned!
For this our heart has become sick; for  these  things our eyes have grown 
dim; for the South is devastated; Arabs roam over it.
But thou, O lord, dost reign for ever; thy crown endure to all generations.
Why dost thou forget us for ever; why dost thou so long forsake us!
Restore us thyself, O’lord, that we may be restored!
— P. K. Mabuong, 1967
The prophet Jeremiah composed the book of Lamentations six centuries 
before the birth of Christ. The Weeping Prophet bemoaned Israel’s trans-
gressions, God’s righ teous indignation that had wrought Jerusalem’s 
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 destruction, and the Jewish exile to Babylon. Despite Israel’s claim to 
being God’s peculiar nation, its sins would not go unpunished. This truth 
notwithstanding, Jeremiah’s under lying theme was that God had not 
forsaken his  people; on the contrary, providence was working amid their 
suffering.1
The First Sudanese Civil War (1955–72) produced rippling effects 
throughout the South’s physical, ideological, and spiritual landscapes. 
According to Ali Mazrui, the conflict “was widely regarded as a religious 
confrontation between a Muslim government in Khartoum and its armies, 
and Christian liberation fighters in the South.”2 Against this backdrop, P. K. 
Mabuong used the Bible to transform South Sudan into a new Zion. In an 
article published in SAnu Youth Organ Monthly Bulletin, Mabuong replaced 
the words “Judah,” “Zion,” and “Mount Zion” from Lamentations chapter 3 
with “the South.”3 And yet, more than merely being a confrontation be-
tween members of diff er ent religions, the Bulletin piece is illustrative of two 
critical ways in which some intellectuals framed the war: first, in the blend-
ing of racial and religious identities in framings of the Sudanese state and 
state actors; and second, in the transformation of the conflict into a spiritual 
war with biblical antecedents.  These developments mark the war as a criti-
cal chapter in the history of South Sudanese po liti cal theology.
Mabuong was not alone in linking Arabs to spiritual or biblical oppres-
sion, as  others expressed that the conflict was spiritual warfare being waged 
in the physical realm. Religious thought provided an impor tant spiritual 
hue to the racial dynamics of the war, becoming a space for southerners to 
articulate the extent of racial division and hostility. Some positioned Arabs 
as inhuman evil agents being used by Satan to war against God’s  people. 
Through a series of calculated insertions, Christians in South Sudan lik-
ened their circumstances to biblical Israel’s history with Egypt and Babylon. 
While the Sudanese government and its soldiers  were linked with Egypt 
and Babylon, southerners— like their Israelite predecessors— were marked 
as God’s beloved, destined for national liberation.4
This chapter pushes against one recent contention that despite “incendi-
ary religious restrictions, the frame of the conflict hinged on elite choices 
regarding land and resources, which inspired an ethno- racial perspective 
rather than a religious one.”5 The war witnessed the creation of a theology 
that maintained that providence was leading southerners to victory. South-
ern intellectuals framed the conflict as a liberation war in which racial and 
religious identities became increasingly interwoven. Southerners could 
claim to share not only a racial and cultural identity but also the spiritual 
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experience of oppression.  These streams of thought encouraged the idea of 
an  imagined community united by race, politics, and spiritual experience 
and provide a lens into how southerners understood their history and na-
tional identity.
araBization and islaMization
The Christian thought that emerged in this period developed from a con-
text of state- sponsored Arabization and Islamization. The government’s 
Arab and Islamic policies began to emerge during the early in de pen dence 
period. In 1956 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “Sudan is in the 
main a cognate part of the Arab world. Our policy  towards the Arab League 
is to support it, to strengthen it and draw strength from it.”6 This policy 
manifested itself in the Arab- Israeli conflict that year, when Sudan sent 
volunteers to assist the Egyptians  after Anglo- French- Israeli forces invaded 
the Suez Canal. While the condominium government had regulated major 
Islamic institutions, one of the models advanced at in de pen dence was an 
Islamic parliamentary republic, which the Umma and Khatimiya camps 
supported. In July of that year the Mahdist Umma Party and Khatimiya 
 People’s Demo cratic Party (pdp) replaced the al- Azhari government and 
elected Abdallah Khalil as prime minister. The publicly financed Depart-
ment of Religious Affairs (dRA) was founded in 1956 and was purposed 
to promote Islam among non- Muslim, non- Arab Sudanese communities 
(particularly in the South). The dRA’s establishment ushered in the gov-
ernment’s targeting of education, and Ziada Arbab was one of the leading 
figures in this pro cess. In February 1957, Arbab announced government in-
tentions to take over mission schools. Implementation began two months 
 later. In 1958 Arbab was appointed minister of education and justice.7
The government’s Arab and Islamic push initiated a major parliamentary 
crisis. In 1956 a national committee was appointed to draft a constitution 
that would be presented to the Constituent Assembly. The proposed con-
stitution included Islam as the religion of state and Arabic as the national 
language. The Arab- Islamic push was coupled with northern re sis tance 
to federation, an opposition partially rooted in a fear that it would mean 
eventual separation. In March 1958 the first parliamentary elections  were 
held, and another Umma- pdp co ali tion government was formed. While the 
Umma government appointed three South Sudanese ministers, the Liberal 
Party had its nominations ignored. In response, southerners sought support 
from non- Arab mps. The government was unable to pass the  constitution, 
70 Chapter 3
leading to a stalemate. On June 16, 1958, all southern mps walked out when 
the Constituent Assembly rejected the federation proposal. Unable to  handle 
southern demands and economic prob lems, the co ali tion government was 
in a precarious position. On November 17, 1958, the army conducted a coup. 
Parliament was dissolved, and General Ibrahim Abboud assumed control. 
The new Sudanese leader tried to eliminate unrest in the South with Islam 
and Arabic.8
School programs  were soon Arabized, and missionaries  were removed 
from the educational system over a five- year period,  until their final expul-
sion in 1963–64. By September 1958, church schools had to provide Islamic 
instruction for Muslim students.  Those who embraced Islam  were given ad-
vantages in school recruiting. The gradual transferal of Christian teachers 
to the North meant a reduction in religious training for southern Chris-
tian students.9 In Ziada Arbab’s speech published in the December 27, 1958, 
issue of the Bahr El Ghazal Daily, he sugested that the education question 
(and Islam’s role in it) was crucial to establishing national unity. Claiming 
that “our growing Sudanese nation is rich with its spiritual potentialities,” 
he stated that national understanding could be reached through the study 
of Arabic in southern village and elementary schools. “We cannot build a 
good community and a sound Sudanese nationality,” Arbab argued, “ unless 
we take aid of the religious doctrine and quote from the philosophy of the 
Islamic Sharia.”10
In February 1960, the Friday Law replaced South Sudan’s Sunday holi-
day.11 This decree— which allowed Christians  free time to attend church 
services— was confronted by students at the forefront of the “Sunday Pro-
test.”12 Missions (particularly Protestant missions) had stressed the impor-
tance of their students needing rest on Sundays, and secondary students 
 were aware of the state’s Islamizing intentions  toward them. Protest from 
the Rumbek Secondary School was particularly virulent.  After Fr. Paolino 
Dogale printed protest papers, he and the Rumbek student leaders  were 
arrested and sentenced to prison. Perhaps the pinnacle of antigovernment 
angst occurred in the wake of the 1962 Missionary Socie ties Act. It de-
manded that Sudanese pastors be registered and licensed by the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs and Endowment and that registered church workers 
be paid by this ministry, aiming to allow the government unlimited inter-
ference with missionaries. Section 3 stipulated that no missionary society 
or member do any mission work outside the terms of a license granted by 
the council of ministers. The act’s ultimate intention was clarified in 1964, 
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when the government ordered the expulsion of all foreign missionaries 
from South Sudan.13
southern re sis tance
As the Sunday Protest demonstrated, many southerners  were not con-
tent to stand idly by while the government enacted its policies. In 1962 
Fr. Saturnino Lohure, William Deng, Clement Mboro, and Joseph Oduho 
formed the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union. When the 
headquarters moved to Kampala, the name was shortened to the Sudan 
African National Union (sAnu). Consisting primarily of southerners, the 
organ ization pushed for complete separation. In 1963 the sAnu founded 
Voice of Southern Sudan, a magazine published from Britain with missionary 
assistance.14
In July 1963, Saturnino and Oduho visited Eu rope to procure financial as-
sistance and support. In Rome they formulated the idea of a guerrilla move-
ment that would need propaganda to rouse the support of exiled southern 
intellectuals, former Equatorial Corps members, southern students, and 
 others. Saturnino proposed that this military wing be named the Sudan Pan- 
African Freedom Fighters to attract Pan- African sympathizers throughout 
the continent. sAnu members opposed his sugestion, preferring a name 
with local meaning. In the end, administrative secretary Severino Fuli sug-
gested the indigenous name Inyanya. The Inyanya borrowed its name from 
the poison of the Gabon viper. Joseph Lagu— who was commissioned as a 
lieutenant in the Sudanese Army before joining the re sis tance movement— 
sugested that the spelling begin with A (which he believed would be easier 
to pronounce). A policy paper dated July 31, 1963, outlined a program based 
on two foundational aims—to wage a liberation war against Arab imperial-
ism for complete southern in de pen dence and to fight another war against 
illiteracy.15 It is useful to note that  people in the Upper Nile disdained and 
rejected the term Anyanya, choosing instead their own names reflecting the 
Anyanya’s goals but with greater appeal to their own culture. The Dinka of 
Bahr el- Ghazal, for example, named the southern military Koc Roor.16 A 
loose phrase used by the Dinka to describe the Anyanya, it means “ people 
of the forest” or “guerrilla fighters” in Dinka— those who fought with hit- 
and- run tactics. The Anyanya fighters  were also deemed Koc Roor  because 
they  were considered to be living in the forest or bush, not having a perma-
nent home.17
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On September 30, 1964, the first seminar on the southern prob lem was 
held at the University of Khartoum. Being hitherto unable to crush the 
southern rebellion, the government was forced to appease its critics and 
improve its image. In mid- October 1964 it announced that University of 
Khartoum students would be allowed to publicly discuss the southern di-
lemma. On the eve ning of October 21, the student  union held a meeting 
to discuss the Southern Prob lem and concluded that the situation would 
never be resolved as long as the regime remained in power. The government 
then reversed its decision and banned  future meetings. The following eve-
ning, students defied the ban by holding another meeting on campus. This 
decision led to a clash between students and police. Known as the October 
Revolution, the uprising led to Abboud’s overthrow and replacement by a 
transitional government responsible for supervising elections.18
While the October Revolution may have given southerners reason to 
hope that change was on the horizon, internal divisions loomed. When 
the Abboud regime was unseated, William Deng wrote to the new civilian 
prime minister, Sirr el Khatim el Khalifa. Deng stated that, for all intents 
and purposes, the sAnu was ready to return to the February 1958 circum-
stance, when the first Constituent Assembly was elected (provided that 
 there be a clear northern commitment to federation this time). The sAnu 
exiles in Kampala, however, did not support this position. A national con-
vention to reor ga nize the sAnu was held in Kampala in November 1964. 
While Oduho hoped to be reaffirmed as president, Joseph Lagu solicited 
sAnu deputy secretary general Agrey Jaden to challenge Oduho so that 
he would not run unopposed. Nugent School alum Jaden defeated Oduho 
by a single vote and won the presidency. Oduho subsequently formed his 
own faction (the Azanian Liberation Front), and Deng refused to accept his 
demotion. Deng’s former colleagues announced that they had suspended 
him from occupying any office.19
The sAnu was beset with personality, factional, and ethnic differences 
over policy. R. O. Collins once noted that the organ ization’s most public 
failure was its incapacity to establish a  viable sAnu organ ization outside 
Sudan’s borders. And yet, under ground southern cells developed outside the 
sAnu fold. One of them— the Southern Front— was a rival southern po liti-
cal organ ization in Khartoum. In March 1965 the Round  Table Conference 
in Khartoum was the first meeting to directly address the South’s  future 
within the country since in de pen dence. While all the northern parties  there 
refused to accept separation as a solution, the southern parties— including 
the sAnu— were divided. Santino Deng’s Sudan Unity Party stood for na-
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tional unity, while the Southern Front, Anyanya, and sAnu wanted seces-
sion. No resolution was achieved. William Deng backed away from self- 
determination and stayed as leader of sAnu “inside” to work for a federal 
solution, while Oduho and Jaden returned to Uganda as leaders of the sepa-
ratist sAnu “outside.” The new government pursued military action against 
the Anyanya and worked with southerners who favored unity.20
a changing church
While the war years saw major changes within the national po liti cal fold, 
significant evolutions  were also in store for the Sudanese church. Sudanese 
Christian communities at in de pen dence  were prototypical mission station 
communities that depended on non- Sudanese individuals for major leader-
ship (though locals provided  limited leadership).21 The Dinka church pri-
marily comprised students, former students, and  those who had moved to 
towns or near mission stations. It was smaller in comparison to other groups 
like the Moru, who— though a smaller ethnicity— had nearly the same 
amount of  people confirmed during Bishop Oliver Allison’s 1960 tour of the 
South as the Dinka did. Before the 1960s the Nuer church was also small, 
with Chris tian ity  limited to three mission schools that few Nuer attended, 
even following the government’s 1947 effort to begin encouraging educa-
tion. While South Sudan’s population around in de pen dence was approxi-
mately 2.8 million, this number dwarfed the number of Christians in the 
South that the Roman Catholic Church, Church Missionary Society (Cms), 
and American Presbyterian Mission collectively tallied in 1956: 206,751, or 
approximately 7.4  percent of the South’s estimated 1955 population. Most of 
 these Christians  were located in Equatoria province and, perhaps as a direct 
consequence,  were singled out for Islamization and Arabization.22
 After the nationalization of mission schools, evangelizing became dif-
ficult for churches, and with the foreign missionary expulsion of 1963–64, 
the military government intended to end Christian proselytizing in the 
South. And yet, the expulsion encouraged an opposite result: South Suda-
nese rather than Eu ro pe ans or Americans directed Sudanese churches. To 
be sure, decreasing Western missionary influence during the period was evi-
denced long before the expulsion. In 1944, the Catholic Church ordained 
its first Sudanese priest (Guido Akou) since 1887. Eight years  later Daniel 
Deng Atong was consecrated the first Sudanese Anglican bishop, and Ireneo 
Dud became the first Sudanese Catholic bishop. Dinka clergy officially took 
the reins of Anglican missionary work among the Dinka when missionary 
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Leonard Sharland returned to  England in 1959 and was not replaced by a Eu-
ro pean. Though the Cms mourned the missionary expulsion, it boasted just 
six missionaries in the South at the time. By 1964 the Episcopal Church had 
fifty- seven Sudanese pastors, while the Catholic Church ordained twenty- 
eight Sudanese between 1955 and 1964.23
In addition to the changing demographics of Christian leadership, the lay 
demographic was also changing. Conversions started to rise in the late 1950s, 
and Catholic baptisms at Isoke and Torit increased significantly from 1960 
to 1964. In 1961, Roman Catholic missionaries in eastern Equatoria mobi-
lized clergy and catechists and campaigned to bring  people into the church. 
More than seven thousand  people  were baptized that year. No random ini-
tiative, the campaign was done in response to the approaching enactment 
of the Missionary Socie ties Act.24 In late February 1964 the New York Times 
reproduced a  Reuters report that— statistical accuracy notwithstanding— 
indicated growth in the South Sudanese Church since the national census 
a de cade before. Listing the South’s population at approximately three mil-
lion, it stated that “Roman Catholic missions from countries other than the 
United States claim 400,000 to 500,000, the Church of  England 120,000 
and the American Mission of the Upper Nile (Presbyterian and Reformed), 
about 3,000.”25 Conversion to the local evangelical church in the southern 
Blue Nile also increased  after the expulsion. The Sudan Interior Mission 
had secured a foothold to work among the Uduk at Chali in 1938. Chali dis-
trict had belonged to the Upper Nile province (in the South)  until July 1953, 
when it became part of Blue Nile province (in the North).26
Among the Nuer  there  were hitherto few Christian converts outside the 
small, literate, and missionary- trained elite. Nonetheless, many viewed 
the burning of a southern church in Khartoum and the expulsion as cru-
cial turning points in their attitudes  toward the government and, conse-
quently, their willingness to rebel. While early Nuer converts appeared on 
the Ethiopian frontier during the war, western Nuer regions  were spared 
some of the war’s worst effects  because of unusually high floods that re-
stricted troop movements. Consequently, western Nuer did not experience 
the move  toward Chris tian ity as  those in the East did. Nevertheless, Nuer 
now exposed other Nuer in rural areas to Chris tian ity, and the Christian 
teachings so presented appeared less foreign than missionary instruction.27 
References  were made throughout the war to the songs and prophecies 
of Nuer prophet Ngundeng Bong, a late nineteenth- century figure who 
emerged as a leader around the time that condominium authority was 
starting to assert itself in the South. Southern Nilotic  peoples have a long 
Liberation War 75
tradition of religious leadership by inspired figures, and anthropologist 
E. E. Evans- Pritchard termed  these figures “prophets.” Douglas Johnson 
has noted that many Nuer have drawn parallels between the teachings of 
Christ and Ngundeng.28
The civil war era was a period of significant religious change for the Dinka. 
A combination of  factors generated new displacement and migration. Some 
young men went to North Sudanese cities to pursue diff er ent livelihoods, 
while the war forced  others into refuge outside the country. Both move-
ments led to a greater openness to Chris tian ity, an attraction rooted in ex-
posure to a world beyond  cattle camps and recognition of the need for new 
resources that education provided.29 During the 1960s many Jieng boys and 
young men left the South for North Sudanese urban centers, and as black 
youth sought opportunities in largely Muslim and Arab settings, many 
found a sense of solidarity in Catholic and Protestant “clubs.”30 Club at-
tendance meant learning to read the vernacular language and studying the 
Bible. The majority converted to Chris tian ity, a faith that provided a foun-
dation for a new communal identity. The Anglican congregation in Khar-
toum North became a primary gathering point for young Dinka mi grants. 
While an indigenous African church started to emerge among the Dinka 
during the sixties and seventies, and Christian adherence grew,  these de-
velopments  were principally driven by Dinka movement from their  cattle 
camps and villages. In this vein, the geographic expanse of Christian belief 
was what it had long been: Christian growth during the sixties still hap-
pened in towns, cities, and now refugee camps.31 “To be a Christian,” writes 
Jesse Zink, “still meant that Dinka had to leave the landscape in which they 
had been raised.”32
Black christian liBeration
Government attempts to inculcate the South with Islam and Arab culture 
gave way to violent military operations and atrocities that drove thousands 
to flee to neighboring countries. Many churches, schools, and villages  were 
destroyed in the summer of 1965, forcing many to flee into the bush or 
take exile in Zaire or Uganda. Northern troops destroyed Sudan’s Angli-
can theological college (Bishop Gwynne College), compelling students and 
staff to leave with their families to Uganda. In October 1969 the Ecumenical 
Programme for Emergency in Africa reported that approximately 180,000 
Sudanese refugees  were spread throughout several East African countries, 
West Cameroon, Eu rope, and the United States.33 Amid massive southern 
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flight  after 1963, Andrew Wheeler has noted, “in the insecurity and deprivation 
of  these years  great numerical growth took place, as well as a profound spiri-
tual deepening.”34
Within a milieu of vio lence, rebellion, and exile, vari ous individuals 
from several segments of society— including refugees, clerics, Anyanya, and 
 others— spiritualized their circumstances in extraordinary ways. Within 
this discourse, God was positioned as being concerned about the southern 
plight and working out their deliverance. This rhe toric was racialized in that 
southerners demonized Arabs and the Arab regime while framing them-
selves as God’s special  people analogous to the Israelites. The dissemination 
of this thought in personal and public spaces sugests a link between private 
religious views and the po liti cal goal of national in de pen dence; it represents 
a defining moment in the narrative of Sudanese po liti cal theology.
*  *  *
To begin, Arabs  were demonized in varying ways. Southerners driven to 
prevent a new chapter in the history of Sudanese slavery cited Arab inten-
tions to enslave blacks as a motivation driving government policies. Slavery, 
as a result, became a central ele ment to an articulated paradigm of racial 
war. In 1963, exile Zacharia Duot de Atem wrote to his former teacher 
that “the Northern Sudanese . . .  are actually attempting to transform the 
Southerners into a servile  people who  will always be the servants of the 
muslims. . . .  They are determined to convert us into an abundant source of 
slaves for the Arab World.”35 Another example comes from President Ibra-
him Nyigilo of the Southern Sudan Christian Association. In January 1962, 
refugees in East Africa established a  sister organ ization called the Sudanese 
Christian Association in East Africa (sCAeA). Headquartered in Kampala, 
members sought support from Christian organ izations and communities 
in East Africa and farther abroad, wanting to draw global attention to the 
persecution in Sudan. Although it took on the appearance of an organi-
zation aimed at assisting refugees, it was actually a front organ ization for 
the sAnu. The financing body of the liberation movement, it secretly raised 
funds, facilitated contacts, provided accommodations for members, and 
promoted sAnu and Anyanya po liti cal and military goals. The association’s 
scholarship program was perhaps its greatest legacy, producing most of the 
southern leadership  after the war (including a young student named John 
Garang).36 In Nyigilo’s letter to the un secretary general, African heads of 
state, and church leaders, he remarked,
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We would not accept unity based on our national degradation, cultural 
and po liti cal slavery. The African everywhere, is rediscovering the Afri-
can image and personality, you would not ask us to suffer the fate of Arab 
racialism and colonialism. In such a nation as the Sudan is constituted 
 today, the African  shall remain nothing but a slave . . .  at the best a sec-
ond rate citizen. We have no choice but to fight for freedom.37
The sACnu (the acronym occasionally used by the exile movement in 
1962) implored Milton Obote to recognize that liberated African nations 
 were responsible for helping to  free Africans still strugling  under a for-
eign yoke. Arguing that Sudanese nationalism was part of the Pan- Arab 
movement and had never positioned itself with Africanism, southerners 
 were suffering  under a yoke akin to their ancestral bondage: “in the Sudan 
the Arab invaders are holding the four million Negroes in chains, who[se] 
grandparents they had in the last  century raided and sold into slavery. 
[Arabs] call the  great nilotics and nilo- hamites, verily the Negroes  here, 
slaves.”38
 After witnessing atrocities caused by security forces in Juba and Wau, 
Bishop Ireneo Dud expressed to the minister of interior that this “inhu-
man behaviour” could not secure God’s protection.39 The perception that 
southerners  were strugling against  people who  were operating outside the 
confines of humanity and God’s grace embellished the seemingly ingrained 
nature of northern Arab cruelty. As an unnamed writer expressed to a priest 
in 1965, “I do not trust an Arab in my life even when an Arab says he has 
seen god I would not believe so.”40 The notion that one’s actions could 
expel  people— and Arab soldiers specifically— from God’s grace was also ex-
pressed in poetic verse by J. M. Deng in the April 1971 issue of Grass Curtain. 
Grass Curtain was published from London by the Southern Sudan Associa-
tion, an organ ization formed in 1970. Directed by Mading de Garang, at 
one point the Anyanya High Command revised and  adopted a plan to use 
the Curtain as an effective medium for the movement.41 Invoking the legacy 
of past invasions and fifteen years of war, Deng lamented, “They feel  free 
now / To lay you waste. . . . / Defying the Almighty’s  great hands / In their 
reckless disregard of humanity.”42 Joseph Lagu similarly levied the “inhuman” 
label on the government when in a 1971 issue he exclaimed that Khartoum’s 
response to Anyanya development programs in the countryside had “always 
been inhuman, brutal and barbaric.”43
Some clerics inferred that the trou bles they faced  were nothing short of 
dev ilish, claims implying that policies that stifled the church and wrought 
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suffering  were essentially evil. An October 1965 letter written by Eduardo 
Mason, Sisto Mazzoldi, Domenico Ferrara, and Herman te Riele to Bishop 
Dud and all southern clergy and laity expressed such sentiments. Each au-
thor occupied positions in Sudanese Catholic leadership: Mason had been 
the vicar apostolic of Bahr el- Ghazal before his appointment as vicar apos-
tolic of El Obeid; Ferrara was the prefect of Mupoi; Mazzoldi was the pre-
fect apostolic of Bahr el- Gebel; and Riele, the prefect of Malakal.44 Express-
ing sorrow at the violent deaths of priests Barnaba Deng and Arkangelo Ali, 
they cited Matthew 5:11 (“blessed are  those that are persecuted for Christ’s 
sake”) and acknowledged that the southern church “carried on valiantly as 
faithful disciples of Jesus, in the midst of  trials and difficulties which  were 
meant by the devil to take the faith from you and to take you out of the 
Church.”45 A Comboni priest of Dinka Malwal background, Barnaba Deng 
had the distinction of being ordained by Cardinal Giovanni Montini— the 
 future Pope Paul VI—in 1959. Police mounted a deadly search for him  after 
he was accused of assisting the rebels. Fleeing to Wau, Deng was eventually 
arrested and killed. Arkangelo Ali was ordained into the Catholic priest-
hood in 1946. On the morning of July 21, 1965, military trucks burst into the 
Rumbek mission compound. The two  fathers stationed  there  were ordered 
to walk in front of the soldiers.  After being taken  under the veranda, Fr. 
Ali was killed. The soldiers hid his body.46  Later that year Fr. Avellino Wani 
started a letter to Bishop Dud by echoing the belief that spiritual warfare 
was operating in the conflict: “Before greeting you, I would insul[t] the dev-
il! . . .  How much it tries to destroy and wickedly demoralize and despair-
ingly disperse us! But in vain.”47
An anecdote from William Levi sheds further light on the perception 
that spiritual forces  were operating in Sudan. Born in 1964 to Messianic 
Jewish parents, Levi’s  family lived in the village of Moli, in Equatoria. In his 
autobiography The Bible or the Axe, Levi notes that the situation in Sudan had 
become increasingly tenuous in 1965. “No one was safe. . . .  Churches  were 
burned, schools closed, and crops destroyed. . . .  Later that year [1965], my 
parents de cided that the time had come to leave their beloved homeland. 
With heavy hearts, they set about the difficult task of moving to Uganda.”48 
He recalls one religion class from his days as a grade two student in Nyakan-
ingwa. Although the anecdote took place during the postwar period of the 
1970s, it illustrates how the  people and events of the day  were perceived 
through a spiritual point of view. Ephesians 6:10–13 was the topic of study, 
and as the class contemplated the meaning of the scripture, the teacher— 
Levi’s grand father— stated:
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“ There is an  enemy . . .  one who would erase the name of Yeshua from 
our country, and would gladly shed our blood to gain his ground. Who 
can name our  enemy?” . . .  A hand went up. “The Muslims of Khar-
toum are our enemies. They would like to drive Christians from this 
country.” A murmur of agreement filled the room,  until my grand-
father silenced it. . . .  “No. . . .  We do not strug le against flesh and 
blood. . . .  Satan is our  enemy. He blinds the eyes of the Muslims to the 
gospel message.”49
Amid accusations that Arabs  were “inhuman” in their cruelty and fight-
ing on the wrong side of spiritual warfare, southern clerics and laity re-
quested God’s help in dealing with such foes.  These sentiments  were often 
expressed in private correspondences. Michael Maror Liec reacted to the 
missionary expulsion by praying that peace could be achieved peacefully: 
“All the priests of ours . . .  are deported back by the Arabs, but nevertheless 
God is  great. Let us pray to God so that we achieve our country without 
blood(shed).”50 Former mission student Elia Seng Majok, writing as a po liti-
cal refugee in the Central African Republic, prayed that through God’s help 
the Arabs could be chased out and defeated despite their strength. For this 
Majok asked former teacher Fr. Matordes to help “by praying for us to get 
our freedom.”51 Refugee Juliano Kita, writing from the Congo, closed one 
letter to a Catholic  brother with the hope that “God help us from Arbation 
[Arabization].”52
In the midst of travails with the government, southerners invoked spe-
cific moments from biblical Israel’s history. One such instance occurred 
 after the expulsion of American Presbyterian missionary Dorothy Rankin. 
Rankin found herself in the government’s crosshairs in early 1961. Charged 
with “causing ill feeling and hatred  towards the Government of the Sudan” 
at her Doleib Hill station, Rankin was summoned to appear before the po-
lice investigator at Malakal on April 25, 1961.53 Two incidents  were in ques-
tion: one in which she reportedly criticized the quality of the food (in refer-
ence to school regulations) and another in which she reportedly punished 
workers who had worked on Sunday by lowering their pay. Even though 
permanent undersecretary of the interior Hassan Abdulla stated that the 
evidence was not sufficient or reliable enough to warrant  legal action in 
courts,  there was enough evidence to warrant administrative action. In an 
irreversible decision, Rankin was ordered out of the country on August 20, 
1961.54 The following month, one of Rankin’s students wrote a letter to her 
that likened her situation with that of biblical Joseph:
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God  will help us.  There was a man named Joseph. That man was . . .  sold 
to the Arabs and was taken away by the Arabs.  There was a famine in 
their land. When he interpreted the king of Egypt’s dream he was made 
chief of the dura store. And when his  brothers came he recognized them 
but he  didn’t tell them who he was,  because he  wasn’t angry at them 
and even gave them grain. Now  don’t you be upset, for God  doesn’t hold 
any hard feeling, and He loves all, except  those who refuse His Word He 
punishes.55
While the biblical narrative describes the group that enslaved Joseph and 
brought him into Egypt as “Ishmaelites”— people who perhaps came from 
east of the Jordan River— the student’s decision to describe them as “Arabs” 
is significant, given the government’s Arabization policies at the time.56 
While not as direct as Mabuong’s insertion of Arabs into Lamentations 3, 
this student’s letter reads as an attempt to place the missionary expulsion in 
an older narrative of Arab mistreatments of God’s  people.
Fr. Jerome Siri, writing from the Congo, related his con temporary 
 experiences with biblical Israel’s exile to Babylon. Siri had been ordained 
a Catholic priest in December 1948. He worked among the Zande for 
seven years and subsequently worked in the new Rumbek Vicariate. Siri 
was with Arkangelo Ali the day he was killed by government soldiers. 
Narrowly escaping, he reached Doruma in Zaire and translated and re-
vised Christian texts into Zande.57 Writing to Monsignor Domenico Fer-
rara, Siri expressed hope that God would quickly answer their prayers 
if he did not intend for them to suffer as long as their Israelite forebear-
ers: “ Here we feel out of place and homesick. If God does not intend to 
have our captivity as . . .  long as that of Babilon [sic], let Him listen to our 
sighs.”58
In Severino Fuli Boki Tombe Gaʾle’s 2002 autobiography, he references 
how Old Testament narratives  were applied to con temporary circumstances. 
Born in Nimule in 1922, he was baptized in 1934 and eventually joined Juba’s 
Province Headquarters Training School.  After his training had concluded, 
Severino became a ju nior accountant in Juba and became po liti cally active 
in Khartoum. With the likes of Abel Alier and Hilary Logali, he created a 
network of under ground cells that gathered funds inside Sudan to support 
the armed liberation strug le. Severino joined the liberation movement in 
Uganda in July 1963.59 As God had offered providential aid to the Israelites 
in their journey to the promised land, Severino offers an elaborate descrip-
tion of God’s assistance  after reaching Uganda.  After advancing fifty meters 
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past the Ugandan border, he relates that he called a halt. Kneeling down 
and facing Sudan, he prayed the following:
Lord Jesus Christ . . .  I thank you for the wonderful assistance you have 
accorded us in our flight . . .  guide my kids and indeed the entire family- 
members who have been thrown into destitution in Defence of your 
Christian faith and our cultural identity and origin . . .  which are being 
annihilated by the Arab North Government. . . .  Help me, Lord, to stand 
up like a man and like a man die, if necessary, in defence of our Christian 
Religion and Faith.60
Once in Uganda, he framed a fortuitous development with another mo-
ment in biblical history— Israel’s journey to the promised land. In 1967 the 
Parliament of Uganda passed a Trophy Act, which allowed Ugandans to 
sell an unlimited number of tusks, rhino horns, and reptile hides. One day, 
Ga’le was shown a par tic u lar batch of trophies that “was to be known from 
then on as the AnyAnyA mAnnA. Like in the case of Israel’s Manna which 
maintained the Jews  until they reached the promised land, the AnyAnyA 
mAnnA also sustained and indeed saved the AnyAnyA- Eastern Command 
from collapse  until . . .  1969.”61 The decision of Rankin’s student to reference 
Joseph, Fr. Siri’s mention of the Babylonian exile, and the labeling of Ugan-
dan trophies as manna each illustrate the ways in which Sudanese used bib-
lical history to encourage themselves and understand their circumstances.
Some refugees and  those who remained in the South used songs to ex-
press their hopes and fears. In some lyr ics, God was approached and de-
scribed as the providential agent that could change their lot. Several Kuku- 
Balokole songs written in the mid-1960s  were mixed with expectation for 
God’s deliverance and pleas for pity. Before the Torit Mutiny, most of the 
Kuku  people who lived in southwestern Equatoria believed in their ancestral 
spirits. Their well- being was largely attributed to their relations with  these 
spirits. An abundant harvest, for example, reflected happy spirits, while 
natu ral disasters  were attributed to their societal neglect.62 Chris tian ity’s 
arrival— and particularly the Church Missionary Society— marked a new 
era in Kuku religious belief systems, and  after the mutiny, many Kuku fled 
to Uganda, where during funerals “youth sang hymns, emotionally- laden 
songs, and beat drums all day and night to alleviate psychological pain.”63
Balokole connections to South Sudan can be inferred in part from the 
travels of Sosthenes Dronyi, a teacher who converted to Chris tian ity amid 
the East African Revival and became an evangelist. By the 1960s he re-
solved to undertake itinerant lay preaching throughout the region, and it 
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is estimated that through him thousands in Uganda,  Kenya, the Congo, and 
Sudan accepted Christ. As he is remembered in part for advocating African 
church  music, it is pos si ble that some of  these Kuku- Balokole songs  were 
indirectly inspired by or connected to Dronyi (or written by Kuku refugees 
in Uganda).64 Durham University’s Sudan Archive contains manuscripts of 
three songs that  were translated and transcribed by Enoch Lobiya, includ-
ing one that contains the lyr ics:
Ti yi moronic ko to’diri
Anyen yi tete’ya
Kujön kune a ti Sudan nikan
Nun wone konyen
Ko yi i döru kata ni
Let us in real ity strug le
That we may win.
The soil of the Sudan is ours
God pity us
 Here in the grass65
Another Kuku- Balokole song expressed a similar message, though with more 
of a tone of dread:
Jur likan lo
Lunasirik kuwe kulo rite ko Merok
Sudan ‘du’dudyö
Lunasirik Nun wone konyen
My  brothers!
Our land is occupied by enemies
The Sudan is ending
 Brothers, let God pity us.66
One song expressed hope in the following lines:
Momo’yi ta Nun
Talo juwe i boro kata
Yesu ko rinit duma lwögu
Na nutu
You who are driven to
The bush— pray to God.
Jesus has  great power
To save  people.67
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The Comboni Archives in Rome are flush with letters written by  those 
who acknowledged God’s providence in the inexplicable ways their lives had 
been spared. Several cited God as directly intervening in their encounters 
with Arab soldiers. Fr. Adelino Fuli, rector of St. Augustine’s Minor Semi-
nary at Tore, recounted an attack from Arab soldiers in which he expressed 
that God had helped them escape with the effect of bullets passing over their 
heads.68 Athian Joseph shared with Fr. Arthur Nebel a similar story of God’s 
saving action in the lives of three men who  were heading to Juba despite 
shooting and  house burning in the area. “The Arab soldiers . . .  began fir-
ing [at] them across the Nile,” Joseph wrote. “One of the soldiers said: ‘Dak 
Abuna Kabir; be  human edrib’ (shoot him), but God had put an unseen shiled 
[sic]  behind which H. Lorship stood with his flock. Three- four bullets passed 
by them but none of them so far was touched.”69 Felix Kule stated that God 
assisted Anyanya forces in a clash against Arab soldiers.  After stating that the 
Anyanya had shot down a plane in Maridi, Kule wrote, “The Almighty God 
punished them that day by confusing them thus shooting each other while 
the tactful Anya- Nya made their way off without any losses.”70
Just as clerics noted God’s work in their encounters with Arab soldiers, 
exilic stories regularly featured recognitions of divine intervention. A letter 
written by “D. Paul” (Fr. Paolino Dogale) recounts a tale in which priests at 
Tore Minor Seminary accused of harboring Anyanya soldiers  were pursued 
by government troops.  These troops had  orders to arrest them and destroy 
a nearby mission.  After mentioning that physical destruction had occurred, 
Dogale noted that “through God’s Providence the Priests and the Semi-
narists managed to escape and fled to Congo.”71 Writing from the Central 
African Republic, Alfredo Akot Bak wrote to an Italian priest that God had 
assisted his trek to the Congo. Despite sadness on hearing that missionaries 
had been expelled, he expressed that only God knew when the South would 
be delivered from the Arabs’ hands.72 Bro. Gabriel Ngor similarly recognized 
God’s hand in his passage to Uganda.  After stating that the towns of Juba, 
Torit, Maridi, and  others  were nearly empty  because of widespread killings 
done by government forces, Ngor explained to Fr. Giuseppe Gusmini that 
 after eight days roaming in the bush in adverse conditions, his well- being 
could only be attributed to God’s help.73
Fi nally,  there was the confidence that southerners  were special in God’s 
sight and that he was concerned with their success and freedom—as his 
 children. This sense of national destiny provided a sense that God would 
reward southern efforts in the face of uncertainty, an impor tant spiritual 
undercurrent to the strug le. As one anonymous writer asserted in 1965, 
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“The pre sent conflict . . .  is not only a Po liti cal, social, Eco nom ical, but also 
a Religious and [Racial] . . .  issue. How it is  going to be solved, and when, 
the answer rests with God and his abandoned  children of the South, who 
are beseeching Him to bring peace.”74 While the imagery of God’s  children 
praying for peace was perhaps meant to evoke sympathy, Nouvel Observateur 
reported Anyanya dances that included the line “We the  children of Mary 
 will kill the Arabs,” words that illustrated the  union of spiritual identity and 
racial warfare.75
One war song read as follows:
The war is hot: Enemies are strong;
But Lord’s  people  will not be defeated at all.
If we are with him, he would save us,
He who  can’t change, we  shall defeat . . .
he had agreed you, to be his  people;
In the work of the King let us [trust],
Let us be strong in his power.76
One Kuku po liti cal song expressed the author’s request of God for 
deliverance:
Yi kwkwaddu nun lo
Yi kwkwaddu nun lo gweja yi
Yi kwkwadou lepen ti yne tiki yi
Toliyen nikay na Southern Sudan
We pray to God
We pray to you who created us
We pray let Him give us
Our freedom of Southern Sudan77
In Rodolfo Deng’s letter to Fr. Nebel, he expresses his conviction that 
victory was assured  because of their special relationship to God. Despite 
the recent deaths of priests Arkangelo Ali and Barnaba Deng at the hands 
of Arab soldiers, Deng was convinced that the righ teousness of their cause 
and divine assistance would ensure their eventual success: “We  shall not 
surrender . . .  the road to Liberty is ‘de facto’ one of bloodshed. We  shall 
win  because the truth is on our side . . .  Confident in God’s Providence, 
of History and in our . . .  Mother Mary we  shall fight on . . .  we have the 
mightiest of all weapons— Prayer.”78 When Pope Paul VI visited Africa in 
1969, Emedio Tafeng conjectured that the papal visit was a sign from God 
meant specifically for southern Sudan. Tafeng, chairman of the Revolution-
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ary Council and president of the Anyidi government, addressed a letter to 
the Pontiff and conjectured that “perhaps Your visit is a God sent occasion 
to mark the beginning of our  human recognition and eventual Liberation 
from the hands of our destryers [sic].”79
peace without freedoM: the addis aBaBa agreeMent
General Jaʿafar al- Nimeiri seized power in Sudan on May 25, 1969, ending 
the period of parliamentary politics that the 1964 October Revolution had 
begun. Public opinion generally accepted the new government, as party 
politics had been unable to solve the Southern Prob lem. Nimeiri, despite 
an attempted coup in 1971, regained his position, and the May Revolution 
continued. In March 1972 it achieved what no Sudanese government had 
done yet: ending the civil war.80
Negotiations commenced at the Addis Ababa Hilton  Hotel on Febru-
ary 16, 1972. Conducted with Haile Selassie’s blessing,  there was a basic 
understanding that the talks would produce a plan for regional autonomy 
rather than a separate southern state. Though the Southern Sudan Libera-
tion Movement originally demanded a southern state, African governments 
in the 1970s  were opposed to secessionist movements. Selassie, himself 
fighting secessionists in Eritrea, was among this number. The long con-
flict reached its conclusion when Nimeiri announced the following month 
that a peace settlement had been reached. The specifics of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement  were multilayered, but the key component was that it granted 
regional autonomy to the South  under the governing umbrella of the na-
tional government. The World Council of Churches, All Africa Council of 
Churches, and Sudan Council of Churches worked as intermediaries and 
messengers for both sides.81
William Levi attended a ribbon- cutting ceremony in Chinyaquia, where 
Lagu and Nimeiri commemorated the agreement. “As the fragments of the 
delicate ribbon fluttered to the ground,” he noted, “a  great roar erupted . . . 
southern Sudan would have the authority to govern her own affairs without 
interference from the North. For millions of Sudanese refugees, it was a 
chance to go home at long last.”82 One group of exiles employed the theme of 
Babylonian exile to memorialize the refugee return. A sign carried between 
bamboo poles was adorned with a quotation from Jeremiah 23:3: “Then 
I  will gather the remnant of my flock out of all the countries where I have 
driven them. The returnees.”83 Given P. K. Mabuong’s  earlier borrowing 
from Jeremiah’s Lamentations to decry the South’s situation, the recogni-
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tion that God was now bringing the refugees back to the South brought the 
situation full circle. While  those  people evoked an Old Testament prophet, 
 others hearkened to Nuer prophet Ngundeng. Peter Gatkuoth Gual was a 
deputy for Abel Alier, minister for southern affairs and leader of the govern-
ment negotiating team at Addis Ababa. Following the agreement, Gatkuoth 
met with Lou chiefs, who told him that Ngundeng had predicted that peace 
would come from the east (Ethiopia’s direction); a Nuer with a left- handed 
 mother (which Gatkuoth’s  mother was); and a slim left- handed stranger 
(which described Alier).84 Thus,  people placed the Addis Ababa Agreement 
within longer prophetic traditions.
The changes experienced by the Sudanese Church during the war con-
tinued into the postwar era. In 1976 the Episcopal Church of the Sudan 
(eCs) became an in de pen dent province within the Anglican Communion. 
Within the Catholic Church, the vicariates and prefectures  were elevated 
in 1974 to metropolitan sees in Khartoum and Juba and five suffragan sees. 
The Sudan Council of Churches conducted development proj ects in both 
North and South Sudan, and other Christian agencies like Norwegian 
Church Aid worked with vari ous medical, government, and educational 
programs throughout the South.  These agencies  were involved in the arrival 
of Ugandan refugees into Sudan following Idi Amin’s first demise and then 
Obote. “Only someone who experienced  these years in southern Sudan,” 
Wheeler wrote, “can adequately appreciate how the Churches grew in size, 
in their evangelistic and developmental endeavors, and in their institutional 
complexity.”85
*  *  *
During the First Sudanese Civil War, activists infused spirituality into their 
language of racial re sis tance, marking an impor tant development in the 
evolution of South Sudanese po liti cal thought. Several understood the war 
as a spiritual contest, and in this vein, figures like Joseph Lagu and Paolino 
Dogale conceptualized southerners as a community defined not only by 
their racial and cultural identity but by their favorable position in a narrative 
of oppression and liberation.
The public and private spaces in which southerners theologized their cir-
cumstances speaks to the fact that this theology was not aimed exclusively 
at non- Sudanese audiences for self- serving, sympathy- conjuring purposes. 
Personal religious views or thoughts expressed in private correspondences 
are diff er ent from public prophetic affirmations of faith. And yet, while this 
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book is principally concerned with what happens when politico- religious 
views are announced, the similarities found in public and private articula-
tions speak to a theology that was not confined to the public sphere. One 
must conclude, then, that the thoughts examined in this chapter  were not 
artificial or intended primarily to generate support from outside supporters 
(even if they did, in fact, help to render such support).
The circumstances in which this rhe toric emerged— during the infancy 
of decolonization, in sub- Saharan Africa’s first postcolonial state, and among 
this religious minority— invite the South Sudanese case to be placed in con-
versation with other con temporary instances of revolutionary movements 
in which race or religion  were primary points of division (Zanzibar and 
South Africa come to mind).86 The South Sudanese case provides a pro-
vocative lens into race and religion as public and policed po liti cal identities. 
Southern intellectuals, rather than approaching race and religion as mutu-
ally exclusive subjectivities, used theology as a crucible with which to define 
race. Fi nally, the Christian discourse highlights the ways in which biblical 
meta phors and imageries  shaped the thought of a diverse cadre of southern 
thinkers. Religious messages  were carried outside traditionally devotional 
contexts by clerics, laypeople, civilians, and soldiers. This real ity points to 
the importance of expanding the scope of sources used to trace the influ-
ence of religious thought on early postcolonial po liti cal imaginaries.
Chapter 4 examines another theology that emerged in another war against 
Khartoum: the longer Second Sudanese Civil War.
4
Khartoum Goliath
the Martial theology of splm/spla update
Like Biblical Philistine Goliath
The nif  enemy looks  giant and  great
tricky and treacherous all the time . . .
Says thousands of mega- ton lies
In the name of false Arabism and
distorted Islam . . .
The nif  bitter  enemy gives terror and destruction
To the  people of Southern Sudan, Nuba and Ingessena
But Alas! The brave furious confident splA
Like Biblical small David with stone and sling
The splA keeps Goliath at bay
The stone and sling of our splA  will smash and mash the skull of nif
Falling dead face downward
Marking the beginning of the end
Like Goliath defeated by  little David
The nif brutal  enemy is doomed . . .
With sure triumphant victory
We  shall shout splA Oyee
— Isaac D. Malith, 1995
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The Philistines and Israelites  were gathered for war. While the Philistines 
occupied one hill, King Saul and his Israelites  were camped on another. A 
valley lay between them. Goliath, a Philistine champion and mountain of a 
man, donned the regalia of war— a bronze helmet, a bronze coat of armor, 
bronze greaves on his legs, a bronze javelin on his back, a spear, and a shield. 
“Choose a man,” he taunted, “and have him come down to me. If he is able 
to fight and kill me, we  will become your subjects; but if I overcome him and 
kill him, you  will become our subjects and serve us.” Goliath took his stand 
 every morning and eve ning for forty days. Now David, son of Jesse, had 
been anointed by the prophet Samuel to rule as Israel’s  future king. Jesse 
asked his son to take grain and bread to his  brothers in the camp. Early one 
morning, David left his flock in a shepherd’s care, loaded up, and set out. 
He reached the camp just as the army was moving into its  battle positions 
and shouting the war cry. Leaving his items, David ran to the  battle lines 
and asked how his  brothers  were  doing. As he was speaking to them, Goli-
ath shouted his habitual message. The shepherd boy asked  those standing 
near him, “What  will be done for the man who kills this Philistine and re-
moves this disgrace from Israel? Who is this uncircumcised Philistine that 
he should defy the armies of the living God?” David informed Saul that he 
would fight the  giant. Saul conceded, and David warned Goliath that “the 
 whole world  will know that  there is a God in Israel. All  those gathered  here 
 will know that it is not by sword or spear that the Lord saves; for the  battle 
is the Lord’s and he  will give all of you into our hands.” With stone and sling 
David stunned Goliath, decapitated him with his own sword, and became 
a legend.1
Goliath’s physical and sartorial description represented the real ity of 
superior Philistine wealth, militancy, and technology. Despite  these ad-
vantages, the Israelites had God on their side. As Goliath and David repre-
sented each of their respective armies, their tête- à- tête was a strug le not 
only between two men but also between lifestyles and gods, with the domi-
nant position in a master- slave hierarchy at stake.2 It has also been surmised 
that while modern racial understandings had no real basis in 1 Samuel or 
its ancient contexts, biblical tradition often cast the Philistines as an Other 
to Israel in a higher degree than its other neighbors. For example, Philis-
tines  were castigated for being uncircumcised while Israel and most of its 
neighbors practiced circumcision. Matthew Arnold states that based on the 
German use of the word Philistine, the term “must have originally meant . . . 
a strong, doged, unenlightened opponent of the chosen  people. . . .  They 
regarded [the Philistines] as . . .  enemies to light; stupid and oppressive, but 
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at the same time very strong.”3 In the mid-1990s, South Sudanese in the 
midst of the Second Sudanese Civil War wanted the Bible to address them 
so that their place in the world could be recognized. Apart from the Bible, 
few other sources  were available with which to interpret their position.4 
Episodes from biblical Israel’s history, like David’s clash with Goliath, be-
came popu lar narratives to fit the modern situation.
The Sudanese government framed its fight against rebel forces as a jihad 
to recruit more Muslims into the ranks of the Popu lar Defense Force (pdf). 
The theme of Islamic martyrdom obscured the war’s high level of casual-
ties sustained by ill- trained pdf members. In a similar fashion, southern 
leaders infused religious themes into their thought and action. Churches 
and other Christian institutions and communities fashioned theologi-
cal responses to the war, and many understood their strug le in terms of 
biblical themes, especially that of suffering. Though the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (splm) never officially affiliated with any religion 
and maintained a policy of religious toleration, it manipulated religion to 
mobilize and garner support at home and abroad. The Sudan  People’s Lib-
eration Army (splA) was transformed into a largely Christian force that 
explic itly used Christian themes and language as propaganda.5
The SPLM/SPLA Update is impor tant to the genealogy of religious poli-
tics through its contribution to the Second Civil War’s framing in spiritual 
terms and the significance of circulating print media in the dissemination 
of po liti cal theology. Published by the splm and splA, the Update published 
content that constituted a martial theology pitting the splA against the 
National Islamic Front (nif). Founded by Hasan al- Turabi, the Islamist nif 
co-ruled the country under his po liti cal guidance.6  After the war’s 2005 
conclusion, splA leader John Garang became “Moses,” and Isaiah’s proph-
ecy concerning Cush was referenced as foretelling southern in de pen dence. 
Paralleling themes that could be heard over Radio splA, Update contribu-
tors fashioned new theories of conflict and identity and attempted to lend 
a unified theory of divine “chosenness” and victory over an evil  enemy.7 
By featuring David, Moses, and Isaiah, this martial theology was gendered 
masculine.
Rather than acting as proselytizers, contributors  were creative intellec-
tuals who or ga nized a spiritual, liberatory account of the war.  These authors 
interpreted events inside biblical and ancient Israelite templates, placed cir-
cumstances in a narrative trajectory, and transformed po liti cal history into 
a spiritual chronicle. That chronicle attracted readers beyond Sudan’s po-
liti cal borders, situating itself within a global Sudanese diaspora and reach-
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ing into the ancient past to locate the strug les of Sudanese Christians in 
an older story of divine chosenness. That the Update was a secular medium 
illustrates the importance of diversifying the sources in which we search 
and analyze the percolation of religious thought in the diaspora. Though it 
may be natu ral to zero in on religious spaces like churches, religious orga-
nizations, and media, secular arenas are also significant spaces to explore 
contours of religious ideology. The danger of marginalizing  those spaces 
in such investigations is to ignore impor tant ways that religion shapes and 
cuts across the totality of lived experiences in the Sudanese diaspora and, 
more broadly, the Africana world.
the spla and gloBal christendoM
Repeated violations of the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement led to a Sec-
ond Civil War, which began in 1983. The Regional Self- Government Act 
worked in concert with the 1973 constitution to establish power- sharing 
arrangements formed between the government and a unified southern re-
gion. A de cade  after  these establishments, President Jaʿafar al-Nimeiri en-
acted Sharia law (he realized that he could no longer fend off opposition 
from the religious right). Nimeiri also repealed the Addis Ababa Agreement 
and divided the South into regions based on the old Equatoria, Upper Nile, 
and Bahr el- Ghazal provinces. In May 1983, an army mutiny in the Upper 
Nile marked the beginning of the Sudan  People’s Liberation Movement and 
Army (splm/A).8
Before the Second Civil War, Chris tian ity in South Sudan was more 
closely linked with educated and formally employed  people living in towns 
rather than  those in rural areas. Southerners saw Christian missions as 
bases to learn skills like literacy rather than resources for spiritual direc-
tion. Christian conversions in the East increased  after the conclusion of the 
First Civil War. Sharon Hutchinson explains that this development repre-
sented a Nuer attempt to resist a coercive government increasingly stirred 
by Islamic fundamentalist princi ples. In addition to such conversions, Nuer 
 labor migration to northern cities  after the hostilities transformed many 
northern churches into social and educational centers in scattered, estrang-
ing urban landscapes. The Second Civil War destroyed the southern urban 
life that had been connected with Chris tian ity, and against the backdrop of 
the government’s politicization of Islam, many southerners began to view 
churches as po liti cal allies. Churches, particularly in northern cities, of-
fered displaced southerners clubs that provided religious teaching, literacy 
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classes, and other social services— resources that, according to Francis Deng, 
allowed them to build broader relationships and a sense of unity.9 The 2005 
ciA World Factbook reported that Sudan’s population was 70  percent Muslim 
and 5  percent Christian, while 25  percent adhered to indigenous religions. 
Christian leaders, however, put their numbers quite higher. One report, pub-
lished in 2007, noted that the Episcopal and Catholic churches  were strongest 
among the Dinka, while the Presbyterians  were foremost among the Nuer.10
Two events had major repercussions on the splm/splA’s trajectory and 
the politicization of Chris tian ity in the war. The first was the nif’s rise 
to power and General Omer al- Bashir’s ascendance to national leadership. 
Or ga nized  after Nimeiri’s 1985 ouster, the nif was an outgrowth of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Its program underscored national unity and, as a 
consequence, presented federalism as an answer to civil war. Perhaps most 
significant was the policy that Islamic law is the only enforceable law. In 
1989 al- Bashir came to power in a June coup that unseated Prime Minister 
Sadiq al- Mahdi’s co ali tion government. Al- Bashir instituted a host of mea-
sures centralizing national power and silencing opposition: all po liti cal par-
ties  were banned, government leaders and scores of military leaders  were 
arrested, and the constitution, national assembly, and trade  unions  were 
abolished. The Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation 
was established as the ruling body, and Hasan al- Turabi— the nif’s founder 
and ideologue— was considered the regime’s main theorist. Southern reac-
tions to al-Bashir’s coup  were generally negative. A year into the new re-
gime, it had still not had any direct peace talks with the splm, and the issue 
of Islamic law was, generally speaking, non- negotiable for southerners.11
An splm/splA radio broadcast  after al- Mahdi’s overthrow indicated its 
sentiment moving forward. Citing the splm manifesto’s statement con-
cerning the ideal separation between mosque and state, the broadcast stated 
that “we advise El Bashir not to take the position taken by fundamentalists 
for that position is dangerous, unhistorical and alien to the Sudan and to 
Africa. . . .  Sharia, or any other religious law pertaining to other religions, is 
personal law, a relationship between the believer and his God.”12 However, 
the National Islamic Front had come to power in 1989 with the express aim 
of establishing an Islamic po liti cal order throughout the country.13
The fall of Ethiopia’s Mengistu regime was the second formative event, 
signaling impor tant shifts for the splA from an operational standpoint 
and in relation to Christian bodies. The splA lost its main supply lines and 
military bases in southwestern Ethiopia, and 350,000 South Sudanese  were 
forced to flee from their refugee camps. The regime’s collapse meant that 
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major changes  were in store for Radio splA. Radio SPLA: The Voice of Revolu-
tionary Armed Strug gle had been established  after the splm/splA was urged 
to create a revolutionary radio station. Located in suburban Addis Ababa, 
Radio splA made its first long- range broadcast in October 1984 and became 
a medium for broadcasting splm/A policy and changes,  battles with the 
Sudanese government, news, commentaries, war songs, and poems that 
celebrated the splA.14 Despite Radio splA’s popularity, the fall of the Men-
gistu regime spelled doom for the splm/A in Ethiopia. Radio splA went off 
the air in 1991, and though the movement had plans to use Upper Talanga 
as a new radio base, it was unstable. The movement needed to find another 
foreign communications base and turned to print media as a means to dis-
seminate information.15
Without the benefit of Ethiopia and cut off from its Marxist supporters, 
the splA’s relations with the church warmed. The evacuation of refugee 
camps— former arenas for evangelism— meant that many trained ministers 
and new Christians re entered the country. Military leaders began to show 
increasing re spect for the church, and Christian spirituality appeared among 
the soldiery. Combatants, for example, created makeshift chapels, and the 
cross was worn around necks and sewn into uniforms.  After al-Bashir’s coup 
the splA allowed church leaders more freedom of activity within splA- 
controlled areas. Church leaders  were also allowed to form the New Sudan 
Council of Churches (nsCC), which was joined by all southern churches 
in 1989 (Khartoum’s Sudan Council of Churches could no longer maintain 
contacts with churches in splA- controlled areas). This tightening of splA- 
church relations resulted in improved credentials with industrialized coun-
tries by sugesting religious freedom and Christian identity. The movement 
hoped that the West could be encouraged to give aid to the South, with 
the nsCC providing channels for assistance from Christian organ izations 
abroad. The council’s advocacy visits to  England, the World Council of 
Churches, and the Vatican successfully showcased South Sudanese needs. 
George Carey, the archbishop of Canterbury, repaid  these visits with one of 
his own in 1994.16
Amid the ethnic and orga nizational factionalism of the period, the 
church tried to rein in the military and reconcile ethnic groups. In Au-
gust 1991 the splA split into two warring factions, a division spurred by an 
unsuccessful coup led by the Nuer Riek Machar (along with other se nior of-
ficers) against commander- in- chief John Garang, a Dinka. The coup leaders 
rejected the splA’s stated po liti cal agenda and instead advocated South Su-
danese po liti cal in de pen dence. This rift eventually led to outright military 
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conflict between the Dinka and the Nuer, the South’s largest ethnic groups. 
Following the split, the church called for reconciliation and brought the 
factional leaders together for negotiation.17
Within the context of tensions between the splA and nsCC, the dia-
logue at the Anglican parish center of Kejiko in July 1997 was intended to 
allow wounds and misunderstandings to be discussed and to establish a mu-
tual agreement. The meeting resulted in the Yei Declaration, in which the 
splA and nsCC committed to closer cooperation in factional reconcilia-
tion, national peacemaking,  human rights promotion, and reconstructing 
“New Sudan” through activities like demining and demobilization. In 1998 
the nsCC’s Peace Department responded to cries for peace from Dinka and 
Nuer civilians in Upper Nile and Bahr el- Ghazal. Thirty- five  people met at 
Lokichogio, where Nuer and Dinka shared stories of suffering they had 
experienced  because of their interethnic conflict. The Lokichogio Confer-
ence demanded an end to abductions,  cattle raiding, and killing, and that 
all commanders halt hostile actions. Following this conference the Nuer 
and Dinka participants, along with nsCC staff, prepared for the first recon-
ciliation conference. More than two thousand  people witnessed the Wunlit 
Dinka- Nuer Conference in early 1999, where  people gained “release from 
their pain . . .  whilst at the same time identifying the issues that would have 
to be confronted and solved.” More than three hundred Nuer and Dinka 
leaders signed a covenant.18 Rev. William Lowrey, who during the 1960s 
had founded the first multiracial Christian organ ization at the University 
of Southern Mississippi, played no small part in reconciliation efforts. Ar-
riving in Sudan as a mission worker among the Nuer in 1991, Rev. Lowrey 
returned in 1998 as the peace con sul tant for the nsCC. Through the nsCC, 
Lowrey developed a People- to- People Peace Pro cess among the Nuer and 
the Dinka. In June 1998 he convened the Nuer- Dinka Chiefs and Church 
Leaders Reconciliation Conference in Loki,  Kenya.19
Lowrey’s actions point to the role of international activism. Following 
the splm/A split in 1991, the nsCC found religious activists in the United 
States who  were  eager to pressure the American government to get involved 
in the war. This effort to link with American activists led to a co ali tion of 
religious and antislavery  human rights organ izations, which looked to pres-
sure the government to work  toward ending the war. The war, in its view, 
was between Arabs and Africans, Chris tian ity and Islam, and— particularly 
impor tant— masters and slaves.20 Modern Sudanese slavery was first re-
ported in American and British newspapers in the late 1980s, when raiders 
from the North started attacking southern villages. Christian Solidarity In-
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ternational (Csi) pioneered “slave redemptions,” paying traders from North 
Sudan to purchase captives and return them to their southern homes. A 
Csi representative would work with splA members during the redemp-
tion trips, and the Christians who redeemed the freed Sudanese typically 
addressed them. The American Anti- Slavery Group (AAsg) joined Csi in 
highlighting the issue of modern slavery in the South. American  human 
rights groups like Csi and AAsg linked the southern plight with that of 
Christians, blacks, and Jewish minorities in Amer i ca. Their work and hu-
manitarian rhe toric influenced the manner in which the conflict was rep-
resented in mainstream Western media. The ritualized slave redemptions 
resonated with slavery’s US history and marked the American and Sudanese 
participants in the redemptions as liberators.21
In 2000, Joe Madison— a civil rights activist, talk show host, and board 
member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
 People (nAACp)— went with Csi on a redemption trip. The following year 
Gloria White- Hammond, an African American co- pastor of Jamaica Plain’s 
(Boston) Bethel Ame Church, similarly set off on a Csi- organized redemp-
tion trip. Perceiving the abductions as modern slavery, White- Hammond 
and her group saw slave redemption as a way for them—as black American 
Christians—to address the weights they shouldered concerning slavery and 
Africa. Black pastors occupied a special position  because they could speak 
to race and religion. Activist ministers like Rev. Walter Fauntroy and Rev. 
Al Sharpton traveled to South Sudan, gave media interviews, and spoke at 
rallies and their churches. One cadre of black American pastors wrote to the 
Congressional Black Caucus demanding greater leadership on the Sudanese 
slavery issue. During White- Hammond’s 2001 trip, Csi informed Sudanese 
captives that they  were freed  because  there  were  people in Amer i ca (i.e., 
Christians, black Americans) who had been touched by their suffering.22
Beginning in the 1990s, Sudan entered the American evangelical mind 
as a site of Christian persecution. Samuel Moyn once noted that the Mus-
lim has taken the place of the Communist in the con temporary Eu ro pean 
imagination (with par tic u lar re spect to the  matter of religious liberty), 
and in this re spect, the post– Cold War context cannot be divorced from 
Amer i ca’s turn to Sudan. Only a de cade  after divisions over antiapartheid 
activism had showcased racial and po liti cal ruptures among theologically 
conservative believers, black and white Americans rallied around South 
Sudanese moral claims. More than being a mere evangelical fixation, the 
Sudan campaign became one of the most broad- based po liti cal co ali tions 
on international  matters since apartheid’s demise. Conservative pro- Israel 
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groups listed Sudan— behind Osama bin Laden and Hamas—as principal 
ele ments in the fight against the danger posed by “militant Islam.”23
spla update: origins, coMposition, and context
Many southern Christians viewed Chris tian ity as a unifying mechanism 
that could curtail ethnic strife and bind the region together against the 
North. Against the backdrop of ethnic conflict, some thought that since 
Muslims  were not fighting one another, a Christian South could be similarly 
united.24 Some elites in the South promoted the notion that Chris tian ity 
be fostered as an impor tant ele ment of southern identity, a religion that—
in league with  factors like En glish and indigenous languages— competed 
against North Sudan’s Arab and Islamic framework. Francis Deng called 
this “an essential ingredient in the hidden agendas of the war of visions,” 
even though, in his estimation,  those in the splm/splA leadership may not 
have openly supported that model.25 By the late 1980s, however, Machar 
recognized the potential for Christian conversion to galvanize southern 
re sis tance and encouraged conversion among civilians.26 One civil official 
in Bahr el- Ghazal explained, “Chris tian ity is needed to stand firm against 
encroaching civilisations. We need a Christian Fundamentalism.”27 With 
Radio splA off the air and a renewed emphasis on Chris tian ity’s position in 
the war, SPLM/SPLA Update became a medium with which to disseminate a 
martial theology of po liti cal dissent.
Created  after the splA fled Ethiopia, the Update was designed to keep 
accurate rec ords and reach  those who could not be reached through tradi-
tional communication. Alternate commander George Akol was appointed 
as its first director. Based in Nairobi, it was disseminated throughout East 
Africa  free of charge. Between 1992 and 2004 it was published almost  every 
week and was a channel of communication between the national leadership, 
diaspora, and Sudanese public. Most issues included commentaries, field 
updates, official reports, and poetry. A main media outlet on orga nizational 
policy and activities, the Update was one of several publications issued by 
splA factions from Nairobi.28
The Update was a global forum. In addition to being distributed to liber-
ated areas within Sudan, it was distributed to all international splm chap-
ters and countries that included the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, 
and the United States. Atem Yaak Atem noted that Nairobi’s non- Sudanese 
expatriate community was attracted to his column, and he further noted 
that Sudanese splm sympathizers from the Gulf and Khartoum- controlled 
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areas secretly read the Update and sent letters praising his column.29 Elhag 
Paul, who received the Update in the UK, remembers first becoming aware 
of the newspaper when he was posted a copy by the splm/A London office. 
He would receive copies by mail or collect it when he was near their of-
fices: “Many South Sudanese in the UK also read it.”30 The Update was also 
international in its content and in the distribution of its contributors:  there 
was coverage of apartheid’s demise, Archbishop Benjamin Yugusuk’s visit to 
Kakuma refugee camp, and a post-9/11 condolence letter to George W. Bush. 
Contributions came from Nairobi, Lesotho, Germany, New Jersey, London, 
and Harare.31
The Update’s global reach may have reflected the movement’s attempt 
to involve the Sudanese diaspora— and Africans more generally—in its lib-
erationist proj ect. The war separated  children from their families, and the 
splA convinced the Ethiopian government to accept southern refugees. 
The Lost Boys entered Ethiopia in 1987, and splA- appointed caretakers in 
the Panyidu refugee camps or ga nized them into groups.32 Abraham Nhial’s 
story is emblematic of the hardships Lost Boys faced in their flight from 
Sudan. As he shared with me, his walk from Aweil to Ethiopia took over 
three months and included many hardships: “ People  were eating young 
boys and girl[s]  were eaten by wild animals, thrown in the rivers, eaten by 
crocodiles, died  because  there’s no  water.” Nhial— who by the time of our 
interview was the Anglican bishop of Aweil— credited God’s power in 
keeping some of them alive as the reason he became a Christian. By 1991 
more than 400,000 South Sudanese  were living in refugee camps in west-
ern Ethiopia, but  after Mengistu’s fall, the splA facilitated the Lost Boy 
resettlement in  Kenya.33
In the late 1990s and early 2000s many southern refugees arrived in 
Western nations. Nearly four thousand resettled in the United States. The 
Lost Boys raised the visibility of southern suffering to American Christians 
who  were interested in their strug le against Islam, an interest that seri-
ously influenced US- Sudan relations. The media focused close attention on 
the Lost Boys’ stories, testimonies sponsored by church groups that directed 
attention to Amer i ca’s policy  toward Sudan. In March 2001, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell declared before the House Subcommittee on Africa that 
the world’s greatest tragedy was occurring in Sudan, and two months  later, 
President Bush highlighted Sudan’s religious freedom violations. He ap-
pointed Senator John Danforth—an ordained Episcopal minster—as his spe-
cial envoy on the Sudan. Nhial, who went on to attend college in Georgia 
and seminary in Pennsylvania, is among  those who have raised awareness 
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about the Lost Boys and broader South Sudanese plight to American audi-
ences.34 It should be noted, however, that the Lost Boy moniker is mislead-
ing; many  were entire families on a secondary resettlement scheme  adopted 
by Australia, Canada, and the United States.
Members of the diaspora wrote letters to the Intergovernmental Author-
ity on Development (igAd) and to the United States, UK, and Norway de-
manding the right to self- determination. Diaspora organ izations also drew 
attention to South Sudanese wishes to secede. The UK- based Sudan Chris-
tian Fellowship (sCf) and Sudanese in Diaspora (sid) each spoke about the 
South’s wishes. Run by Josephine Lagu, the sid worked with the House of 
Commons’ All- Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan. 
Among other ser vices, it aimed to raise awareness of the refugee plight among 
policy makers and agencies and to provide assistance for asylum applications.35 
Diasporic support was not lost on John Garang, who “constantly wooed” 
the diaspora “ because he wanted to be the sole leader of South Sudan. . . . 
Members of the Diaspora used their connections with se nior members of 
the splm to influence the agenda.”36 In Garang’s 2004 meeting with Lost 
Boys in Phoenix, he referred to them as “freedom fighters” and, in recog-
nition of their role in strengthening relations between the United States 
and South Sudan, claimed “that he had 3,800 ambassadors to the United 
States.”37
Martial theology of splm/spla update
Writing from Nairobi, Kong Chang used the example of biblical David to 
argue that southern youth carried  great responsibility: “David, the Isra-
elite youth who was quite religious not only killed Goliath . . .  but was 
also deemed fit to be King . . .  our elders . . .  did fight in many parts of the 
country . . .  the torch is with you. History  will judge you harshly if it burns 
out in your hands.”38 In many ways, the Update’s martial brand of Christian 
thought  adopted the theological and racial themes and arguments from 
the David and Goliath story. As David represented God’s chosen  people 
and Goliath an evil Other bent on subjugation, contributors made similar 
distinctions between themselves and Khartoum. Following the First Abuja 
Conference, the Update published a commentary that likened the regime to 
“the Biblical Goliath.” The conference, convened in May 1992, was intended 
as a space where the splm and Sudanese government could attempt to re-
solve issues of division. The government argued that the Muslim majority 
had a right to establish an Islamic constitutional system, that the South 
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could be exempt from Islamic punishments (but not Islamic laws), and that 
Sudan would be transformed into an Arab- Islamic country. Both splm 
wings rejected the government’s position in  favor of a secular demo cratic 
system.39 One writer expressed discontent at Khartoum’s position: “Like the 
Biblical Goliath, the  enemy went to Abuja . . .  told the splm/splA to cave 
in or die . . .  the South stood its ground . . .  and chose to be  free or dead. . . . 
The Abuja Declaration sent Goliath reading [reeling].”40 Years  later Isaac 
Malith appropriated David and Goliath to argue that splA victory was cer-
tain: “Like Biblical Philistine Goliath / The nif  enemy looks  giant. . . .  / But 
Alas! . . . /  The stone and sling of our splA  will smash and mash the skull of 
nif. . . . /  With sure triumphant victory / We  shall shout splA Oyee.”41 This 
framing of the splA, though evocative, contradicted real ity. With arms and 
support from the Ethiopian government, the splA could by the early 1990s 
mobilize fifty thousand soldiers that could attack in concert with northern 
allies. The army had at least twelve battalions and weaponry that included 
antiaircraft missiles, Ak-47s, and mines.42 While the sense of destiny and 
righ teousness that the David and Goliath parallel imparted was significant, 
the David appropriation nevertheless covered up the structural realities of 
the splA’s war machine.
While the David narrative scripted a victorious outcome, the most fa-
mous biblical tale of liberation— Exodus— was also featured to convey a 
similar message. In this paradigm John Garang was Moses, called to lead 
Sudan into a new promised land. In 1994 the Update published perhaps its 
first Garang- Moses comparison when Fr. Thomas Attiyah opined that slav-
ery united New Sudan with the historical Jews. Born in eastern Equatoria 
in 1941, Attiyah was ordained as a priest in the Congregation of the Apostles 
of Jesus in 1969 in  Kenya. During his lengthy clerical  career, he served as a 
rector at several East African seminaries. During the Second Sudanese Civil 
War, South Sudanese members of the Apostles of Jesus worked primarily in 
 Kenya and liberated areas controlled by the splA. Attiyah worked mostly 
in Juba. Written  under the heading “Let my  people go,” Attiyah acknowl-
edged that God worked through history and sugested that Garang could 
fill Moses’s position in leading his  people to an in de pen dent state: “He is 
‘our Moses’ . . .  Dr John. . . .  Be courageous! . . .  be  humble like Moses of old, 
full of trust . . .  in the Lord and lead the  people to their total freedom.”43
The Update published content that used scripture to decry tribalism and 
po liti cal factionalism— realities that, throughout the war, threatened to 
upend the liberation proj ect. In Fr. Attiyah’s published homily, he stated 
that the Sudanese shared the Israelite experience of suffering and sugested 
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that they “get united like the Israelites . . .  and confront the beast in unity 
and solidarity.”44 Benjamin Izale echoed the belief that the Israelites repre-
sented a model of unity in his poem against tribalism: “We fight the divi-
sive policy, / Divide and rule, / No Madi No Latuko . . .  / ‘Moses’ at Sudan 
echoes, / A joint front, / Unity, / Equality.”45 While some used the Jewish 
scriptures to convey the belief that unity was required for victory, the Chris-
tian New Testament was employed for the same purpose. Fr. Attiyah used 
Colossians to express the harmony that diff er ent ethnicities had in Christ: 
“ Every ethnic group in the South has the Christian responsibility to unite 
with fellow men and  women. . . .  Today our unity . . .  is a  matter of life and 
death.” Paraphrasing Paul, Attiyah stated, “As Christians, we have put on 
the image of Christ . . .  there is no room for distinction between Dinka and 
Nuer, Shilluk and Zande. . . .  There is only Christ.”46
A con temporary statement recorded in Wendy James’s War and Survival 
shows both the connection some had with the Exodus narrative outside the 
Update and the diff er ent applications that  people could glean from it. Itang 
was a refugee site near Gambela for  people from South Sudan. In May 1988, 
the New York Times reported that approximately 182,000 had crowded into 
the camp. Suske, the first wife of Pastor Paul Sol (a se nior elder in Chali’s 
Christian community), referenced Itang in her following statement to James 
in early October 1991:
Yes, we are living like the  people of old.— What  people?— The Israelite 
 people . . .  we  shall wait and eventually believe, as the Israelites did. And 
when every one believes, our God  will lead us, to look  after us in our home 
where we  shall one day live . . .  we are like the Israelite  people, from cry-
ing in the wilderness. They strayed, and they went into a cave in the 
mountains. Moses led them, he went to help them . . .  as we came from 
Itang, I began to  really believe again, as we came through the  water. And 
it was raining, and we  were  really like the Israelites of old, and I wanted to 
believe like them, and go on with a good  will.47
In addition to claims that the Sudanese government could be likened 
to Goliath, other writers in the Update demonized al-Bashir, the nif, and 
Arabs in general. Latio Lo Jaden participated in this trend. Born in 1947, 
Latio Jaden was the son of Agrey Jaden, the prominent South Sudanese 
leader who distinguished himself during the First Civil War. Latio Jaden 
finished primary school as one of the top twenty students in Juba, allowing 
him entry into secondary school. To his surprise, however, he was rejected 
and admitted instead to a mahad (a Muslim training center that would 
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have prepared him to become a Muslim teacher for Islamic khalwa schools). 
When his  father found out, he advised his son to stay out of school, which 
he did  until the age of fifteen. By 1958 Agrey Jaden had fallen into disfavor 
with the Sudanese government, been placed  under  house arrest, and been 
informed that none of his  children would be educated. Fleeing to Uganda in 
1960, Agrey sent for his  family to join him in 1961. Latio resumed his educa-
tion in Kampala and began learning En glish. In 1983 he became involved in 
a movement that advocated for South Sudan’s liberation, which led to his 
final exiling to Zaire and  later Uganda.48 The Update published his poem 
“Khartoum by Night” in its February 27, 1994, issue. Written from Nairobi, 







And in the open play
Grounds at night
And in the dark . . .
Man to man







You dev ilish city.49
Latio Jaden’s decision to link Khartoum with sodomy hearkened back to 
similar references made to Khartoum and the adjacent city of Omdurman 
during  earlier periods in Sudanese history. On seeing the carnage and de-
struction of Omdurman following Kitchener’s decisive victory in Septem-
ber 1898, Owen S. Watkins— a Wesleyan chaplain attached to his forces— 
reflected, “His wrath came to our minds, for this was a veritable African 
Sodom. . . .  Never in my  whole life has sin appeared so evil and disgusting as 
on that day when viewed in its brutal native ugliness.”50 In Andrew Wheel-
er’s description of nineteenth- century mission work in the Sudan, he writes 
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that Khartoum came to be known as the “Capital of Hell.”51 Thus, Jaden’s 
description of Khartoum as a city with souls possessed by sodomy not only 
aimed to soil its reputation but also echoed other instances of framing 
North Sudan’s bigest cities as paragons of wickedness.
Jaden was joined in his aspersions by Nyandeng Malek Deliech. Born 
in 1964, Malek moved with her aunt to Juba to pursue her education at 
the age of thirteen, a decision that protected her from early nuptials.  After 
completing secondary school, she received a scholarship to attend Egypt’s 
Zagazig University, and in Egypt, she became po liti cally active and joined 
the splm. Graduating in 1991, she eventually received another scholarship 
to continue her studies in  England, where she earned a master’s degree 
from the University of Wolverhampton in 2003.52 It was perhaps during her 
stint in  England that Malek, shortly  after the 9/11 attacks, made a Crucifix-
ion analogy when lamenting that southerners had suffered from the same 
 enemy that had just struck Amer i ca:
We, the survivors of the suffering civil society of South Sudan . . .  share 
the grief with the American leadership and the relatives and friends of 
the victims of the barbaric attack. . . .  We strongly condemn all sorts 
of vio lence and wanton massacre of innocent  human beings. . . .  This 
has been the plea of South Sudan civilians during the last half  century 
of unmatched brutal atrocities by the same enemies of civilization and 
democ ratization. . . .  We are being forced . . .  to drink from the same cup 
of the deadly liquid served to Jesus on the Cross.53
Malek’s reference to the “same enemies” is revealing when considering the 
nif’s ties to Osama bin Laden. In 1991 bin Laden moved from Af ghan i stan 
to Khartoum, where he was nominally involved in development proj ects 
but actually engaged in furthering his Islamic  causes. During his stint in 
Sudan, he was implicated in several terrorist attacks and accused by the 
United States of  running militant camps in the country. The United States 
charged Sudan as a “state sponsor of terrorism”  after the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing. The Sudanese foreign minister asked American diplo-
mats what his country needed to do to shed the terrorist label, and  after 
US ambassador Tim Carney applied pressure, bin Laden was forced out in 
May 1996.54
Malek’s involvement with the splm and the Update’s inclusion of her ar-
ticle is one illustration of  women’s involvement in the movement. Accord-
ing to Nhial, “They [ women]  were the one[s]  running the church in most 
cases. They  were the one[s] taking care of the  children of our soldiers. Our 
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soldiers  were not having salaries, so they  were the one[s] cooking for them 
and provid[ing] food for them.”55 To be sure,  women’s involvement went 
beyond simply taking care of soldiers. In 1984 John Garang created Ketiba 
Banat, the splA’s only girls’ battalion. Many left school or home to join 
the splA, including Elizabeth Anei— a member of the University of Juba’s 
student  union, who joined the splA and trained  others in military tactics. 
Oftentimes the military life offered  women the chance to further their edu-
cation while gaining job skills on an equal plane with men. Many trained for 
such positions as armed patrol, radio communications, the medical corps, 
and participation on the front with men. All told, the splA incorporated 
more  women than the Anyanya force in the 1960s. And yet, Clémence Pinaud 
writes, the splA differed from other socialist guerrilla groups through its 
exclusion of  women from its po liti cal agenda (a real ity that dated to the 
beginning). Some groups of  women in Equatoria, the Nuba Mountains, 
Ethiopia, and Cuba  were militarily trained and stayed in the splA longer 
than most Ketiba Banat recruits, who  were speedily married off to splA 
dignitaries and departed the front lines.56
Along with Malek’s post-9/11 reference to the Crucifixion came antigov-
ernment vilifications that Khartoum was evil. In Amosa Michael’s “Weap-
ons to Defeat the nif in the Bible: Letter to All Freedom Fighters,” he used 
several scriptures to encourage readers to hold fast and resist al-Bashir:
Satan has legions of . . .  wicked spirits waging war against you. . . .  Their 
base of operation is . . .  Khartoum and other countries that sponsor Is-
lamic fundamentalism . . .  the devil is devising this devastating mission 
of Christian cleansing of which Omer Beshir is one of the field com-
manders. . . .  Let us come together, plan our warfare and fight the  enemy 
of the  children of God.
Michael comforted readers by pointing to Luke 7, where Jesus heals a cen-
turion’s servant. In that passage, according to Michael, “we see a classical 
example of long range missile in the battlefield.” “I challenge you in the 
name of Jesus,” he continued, “stand up and start bombing any satanic tar-
gets in the Sudan.”57  Father Attiyah similarly  adopted the theme of good 
versus evil when he coupled the assertion that Khartoum’s po liti cal system 
was “evil” with the claim that “social justice requires that evil system be de-
stroyed and replaced with the just one.”58 Another example of demonization 
included assistant commander Gabriel Riak’s assertion that the Sudanese 
 were suffering from “blood sucking Lucifers/dev ils. . . .  / Fighting our way 
out means your liberation / From feisty hands.”59
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Despite such excoriations, the splm/A did not look to completely sup-
press or distance itself from Islam. On the contrary, the movement—on 
the battlefield and in the Update— made efforts to show re spect for Islam. 
Within the newspaper, some contributors made sure to separate Islam from 
the splA’s Muslim opponents. One such figure was Steven Wöndu, who 
reserved his disdain for individuals rather than Islam entirely: “The moral 
and ethical de cadence of the Turabi- Beshir syndicate is beyond  human 
understanding. . . .  Allah and Islam, I thought, represent purity. . . .  The 
Turabi- Beshir regime . . .  portray the characters of Lucifer.”60 His decision 
to associate Islam with goodness represents the fact that the Update rarely 
if ever directed angst against Islam writ large but instead targeted the nif’s 
fundamentalist Islam. Latio Jaden expressed this distinction in poetic verse: 
“Ours is not hatred of Arabism or Islam / But this type of Islam.”61 Nine 
clerics who participated in the 1993 nsCC General Assembly in Kaya wrote 
a letter on behalf of South Sudan’s Christian community, expressing pacific 
sentiments  toward North Sudanese Muslims. The Update published this 
letter, with one portion reading: “We do not hate the Arabs and Muslims 
of Northern Sudan . . .  among them  there are many who are tired of this 
senseless war . . .  we have still hope that  those whose hearts have hardened 
may . . .  recognise that brotherhood and sisterhood is our common call.”62
Several of my research participants who  were (and still are) active in 
the church acknowledged the presence of Muslims in the splm/splA. Rev. 
John Daau, founder of the Good Shepherd College and Seminary as well as 
founder and editor of the Christian Times, expressed that the splA allowed 
soldiers to follow their religion of choice. Muslims “ were given their own 
opportunities to worship and to preach to their own fellow Muslims . . .  on 
Fridays, Muslims  were allowed to do their own  thing.”63 The Rt. Rev. Bismark 
Avokaya, Anglican bishop of Mundri, referenced the fact that some splA 
se nior commanders  were Muslim.64 Angelo Lokoyome, who at the time of 
our interview was working as the justice and peace coordinator in the Cath-
olic Archdiocese of Juba, similarly acknowledged the Muslim presence in 
the war: “This war was not fought by Christians alone. We had Muslims . . . 
in the bush. . . .  Even this splA war, and even with all our strug les now, we 
have Muslims also who behave as South Sudanese  because for them, they 
are saying before they became Muslims they  were first South Sudanese.”65 
In the words of Mahmoud E. Yousif, former chairman of the New Sudan 
Islamic Council and South Sudan Islamic Council, “the role played by 
Muslims in splm/A (from South Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and 
Darfur),  can’t be underestimated, and without them South Sudan  wouldn’t 
Khartoum Goliath 105
be as it is  today.” One illustration he used to support his argument occurred 
 after Riek Machar formed the Nasir faction in 1992. Yousif explained to me 
that  after Machar destroyed several splA forces up to Mongalla, Salva Kiir 
led three splm/A battalions from Nuba.  These forces— which  were more 
than 65  percent Muslim— repulsed Machar.66
The final component of religious thought stipulated that God would 
protect New Sudan and ensure its liberation. Amosa Michael lent a sense 
of confidence by borrowing from 2 Corinthians: “Let us stand alongside our 
brethren who are in combat with the demon possessed Omer Beshir and 
his followers. All of us are soldiers in Christ. . . .  Our weapons have a di-
vine power for the pulling down [of] strongholds.”67 This New Testament 
example notwithstanding, a prophecy concerning Cush from the book of 
Isaiah was the foundational ele ment of the belief in ultimate victory. The 
Kingdom of Cush was an ancient civilization located south of Egypt. As it 
controlled the Nile cataracts— barriers to river transportation—it occupied 
a strategic location with re spect to regional trade. In around 650 bCe, a 
garrison of Jewish mercenary soldiers that had been brought to Egypt to 
defend the southern border with Cush was established on Elephantine Is-
land. Reputed in ancient art and lit er a ture as soldiers, Cush and Cushites 
are referenced in the Bible fifty- four times.68 In Isaiah 18, the Old Testament 
prophet outlined the following “Prophesy against Cush”:
Woe to the land of whirring wings
 along the rivers of Cush,
 which sends envoys by sea
in papyrus boats over the  water.
Go, swift messengers,
to a  people tall and smooth- skinned,
 to a  people feared far and wide,
an agressive nation of strange speech,
 whose land is divided by rivers.
All you  people of the world,
 you who live on the earth,
when a banner is raised on the mountains,
 you  will see it,
and when a trumpet sounds,
 you  will hear it.
Isaiah states that the Lord would “cut off the shoots with pruning knives, 
and cut down and take away the spreading branches,” and the Cushites 
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would be left to become the food of preying mountain birds and wild animals. 
“At that time,” however,
gifts  will be brought to the Lord Almighty
from a  people tall and smooth- skinned,
 from a  people feared far and wide,
an agressive nation of strange speech,
 whose land is divided by rivers—
the gifts  will be brought to Mount Zion, the place of the Name of the
 Lord Almighty.69
Prophecy interpretation is relevant to any discussion concerning Isa-
iah 18 and South Sudan. Douglas Johnson has analyzed interpretations of 
the prophecies of Ngundeng, noting that his songs became quite popu lar 
with splA soldiers who  were originally recruited mainly from Dinka and 
Nuer from Upper Nile and Bahr el- Ghazal. During the 1980s, the splA 
reinterpreted his songs to create military unity among its soldiery and to 
strengthen its claim to establish bases in Gajaak areas (the Gajaak are the 
largest Nuer group in Ethiopian territory). Songs that mentioned Kartum 
bari  were understood to foretell military and po liti cal victory in Khartoum. 
Increasingly prominent during the war as a symbol of antigovernment re sis-
tance, as Christiane Falge has noted, Ngundeng’s post-1991 fame was linked 
to the fragmentation of southern po liti cal and military unity and Nuer 
society’s ethnic, religious, and po liti cal fragmentation.70
By the early 1990s, one Nuer evangelist had already begun to invoke Isa-
iah’s prophecy as an argument to encourage Christian conversion. In James 
Mut Kueth’s interview with journalist Deborah Scrogins, the Presbyterian 
minister at Nasir argued that Isaiah 18 foretold Sudan’s  future.71 The Update 
published invocations to Cush as a foundation for Sudanese nationalism, Pan- 
Africanism, and the belief that liberation was at hand through the realiza-
tion of Isaiah’s prophecy. A special edition published a paper conveying that 
“we”  were the land of Cush, the dark- skinned  people noted for their martial 
prowess. Cush, the writer maintained, provided the example for New Sudan 
from which “we must re- trace our cultural roots . . .  to evolve a concept of 
Sudanese nationalism, which is capable of rallying all the pre sent Sudanese 
 peoples around ‘nation- formation,’ ‘nation- building’ and ‘national unity.’ ”72 
Kwarnyikiir Abdelilah Zion addressed a poem to “Cushites everywhere,” 
admonishing readers to trust God for victory: “March with hopes and do 
not despair. / For the God of Isaiah is quite aware. . . .  / The pre sent war by 
all means  shall be won. . . .  / You have been named by Zion.”73 Perhaps the 
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most compelling reference to Cush appeared in Ater Deng Abuk’s poem 
“The Sudan Laugh.” Referring to the quip that God laughed when he cre-
ated Sudan, Abuk rejoiced that the curse on Cush was no more:
Yes! Comes a voice from beyond Isaiah 18. . . .  Cush is uncursed! Lam, 
Riek, Nyuon, Kuanyin Achan’s sons of Jericho have removed the curse at 
Ngundeang’s Sobat Valley of An- chor. . . .  Cush lost, now regained! You, tall 
smooth- skinned  people feared far and wide! . . .  Your Hour has come! . . . 
the New Sudan!74
To grasp the full meaning of Abuk’s allusions, po liti cal developments in 
South Sudan in 1994 (when the poem was published) warrant elucidation. 
Divisions within the splA- United resulted in fighting between the two larg-
est Nuer groups. The conference purposed to end the Nuer civil war rededi-
cated the splA- United to achieving southern in de pen dence and dismissed 
 those accused of collaborating with the government (including Nyuon, 
Kuanyin, and Lam). This move appeared to pave the way for a truce with 
the splA.75 Abuk must have interpreted their dismissal as strengthening by 
subtraction. In the book of Joshua, the Israelite Achan is punished for taking 
spoils from Jericho that should have been devoted to the Lord’s trea sury. 
God turns his anger from Israel  after Achan is stoned. Thus, Abuk  adopted 
the biblical narrative by conflating Achan’s stoning with the “stoning” of 
the Khartoum collaborators.
The splA leadership also referenced biblical Cush outside the pages of 
the Update. In “Vision, Perspective, and Position of the splm,” secretary for 
education and religious affairs Samson L. Kwaje stated that Isaiah’s mention 
of Cush was a clear description of con temporary South Sudan.76 Garang, a 
secularist at the beginning of the war, saw utility in including Cush in his 
politics. He began combing the Bible “in the hope of divining the  future 
outcome of this war.”77 In a paper delivered on his behalf to the All Africa 
Students Conference in 2005, Garang mentioned Cush in his attempt 
to link the splm proj ect with Pan- Africanism. Connecting Sudan to the 
Pan- African movement’s strug le, Sudanese fights against oppression  were 
“aimed and are aimed at regaining African dignity and nationhood that has 
been mutilated over the centuries.” He contextualized the liberation strug-
gle by referencing civilizations that had appeared and dis appeared in South 
Sudan (including Cush). For Garang such pre ce dents spoke to Sudan’s criti-
cal role in history and provided a counterargument for  those wishing to 
remove Sudanese from history.78 In  these ways the splm/A  adopted Cush as 
a means to add a sense of heritage and prophetic destiny.
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And yet, one of my research participants, whom I have given the pseu-
donym “Faith,” explained that borrowing Cush may have been related to the 
splA’s heavi ly Dinka membership. She noted that just as many northerners 
trace their genealogy to Muhammad, the Dinka have an affinity for tracing 
“their ancestry to ancient Cush and therefore Jewish ancestry.” The Dinka, 
in her view, conceptualized themselves as being like the Cushites— modern 
warriors who likely dreamed of creating a kingdom as their  imagined pre-
de ces sors had.79 Thus, appropriating Cush may have been used to support 
two objectives: first, to invite  people to perform ethnic and gender identi-
ties; and second, to justify the organ ization’s objective of a united Sudan 
(Elhag Paul opined that using Cush may have related to Garang’s attempt 
to sell his united objective to  people in the North and South).80 Such a de-
sire would contradict the references to Cush and Isaiah leading up to and 
through in de pen dence, when they  were linked to the prospect of po liti cal 
separation.
African religionists have long identified with the history of ancient Is-
rael. Tudor Parfitt notes that Israelite racial identities  were widely sugested 
and imposed throughout the world during colonialism. Often imbued with 
area- or group- specific genealogies and justifications, adopting an Israelite 
faith “was a way of creating . . .  in de pen dence from colonial authority, of 
establishing a mea sure of racial superiority, of saying ‘this is our religion.’ ” 
Olaudah Equiano sugested in his slave narrative that the Igbo might be 
related to the ancient Jews and that Igbo religion may have been a modern 
vestige of ancient Jewish faith. Recent Igbo history— namely, being a scat-
tered minority in Nigeria’s cities and experiencing the Biafran genocide— 
has drawn comparisons between their experiences and  those of the Jews.81 
In the first Zulu history written by a Zulu author, Magema Fuze— who was 
cognizant of colonial analogies between Zulu practices and Israel’s rituals— 
claimed that his  people did not originate in southern Africa and agreed 
with the notion that “we black  people came from the  people of Israel.”82 In 
addition to the Igbo and Zulu, other African claims to links with biblical 
Israel include the Malian Inadan, who claim descent from David; Ethiopian 
claims that trace back to Solomon; and Ugandan traditions that claim a 
lineage of thirty- three kings tracing back to David.83
Fi nally, Salim C. Wilson was the first Dinka to publish the claim that 
they  were descended from the ancient Israelites, an assertion he made in his 
circa 1939 I Was a Slave.84 De cades  later, Professor M. M. Ninan of Juba Uni-
versity wrote a comparative study of Kuku and Hebrew culture, sugesting 
that “a historical common contact theory or information exchange theory 
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could not possibly explain such close similarity. We are thus led to the only 
alternative of common source . . .  God did reveal himself to Kukus in a way 
similar to the Hebrews.”85
coMprehensive peace and the death of Moses
The SPLA Update illustrates that po liti cal theology did not end with the 
First Civil War; on the contrary, this newspaper produced by the revolu-
tionary splm/splA disseminated content during the subsequent war that 
spiritualized the conflict in creative ways. Wendy James notes that the in-
fluence of old ideas about suffering, loss, and wandering in the bush may 
have joined with the concept of a war against evil, a combination that 
perhaps led to strange and novel visions, dreams, and enactments. “But 
through dreams and memories,” she writes, “both strong Christian believers 
and  others can find meaningful ways of connecting pre sent experience with 
the past, and somehow rationalizing the world by looking back to . . .  kinds 
of self- understanding which refer back to times long before the advent of 
the missionaries.”86 The religious references found throughout the Update 
reveal the splA’s newspaper as a space where contributors creatively used 
theology to fashion a sense of self that was historical, spiritual, and divinely 
favored in the midst of war.
The Update’s biblical references sugest that its editors wanted to use 
scripture to broadcast a narrative in which oppressed Sudanese obtain vic-
tory and liberation from the Khartoum government. Facing the real ity of 
factionalism, invocations of Cush and ancient Israel not only provided a 
common heritage and reading of history but also invited readers to turn 
their gaze from challenges to a narrative of assured victory. Theology per-
formed the po liti cal work of defining enemies and reinterpreting circum-
stances into biblical templates so that a trajectory ending with splm/A 
victory could be established and disseminated. While the Update’s use of 
 theology mirrored Khartoum’s use of Islam in framing the war as a jihad, 
the splA’s use of Chris tian ity was not comparable in scale. Nevertheless, 
the Update’s religious thought was similarly intended to transform the war 
into a spiritual contest for its readership within and outside Sudan.
 There is room to consider how Sudanese invocations of Cush may paral-
lel  those by other African or diasporic religionists. The Africa Bible Commen-
tary’s coverage of Cush/Cushites offers insight into the meaning of Cush for 
African theologians. Edouard Nsiku, a Congolese Baptist, used the Isaiah 
prophecy to both argue that blacks and whites have been oppressive and 
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that Africans have reason to hope: “Africa  will turn to god in its misery . . . 
and its former glory  will be restored (18:7). What a message of hope for our 
continent!”87 Congolese Nupanga Weanzana noted that Cush could be con-
sidered Africa’s ancestors, thereby widening the scope of the term to infer 
all Africans (and not just Sudanese).88 In another instance Weanzana, along 
with the  Kenyan Samuel Ngewa, Eritrean Tewoldemedhin Habtu, and Ni-
gerian Zamani Kafang, used Cush’s appearance in Psalm 7 to note that the 
psalmist speaks to the African Church “and reminds it of the role it should 
play in promoting justice.”89 In  these ways, then, the Commentary frames 
Cush as being representative of Africa and, consequently, a reference point 
by which Africans can see themselves in scripture. Furthermore,  there is 
the added assurance that Africans can look to Cush to provide hope for the 
pre sent day. This perspective is consistent with Garang’s use of the Cush 
moniker to link the splm proj ect with Pan- Africanism. Identifying Cush 
with Sudan not only provided Sudanese with historical legitimacy but also 
situated the nation in an African framework despite Khartoum’s historical 
efforts to align itself with the Arab world. Cush, therefore, provided a bibli-
cal, African, and liberationist heritage for the splm.
This chapter sugests that more deeply examining diasporic print forms 
like the Update can advance our knowledge of religion’s movement and 
socio po liti cal usage in the African diaspora. Advances in communications 
and technology have facilitated the flow of cultures,  peoples, and ideas to 
the point where a “global village” has become realized in the blurring of 
geographic and virtual spaces.90 The Update connected Sudanese to  people 
and developments back home and served as a printed space in which an 
 imagined community of diasporic readers and contributors could be forged 
and exposed to the same religious ideas.
*  *  *
On January 9, 2005, the splm and Sudanese government signed the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement (CpA). With John Garang and Vice President 
ʿAli Osman Muhammad Taha as the main negotiators, the CpA ended the 
Second Civil War. The agreement’s main features included separate gov-
ernance for the South, an even split of oil revenues between North and 
South, and a six- year transitional period to unity or separation. A south-
ern referendum for unity or secession was mandated to take place in 2011. 
The issue of religion— which was, during the negotiations, the most con-
tentious issue— was addressed, with Sharia law withdrawn from the South 
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and non- Muslims in the North exempted from its enforcement. Though 
the boundary of the Abyei region was unresolved, the national assembly 
approved the agreement. Like the pro cess leading up to the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, the church played an influential role in reaching peace, includ-
ing eCs archbishop Daniel Deng serving as an architect and the Sudan 
Council of Churches advocating for peace and reconciliation.91 The CpA 
catapulted Garang to further heights of adoration. The feeling in Khartoum 
when Garang was sworn in as first vice president of Sudan (and president 
of South Sudan) was triumphant. Millions came to see him. Christian ele-
ments imbued his swearing-in ceremony; he placed his left hand on a Bible, 
and cries of Alleluia accompanied his booming En glish oath. Field marshal 
al-Bashir and Muhammad Taha  were sworn in in Arabic, with their hands 
on a Koran and accompanied by shouts of Allahu Akbar. One commentator 
noted that “the Southern Sudanese in the crowd went wild, perhaps at the 
substance of the words, more likely at the contrasts John evoked.”92
The manner in which Garang’s life ended cemented the Mosaic narra-
tive. Despite the intimate relationship that Moses enjoyed with God, he 
was prohibited from entering the promised land  after an act of disobedi-
ence (Num. 20:6–12). In Deuteronomy 31 Moses spoke before Israel and 
told them that Joshua would cross the Jordan River with them, and he 
died three chapters  later on Mount Nebo.  After Garang’s swearing in, he 
returned from Khartoum and called all the impor tant cabinet members. 
Salva Kiir, an early follower of Garang who had fought in the first war and 
stayed with him amid the factionalism of the second, was pre sent.93 Ga-
rang took Kiir by the arm and brought him aside. They talked for roughly 
two hours, with no one aware of what they  were discussing. When they 
returned, Garang told the  people that Kiir was their leader and charged 
him with the task of taking care of them. “That is why some  people now,” 
Bishop Ezekiel Diing expressed to me, “say Salva is Joshua,  because of what 
they heard when Garang” spoke.94 Garang de cided to go to Uganda. He 
was about to leave for Kampala with his wife, Rebecca, when she refused 
to accompany him.  After meeting with President Museveni, the Ugan-
dan presidential he li cop ter carry ing Garang back to Sudan crashed into 
a mountain in the Imatong Range. He died.95 According to Diing, Moses 
and Garang had given their lives in the same way: “Moses end up his life 
on the mountain. . . .  Garang also end up his life on the mountain. . . . 
When Moses . . .  knew that he was living but that he was not  going to 
continue . . .  and he looked beyond at the land that the  people had, but he 
 will not cross, go back and talk to Joshua.”96
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Garang’s funeral was held at Juba’s All Saints Cathedral. Thousands of 
soldiers patrolled the streets, and President al-Bashir pledged that Khartoum 
would not back away from the peace agreement. Despite this showing of 
solidarity, anti- Arab sentiment was violently tangible. Much of Juba’s Arab 
community fled the city  after clashes resulted in the deaths of at least fifteen 
 people. Many Muslim- owned shops  were burned down. One man in Juba 
was quoted as saying, “The northerners hate us, we hate them, so we demand 
our own country.”97
5
The Troubled Promised Land
In the 60s and 70s, our elders knew and called themselves by names but 
 today we referrer [sic] to each other as Lado the Barri [sic], Chol the Dinka, 
Duoth the Nuer,  etc. We are digressing in thinking instead of progressing. 
When are we  going to stop this Stone Age behaviour so that once again 
South Sudan becomes a place of milk and honey and not multiple grave 
yards?
— Jimmy Onge Aremo, Sudan Tribune, February 19, 2015
The book of Exodus chronicles the story of the Hebrew leader Moses. As an 
infant, Moses was placed in a basket and sent down the Nile  after all Jewish 
baby boys in Egypt  were ordered to be killed. Seen by Pha raoh’s  daughter 
and retrieved by her slave, Moses was subsequently reared in luxury. One 
day Moses, now a grown man, became incensed at the sight of an Egyptian 
beating a Hebrew. Moses slayed the abuser and fled to Midian, presumably 
to spend the rest of his days in obscurity. God, however, had other plans. 
He appeared to Moses from a burning bush and commissioned the stutterer 
to lead his  people out of bondage.  After a series of plagues and the provi-
dential killing of every firstborn son in Egypt, Pha raoh— whose own son 
had been killed in the purge— acceded to Moses’s request.  After the Hebrew 
flight from Egypt had already commenced, Pha raoh had a change of heart 
and pursued the Israelites. In what is perhaps the Old Testament’s most 
iconic scene, God parted the Red Sea before the fleeing host so that they 
could escape over dry land. When God unbridled the floodgates, Pha raoh’s 
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army was annihilated.1  After forty years in the wilderness, Moses’s successor 
Joshua led the chosen  people into their promised land.
Ridley Scott’s Hollywood adaptation Exodus: Gods and Kings debuted 
in 2014.  Toward the end of the film, Moses— played by Christian Bale— sits 
down and talks to Joshua. Having just crossed the Red Sea with the rest 
of the  Children of Israel, Moses acknowledged that they  were as big as a 
nation of tribes. This concerned him. When Joshua questioned him about 
this, Moses looked at his comrade and retorted, “You have to ask?” “But 
we all have the same goal,” responded Joshua. “We do now,” said Moses. 
“What happens when we stop  running?”2 While that par tic u lar scene is 
rooted in creative license and is not found in the biblical account, it never-
theless points to the internal Israelite squabbling that the Bible does rec ord 
following the Exodus. Despite the romantic Exodus narrative, the Penta-
teuch frames the Israelites as a grumbling, unfaithful  people throughout 
their journey to Canaan. At the sight of the Egyptian pursuit, the Israelites 
derisively asked Moses if he had led them out to the desert  because  there 
 were no graves in Egypt (Ex. 14:11).  After entering the promised land, the 
Israelites experienced the period of the Judges, arguably the darkest era of 
their history before the Babylonian exile. Throughout the Old Testament 
are numerous reminders for the Israelites to remember God’s liberating acts 
during the Exodus.  These admonitions  were not enough to make or keep 
them obedient.
Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni was the chief guest at the first an-
niversary of South Sudanese in de pen dence cele brations in Juba in July 2012. 
Recounting the history of the fight for in de pen dence and paying tribute 
to the splm, Museveni lamented the tendency among black  people to be 
prone to division. He urged President Salva Kiir to reach a deal with the 
Sudanese government and used the Israelite example as a cautionary tale 
for South Sudanese: “Museveni has called on the  people of South Sudan 
not to be like the Biblical  children of Israel who  were about to back- track 
to Egypt when faced with challenges. ‘You should stand firm and make 
sure that judgment is attained. Be strong, the modern world  doesn’t have 
a place for the weak hearted,’ he said.”3 Less than three years into in de-
pen dence—or, to use the Exodus idiom, three years  after southerners had 
“ stopped  running”— the nation found itself at war again. In December 2013, 
a conflagration drawn heavi ly by ethnic lines (primarily Nuer v. Dinka) was 
kindled. What became of the rhe toric that the “Joshua” Kiir had led the 
nation into the promised land? What of all the flowery invocations of Cush 
and claims that Isaiah’s ancient prophecy had been realized?
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This chapter begins with a description of developments since the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CpA). Division and enmity between 
southern factions persisted during the postwar years, and in de pen dence 
was not sufficient to keep some from recognizing serious challenges facing 
the country.  Matters came to a head in December 2013, when vio lence broke 
out between members of the presidential guard, precipitating vio lence 
throughout the country between forces led by Salva Kiir and Riek Machar. 
Between then and 2018, tens of thousands died, more than two million fled 
to neighboring countries, and nearly two million more became internally 
displaced.4
The war debunked any notion that southerners felt a sense of pan- 
Christian solidarity strong enough to subsume ethnicity or prevent ethnic 
tension. And yet, the war produced a dynamic crucible of religious thought. 
As with  earlier periods, Christian po liti cal imagination was not  limited to 
ordained clergy but was formulated by lay politicians and civilians alike. 
The post- CpA period is distinct, however, for the efflorescence of ideas that 
appeared online. No longer  limited to physical print media, online venues 
like the Sudan Tribune  were spaces where  those throughout the diaspora 
could make their expressions known. A second observation gleaned from 
this period is the endurance of an idea expressed during the condominium 
era— that intergroup fighting was a spiritual “evil” and that uniting  under 
God was the solution to this prob lem. Unlike Fr. Attiyah’s contention that 
all ethnicities  were one in Christ, however, two bishops affirmed God’s 
handi work in diversity. Fi nally, the church’s evolving but consistent prox-
imity to po liti cal happenings mirrored the way in which po liti cal theology 
similarly evolved but remained consistently present. Vari ous intellectuals 
found it fit to relate par tic u lar scriptures and theologies to the situation. 
Religious thought still functioned as a po liti cal technology despite the fun-
damentally changed scope of who and what constituted us and them, good 
and evil, heroes and villains.
coMprehensive peace to civil war
The end of the Second Civil War did not mask the realities of internal 
divisions and simmering prob lems. Since its founding, the splm strug-
gled to maintain legitimate internal demo cratic practices and was forced 
to rely on tenuous alliances to maintain stability. The CpA was negotiated 
between the splm/A and Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party; other op-
position groups  were excluded. Many southern groups  were absorbed into 
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the splm/A in the years that followed, but a joint platform reflecting the 
interests of an increasingly diverse membership was never  adopted. Fur-
thermore, divisions between combatants and communities following the 
1991 Nasir split  were not reconciled during the CpA period. The massive 
Nuer South Sudan Defence Forces (ssdf) was, like all other armed groups, 
required during the interim period to ally with the Sudan Alliance Forces 
(sAf) or splA, and vio lence between the splA and other southern armed 
groups continued. The 2006 Juba Declaration— which Kiir announced in 
his attempt to manage divisions— led to the ssdf’s incorporation into the 
splA and other security ser vices, as well as the creation of a more unified 
military front leading up to the referendum.5
In 2007 Rebecca Garang— widow of John Garang and minister of roads 
and transport for the government of South Sudan (goss)— called on  people 
to support the CpA, calling it “the Bible of the marginalized communities.” 
Despite accusations against se nior government ministers (herself included), 
she encouraged  people to have confidence in the goss’s capacity to de-
liver expected ser vices and emphasized the need for construction, public 
works, and the development of mass media to improve communication.6 
The following year, continued frustration at corruption and lack of devel-
opment led journalist Roba Gibia to write a scathing editorial in the Sudan 
Tribune. Founded in 2003, the Tribune is a Paris- based nonprofit website that 
is run by in de pen dent Sudanese and international journalists and editors. 
Gibia compared goss members to the Jewish scribes during the time of 
Christ. The goss officials and leaders, Gibia contended,  were behaving like 
the scribes and priests who claimed to be pure “but are the very  people re-
sponsible for the suffering of their  people,  because they have cut off them-
selves from their own  people and do not know their . . .  day- to- day prob-
lems.”7 Gibia also noted that some southern ethnicities saw themselves as 
superior to other groups: “Tribalism and nepotism has infested goss which 
breeds corruption, and has become the definite  enemy of South Sudanese.”8
Gibia was joined a year  later by Mawut Guarak, who also used the Bible 
in his antigovernment critique. Guarak had spent time as a child soldier 
and several years in a refugee camp before arriving in Syracuse, New York, 
as a Lost Boy in 2001.  After attending Onondaga Community College, he 
earned a master’s degree from suny- Binghamton.9 In February 2009, the 
Tribune published his piece “Conflict of Interest?,” in which he cited the 
fact that top government officials had been taking jobs as executives in oil 
and other mining companies. Many of  these politicians, Guarak claimed, 
condemned corruption in the media. He noted that Jesus, as a teacher in 
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Jerusalem and Judea, asked his disciples how Satan could cast out Satan. 
Just as a  house divided against itself cannot stand, a divided Satan cannot 
stand  either (Mark 3:23–26). “Based on interpretation of the above verses,” 
he argued, “it is hard . . .  for a government official to serve public purposes 
in Juba and be [an] executive in major oil companies and expect to not be 
corrupted. How can regional officials . . .  fight corruption when they are 
lobbying against government (as executive[s] in the oil companies)?”10
South Sudan faced manifold issues. While all  children  were supposed to 
have access to formal or informal education by 2010 (with a new curricu-
lum), education continued to suffer from untrained teachers, inadequate 
school buildings, overcrowded classes, and lack of educational materials. 
Healthcare facilities  were unevenly distributed. Economic recovery and 
pro gress occurred primarily in urban areas. One study found that in 2009 
alone, intra- South vio lence had resulted in 2,500 deaths and 350,000 dis-
placed  people. Another study noted three uprisings by dissident splm/A 
members. Following the conclusion of the electoral pro cess in April 2010, 
General George Deng— a former in de pen dent candidate for the Jonglei state 
governorship and former splA deputy chief of general staff— left Bor with his 
soldiers and clashed with splA troops.  Human Rights Watch documented 
rights violations during the elections and reported growing instability in the 
central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and western Bahr el- Ghazal states.11
Amid frustration at the national leadership and overall state of affairs, 
a national anthem was drafted that highlighted the continued salience of 
Christian symbolism. By late summer 2010, the government, along with 
some individuals, began to brainstorm ideas for the anthem. The task was 
officially entrusted to the 2011 Machar- chaired taskforce.  After conducting 
an anthem workshop, Col. Malaak Ayuen— who led the information and 
public relations desk at splA’s general headquarters— appeared on South 
Sudan tv to report the outcome of his group’s efforts. Ayuen explained that 
the group preferred to refer to South Sudan as the “Land of Cush.”12 An 
early draft of the anthem— written by forty- nine poets— followed guidelines 
set by the government and army and included the following lyr ics:
Oh God! We praise and glorify you / For your grace upon Cush, / The 
land of  great warriors. . . .  / Lord bless South Sudan! / Oh black warriors! 
/ Let’s stand up in silence and re spect, / Saluting millions of martyrs 
whose / Blood cemented our national foundation. . . .  / Oh Eden! / Land 
of milk and honey and hard- working  people, / Uphold us united in peace 
and harmony.13
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The seven ele ments to be considered in the anthem would include History, 
Land,  People, Strug le, Sacrifices, Destination, and Flag. The religious com-
ponents dealt most specifically with History,  People, and Land. According 
to Ayuen, God was the architect of ancient world civilization and the glory, 
ethics, and values of South Sudanese history. The land was the Garden 
of Eden blessed with riches like oil, abundant  water, mountains, and the 
 people who loved their land. The South Sudanese, furthermore, “are Bibli-
cal Africans as revealed in Isaiah 18; have unity in diversity [and are]  people 
with determination, commitment to hard work and nation building.”14
The anthem was met with criticism over what was perceived to be a 
flawed, even dangerous use of religious idioms. Gordon Buay, a signatory of 
the 2008 Washington Declaration that merged the splm and ssdf, wrote 
an editorial arguing for the removal of military officers from the anthem 
committee. Buay noted that neither Major General Kuol Deim Kuol nor 
Col o nel Malaak— the two men who came up with the “Land of Cush” idea— 
were biblical historians who could defend the claim that southern ethnic 
groups  were the only Cushitic  people in the Horn of Africa. The question in 
the minds of educated southerners, Buay continued, was why  those officers 
would title the anthem “Land of Cush” if South Sudanese  were not Africa’s 
only Cushitic  people. He argued that the idea to use Cush was rooted in 
John Garang, who used the Good News Bible (which references Cush as 
“Sudan” in its version of Isaiah 18) as propaganda to support his argument 
for the creation of a New Sudan. Buay asserted that since “the splA officers 
do not read books on biblical history, they think Dr. John Garang was a re-
ligious expert although most educated Southerners know that John Garang 
was [an] Agro- economist, not biblical historian.”15 Buay’s sentiments  were 
echoed by Deng Riak Khoryoam, who argued in the Tribune that South 
Sudan was the best name for the new nation. Khoryoam argued against the 
use of Cush  because of its ambiguities: “Kush” simply meant “black” like 
Sudan, and southerners  were not the only black  peoples in the Sudan or 
Africa. He also noted that Cush was not appropriate  because  people had his-
torically taken up arms to liberate Sudan, not Cush.16 In the end, Cush was 
not chosen as the country’s official name, and many of the religious idioms 
in the anthem’s early draft form  were removed. Only the mention of God 
remained in the anthem’s first and last lines.17
The in de pen dence referendum took place between January 9 and 15, 2011. 
 Toward the end of the referendum, Benjamin Mkapa, chair of the un secre-
tary general’s Panel on the Referenda in the Sudan, stated that it had gone 
quite smoothly and even exceeded expectations. His briefing was followed 
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by that of Haile Menkerios, special representative of the secretary general 
and head of the un’s Mission in the Sudan, who reported that the Southern 
Sudan Referendum Commission would announce final results on February 7 
and any appeals a week  later. In the end, 98.3  percent of participants voted for 
in de pen dence. Despite the elimination of Cush from the national anthem, 
the Isaiah 18 prophecy continued to hold  great weight. In February 2012, the 
Tribune reported that southern Christians  were planning a pilgrimage to the 
Holy Land and to pre sent gifts on Mount Zion. Vice President Machar’s press 
secretary conveyed that church leaders had explained to him that the pil-
grimage had been promised by God in Isaiah’s prophecy three millennia ago.18
Interestingly— and perhaps not coincidentally— Kiir chose Israel as one of 
the sites for his first presidential visits. Israel had been one of the first nations 
to recognize South Sudan’s in de pen dence. Though his December 20, 2011, 
trip lasted less than twenty- four hours, Kiir met with Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Danny Ayalon, President Shimon Peres, Prime Minister Benjamin Net-
anyahu, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, and Defense Minister Ehud 
Barak. In addition to sharing that South Sudan and Israel “shared values” 
and conquered “similar strug les,” Kiir made sure to note his enthusiasm 
to— representing all South Sudanese— “set foot in the Promised Land.”19
descent to war
Despite the thrill of in de pen dence, dissatisfaction increased. Many blamed 
the national leadership for failing to deliver on impor tant ser vices.20 On the 
first in de pen dence anniversary, the Tribune published a piece by Jacob K. 
Lupai that listed corruption, illiteracy, insecurity, and tribalism/nepotism as 
the country’s categories of challenges. Lupai paid most attention to tribalism 
and nepotism, noting that one ethnic group controlled about 43  percent of 
ministerial positions, even though more than fifty groups may have par-
ticipated in the liberation strug le. He concluded, “It is an open question 
 whether it is tribalism/nepotism that influences appointments or [ whether] 
they are made on merit.”21 In a disagreement with Khartoum over how much 
the new nation should pay to export oil using Sudan’s infrastructure and 
port, South Sudan de cided to shut off its oil production six months  after 
in de pen dence. Allegations of corruption  were legitimated when President 
Kiir admitted that more than seventy officials had stolen $4 billion. When 
southern troops entered a contested oil field, clashes began that spurred 
fear of war.  After threats from the United States, troops pulled out and oil 
was turned back on eigh teen months  later.22
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In October 2012, Zechariah Manyok Biar heard a message in his church 
that “sent chilly air” through his bones, something that made him fear-
ful about the country’s  future.23 Biar’s life points to the influential role of 
Christian networks and infrastructure. As a twelve- year- old, Biar signed up 
to join the army and walked hundreds of miles to an splA camp in Ethio-
pia. United Nations aid brought some gospel- bearing teachers, and Biar was 
baptized in 1989. He became an army chaplain in 1994 and, five years  later, 
was offered a chance to continue his education by his battalion commander. 
He enrolled in a two- year Bible college and subsequently earned a theology 
diploma from a three- year Bible college (Timothy Training Institute). Biar 
eventually encountered Kansas native Mike Smith, who was  doing medical 
mission work in Sudan. Smith asked Biar to help him learn Dinka and Ara-
bic, and as a result of their connection, Biar earned a bachelor’s degree from 
Kampala International University. Smith used his contacts with Abilene 
Christian University (ACu) to help Biar acquire a scholarship to cover his 
gradu ate school costs  there. In the pro cess of earning his master’s from 
ACu’s Gradu ate School of Theology, Biar wrote columns on governance for 
Sudanese newspapers. He graduated in 2010 and  later became executive di-
rector in South Sudan’s Interior Ministry.24
On the last Sunday of October 2012, Biar wrote that many  people had 
called his pastor, asking him to advise other preachers to refrain from criti-
cizing the government from the pulpit. Most recently, he had been called 
by the president’s office, which asked him to do the same.  Earlier that 
month, a journalist from a popu lar Juba radio program had told Biar that 
he had been repeatedly called by security officials and told that discussion 
topics must first be licensed by National Security. This led Biar to state his 
belief that
[Kiir] would be the last person to do this. However, I could be wrong 
if his Office can call pastors to stop them from preaching biblical 
chapters which criticize leaders. The Bible . . .  talks about good and 
bad leadership . . .  why are preachers prevented from talking about good 
governance  today when we know they  were encouraged by the same 
leaders to talk about it during the North- South civil war? Or is it  because 
the leaders then  were in Khartoum and not in Juba?25
The church, to be sure, did collaborate with the South Sudanese govern-
ment during the CpA period; pulpits  were used to encourage  people to par-
ticipate in the 2008 census, the 2010 elections, and the 2011 referendum. 
The South Sudan Council of Churches, founded in 1990 by the region’s 
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Christian churches, actually led efforts that proved quite influential in the 
CpA and was involved in the pro cess that led to the referendum. It was not 
the first time that the government had had direct contact with the church 
regarding the nature of disseminated messages. In 2009, a government min-
ister had asked churches to assist the government in preaching a message of 
peace and in holding reconciliation initiatives to foster unity in the lead-up 
to the referendum.26 Yet, this par tic u lar attempt to influence pulpit mes-
sages appeared to compel Biar to lament that “I am now [more] afraid than 
before that Juba is  going back to Khartoum.”27
Infringement on church messaging became a serious issue for Juba’s Bakh-
ita Radio during the 2005–13 period. Founded in 2006, Bakhita Radio was 
the Catholic Radio Network’s first and central station (the CRn is owned 
by the Sudan Catholic Bishops’ Conference).  Sister Sierra, its first director, 
described the station as “a significant and vital forum for information and 
entertainment[, allowing]  people to express their views as citizens and as 
Christians . . .  our Radio station engaged on civic education, gender, health, 
and religious programs, prayer vigils, meetings, and training workshops.”28 
Martin Agwella, the Archdiocese of Juba’s secretary general from 2006 to 
2012, noted that the radio proj ect was intended to contribute to the work 
of peacebuilding and reconciliation following the long civil war: “A com-
munity radio that would give ordinary  people voice regarding issues”—such 
as those of a political, sociocultural, or economic nature—“that affect their 
lives.”29 And yet, Agwella notes that the station found itself in the crosshairs 
of security operatives who did not want some programs to be aired. “Our 
radio staff  were frequently harassed, arrested. . . . I was involved in meeting 
and talking with key security officials and concerned offices at the minis-
try of information regarding  those unfortunate incidences.” He explained 
that prob lems  were often settled without reaching the offices of the presi-
dent, the ministers of information and security, or the Catholic archbishop. 
While Sr. Sierra similarly noted that “Bakhita Radio was often  under siege,” 
she offered that “with a team of Sudanese personnel, most of them  women, 
we stood strong in the face of confrontation, po liti cal pressure and harass-
ment from police and other government forces.”30
civil war
In time, Kiir’s actions became increasingly sweeping. He reshuffled the 
army, retired many generals, and stripped Machar of his vice presidential 
powers in July 2013. Kiir also replaced most of the cabinet, dissolved some 
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key party institutions, and suspended splm secretary general Pagan Amum 
pending a corruption investigation. Contentious reshuffling of state- level 
party and national leadership even led in one instance to an armed con-
frontation between splm members in the Upper Nile parliament. Sacked 
officials tried to fight back. On December 6, 2013, Rebecca Garang, Pagan 
Amum, and many dismissed cabinet members held a press conference in 
Juba denouncing the splm’s lack of direction. On December 14, at a meet-
ing of the splm’s National Liberation Council, Kiir gained approval for 
Amum’s removal and for  future votes to be done by show of hands rather 
than secret balloting. Dismissed officials and their supporters boycotted the 
following day’s session.31
On the eve ning of December 15, 2013, a fight broke out between Dinka 
and Nuer soldiers of the presidential guard in a military barracks near Juba’s 
city center. Sporadic fighting continued throughout the night before order 
was restored the following morning. While the government blamed Machar 
for planning a coup attempt, he responded that the vio lence had begun 
when Dinka (Kiir’s ethnic group) soldiers tried to disarm Nuer (Machar’s 
ethnic group) soldiers.32 That the conflict had the presidential guard at its 
epicenter presented a saddening irony. Known to Jubans as the Tigers, the 
guard was a multiethnic unit meant to bind members of vari ous ethnic 
groups.33
“Riek W” was not openly known as a Nuer to his colleagues in the presi-
dential guard. In sharing how the fighting between Nuer and Dinka Tigers 
developed into anti- Nuer civilian vio lence throughout the city, he stated 
that “they took  people who  were not soldiers and tied their hands and shot 
them. I saw this with my own eyes, I was  there wearing the same uniform 
as them.” Afraid for his life and frightened by civilian murders, he aban-
doned his post in the presidential compound the weekend  after the vio lence 
broke out. Stating that the curfew was being used as a period to remove 
bodies, Riek claimed to have seen “large trucks” towing bodies.34 Machar’s 
 house was bombarded and surrounded. Jickson Gatjang, a distant relative of 
Machar’s who was in the compound that night, stated that the buildings had 
been destroyed and that members of Machar’s bodyguard  were executed 
before more general bloodletting commenced.35 “When they know you are 
Nuer they  don’t have any more questions,” he said. “It’s just a bullet to your 
head.”36
The following day, Kiir— dressed in Tiger battalion uniform— announced 
on national tele vi sion that Machar had attempted a coup, that the govern-
ment was in full control of the security situation in Juba, and that forces 
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 were pursuing the attackers. He also stated that an overnight curfew would 
be imposed and remain in effect in defi nitely. Eleven se nior figures  were ar-
rested for their alleged involvement within two weeks’ time. While Machar 
escaped and refuted any involvement, he soon declared himself leader of 
the armed opposition movement, splm/A in Opposition (splA- io). The 
splA- io quickly seized control of significant parts of Jonglei— where fight-
ing between Dinka and Nuer also broke out in a military barracks—as well 
as the Upper Nile and Unity states. Fighting also spread to other areas.37 
Concomitant with the spread of vio lence was the increasingly apparent 
ethnic tenor of the maelstrom. With reports of ethnically targeted kill-
ings filtering out from Juba and reaching areas like the Nuer- dominated 
Unity state, copycat mayhems occurred.38 By late December, the Guardian 
reported that the un base in Juba already  housed ten thousand  people. A 
handmade sign hung from rolls of razor wire with words of solace: “The lord 
is our best defender.”39
The White Army (wA) emerged as one of the prominent  faces of the anti- 
Dinka vio lence. Although the wA was not a unified organ ization,  people 
began referring to Nuer- speaking militias as the wA in 1991. Used when 
describing groups of armed civilians who  were purportedly loyal to Nuer- 
speaking prophet Wutnyang Gatatek, the White Army descriptor has broad-
ened to refer to all Nuer- speaking militias who are not members of a salaried, 
uniformed army.40 When in 1991 Machar and Lam Akol broke from the 
splm/A, the wA was involved in the Bor Massacre that year, which claimed 
the lives of roughly two thousand Dinka civilians. This event led to some 
of the most ferocious fighting of the Second Civil War, the increasingly eth-
nic division of southern forces, and the targeting of civilian populations 
based on ethnicity.41 In response to the systematic vio lence levied on Nuer 
by Dinka ele ments in the presidential guard and other security forces, the 
wA targeted Dinka in more than twelve locations. In one instance, a force of 
two thousand Lou Nuer youths— wA ele ments— overran a un base in Jon-
glei and killed at least twenty  people (mainly Dinka government officials and 
two un peacekeepers). By late December, an estimated twenty- five thou-
sand members of the wA  were reported to be marching  toward a contested 
state capital.42
In May 2014 the un Security Council shifted the mission’s mandate from 
nation building to civilian protection, granting un troops the right to use 
force. Two months  later, the Security Council declared that South Sudan’s 
food crisis was the worst in the world (vio lence had prevented farmers from 
planting or harvesting crops). In February 2017 a famine was declared in 
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South Sudan, the world’s first since 2011. Armed conflict, low harvests, and 
skyrocketing food prices  were blamed for the crisis. While the country was 
declared to no longer be in a state of famine by June 2017, a un- backed report 
noted that the situation was still extreme.43
*  *  *
Peace talks began in January 2014. Responding quickly to the conflict, three 
envoys (Ambassador Seyoum Mesfin of Ethiopia, General Lazarus Sumbei-
ywo of  Kenya, and Sudan’s General Mohammad Ahmed Mustafa al- Dhabi) 
shuttled between Juba, opposition- controlled territory, and Addis Ababa, 
where peace talks  were held. Negotiations produced a ceasefire in Janu-
ary 2014 that was  violated almost immediately with the partial recapture 
of Malakal. Mediation efforts  were handicapped by the presence of Ugan-
dan troops supporting Salva Kiir’s side. Peace deals continued to material-
ize and evaporate, with Kiir and Machar reaching four agreements by early 
July 2014 that each fell through in a  matter of days. Both parties and other 
splinter groups  violated the ceasefires on multiple occasions. March 5, 2015, 
was set as a deadline for Kiir and Machar to sign a comprehensive peace 
agreement, but they could not agree on issues like power sharing and secu-
rity arrangement. The 2015 national elections  were postponed, and in late 
March 2015, mps passed Constitutional Amendment Bill 2015, extending 
President Kiir’s term  until 2018.44
Kiir and Machar signed a peace agreement on August 26, 2015, following 
several rounds of negotiations supported by the Intergovernmental Author-
ity on Development (igAd) and  under threat of international sanctions. 
As the first step  toward ending the conflict, Machar returned to Juba on 
April 26, 2016, and was sworn in as vice president. Vio lence between the 
government and opposition groups broke out yet again just months  later. 
Scores of  people  were again displaced, Machar fled the country, and Kiir 
installed a new vice president, General Taban Deng Gai (one of Machar’s 
deputies, who now claimed to lead the splA- io).45 While yet another cease-
fire was signed on December 21, 2017, us ambassador to the un Nikki Haley 
stated that Salva Kiir had  violated the agreement days  later by preventing 
millions from receiving aid despite a pledge of unencumbered access and 
by promoting three generals sanctioned by the Security Council for mas-
sacring civilians. In January 2018, Haley stated that the United States was 
stopping its support for Kiir,  calling him “an unfit partner.” She urged the 
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Security Council to support an arms embargo, which the United States es-
tablished by early February.46
In June 2018, Kiir and Machar participated in negotiations that  were me-
diated by bordering states Sudan and Uganda. The following month the two 
belligerents signed the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement, a settlement 
that included a ceasefire and promise to negotiate a power- sharing agree-
ment to conclude the conflict. In August and at long last, Kiir and Machar 
signed one last ceasefire and power- sharing agreement. This agreement was 
followed by the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict 
in South Sudan—an arrangement signed by the government, Machar, and 
other rebel factions. This Revitalized Agreement reinstated Machar to his 
former vp role and included a new power- sharing structure. Machar re-
turned to the country in October 2018 for a nationwide cele bration to com-
memorate the end of the war.47
The war’s statistics tell a sordid tale. Less than two weeks  after the initial 
vio lence, un special representative for South Sudan Hilde Johnson stated 
that more than one thousand  people had been killed. By early July 2014, the 
Economist reported that  there  were at least ten thousand dead. Added to 
 those killed are  those who sustained violent wounds. By early January 2014, 
the World Health Organ ization had documented 2,566 cases of gunshot 
wounds across six of the country’s ten states, and by early February, the un 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs counted 4,895 patients 
who had been treated for gunshot wounds since December 15. By early Janu-
ary 2014, more than two thousand  people  were fleeing to Uganda per day, 
while more than thirty thousand had already fled to neighboring countries 
like  Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan. This number was dwarfed by 
the more than two hundred thousand internally displaced, including sixty 
thousand at un compounds. By mid- July 2014 one million  were said to have 
fled their homes, with the number  housed at un compounds having risen 
to one hundred thousand. As of late February 2018— a  little over four years 
 after the first shots  were fired— the Council on Foreign Relations estimated 
that more than fifty thousand had been killed and four million displaced.48
war tiMe religious politics
In April 2014,  people flocked to churches to celebrate Easter. President Kiir, 
a Catholic, marked Good Friday at Juba’s Kator Cathedral. The ser vice was 
 attended by several government ministers and foreign diplomats. In his 
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remarks, Kiir called for forgiveness and the burying of po liti cal differences. 
“As Christians and  people of God,” he said, “we should pray hard that this 
country celebrate the next Easter in peace.” Paulino Lukudu Loro, the arch-
bishop of Juba Diocese, conducted a prayer ser vice at the cathedral that day.49 
Three years  earlier, Loro had co- led the October 2011 symposium “One Church 
from  Every Tribe, Tongue and  People” at Juba’s Nyakuron Cultural Centre. 
The title was borrowed from Revelation 7:9, where John describes his apoca-
lyptic vision of an innumerable multitude from  every tribe, tongue, and  people 
dressed in white, holding palms, and standing before the throne and the Lamb. 
Or ga nized by the Catholic Church, Loro led the symposium with Cardinal 
Gabriel Zubeir Wako.50 In the symposium’s opening address, Loro delivered a 
power ful argument concerning diversity and unity in the new nation:
We cannot— and must not—be afraid of our tribes.  Unless we recognise 
and believe in our tribes first of all as gifts of God, we  will have a prob lem, 
and we may fight  because of our tribal background. . . .  We must recog-
nise ourselves indeed as a part of our tribe, so that we  will be able to be 
together in honesty. It is useless for us to deny ourselves, “Oh, let us not 
mention our tribe and background.” Wrong! We are then hiding some-
thing. We are what we are. . . .  If I realise myself, and each one of you in 
your tribe, that you are what you are and that we can be together, then 
we can make one nation from  every tribe, tongue and  people.51
At the Easter 2014 ser vice, approximately two- and- a- half years  after his 
comments (and months  after violent ethnic conflict had exploded in Juba), 
Archbishop Loro applied ele ments of the resurrection story to the con-
temporary situation. “The message of Easter is a message of man fi nally 
returning to the love and care that he used to enjoy with his  Father before 
he sinned,” he shared. “If all of us can remember that the Lord has freed us, 
being reconciled with God and with one another but as long as we are miss-
ing out on that fact, we  will continue being alienated from each other and 
from our God.” Claiming that politicians seemed to be losing sight of the 
fact that they had only one country, Loro observed that the conflict showed 
that politicians lacked tolerance and re spect for  human rights: “ There are 
some selfish individuals in our midst [who] have got power and money . . . 
young  people, unfortunately, who are not having anything to do, are eas-
ily bought and they start to engage in vio lence . . .  if we blow [the country] 
up . . .  we  will have no place to run to.”52
Despite conflicting reports regarding the new nation’s religious com-
position, Chris tian ity is South Sudan’s primary faith; a 2012 Pew Research 
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Center report estimated that approximately 60  percent of the country was 
Christian, followed by 33  percent who followed African traditional religions, 
6  percent Muslim, and the remainder unaffiliated.53 The remarks made by 
President Kiir and Archbishop Loro at the Easter ser vice are but one ex-
ample of efforts made by the government, church officials, and laypeople to 
inject Christian thought into comments concerning the conflict. Ranging 
from outright condemnations (of Kiir, Machar, and the government more 
broadly) to pleas for peace,  these episodes illustrate the continued utility 
that South Sudanese have found in using the Bible and theology to levy po-
liti cal messages.  Those who have opined that God is central to any chance 
of peace in this ethnically driven conflict subliminally hearken back to the 
days of the Nugent School, when officials  there similarly expressed the 
need for God to achieve transethnic amity. Thus, not only has politicized 
Christian thought been unrestricted to the two civil wars with Khartoum, 
it has also continued to dovetail with the pre-1956 issue of intrasouthern 
relations.
*  *  *
Church leaders—at least within the conflict’s first year— were hitherto 
unable to seriously influence politicians and generals. The warring groups 
refused church participation in peace negotiations  until June 2014 (six 
months into the conflict), and the parties repeatedly boycotted subse-
quent talks to avoid participation from religious groups and other non-
armed actors. Anglican bishop Enoch Tombe said, “The po liti cal leaders 
think that their side of the story is always correct. [They ask us], why 
do you speak as if you are with the rebels?” Jason Patinkin reported that 
some believed that top politicians’ disrespect for the church reflected a 
deeper prob lem that hit at the core of South Sudan’s traditionally ac-
cepted history— one that posited the in de pen dence strug le as a fight 
for religious freedom for the primarily Christian South against Khar-
toum’s Islamist government. This, however, was inaccurate— the splA 
was initially backed by Ethiopian Communists and began as a Marxist- 
influenced movement. Bishop Tombe opined that the war’s atrocities de-
stroyed the myth that the splA  were Christian liberators. Noting that 
the politicians could not claim to be Christian, Tombe stated, “Even if 
they go to church on Sunday they are not guided by Christian values 
only. They may be Christian by name, but Christian values have not  really 
penetrated.”54
128 Chapter 5
Patinkin, reporting for the Christian Science Monitor in December 2014, 
noted that churches or clergy  were attacked in Juba, Bor, and Malakal— 
locations that witnessed some of the most vicious fighting. Priests  were 
murdered, and civilians  were occasionally slaughtered in the very churches 
where they had sought safety. Catholic radio stations in government- 
controlled areas  were censored and shut down (along with staff being im-
prisoned), and government security agents attempted to quell a Decem-
ber 2014 peace march in Juba led by the Catholic Church to mark the war’s 
one- year anniversary. Rebel hardliners reportedly threatened or attacked 
pastors who preached moderation in their areas.55 Four years  later Vice 
President James Wani Iga accused priests of promoting vio lence, while 
 others have accused the church of being inactive during the conflict.56
 These criticisms notwithstanding, some members of the warring parties 
(and, postconflict, formerly warring parties) reached out to or worked with 
the church. In 2016 Nadia Arop, national minister of youth and sport, called 
on churches to pray for peace in the country. Accompanying Arop’s call 
that year was a report that Kiir, first vp Machar, and second vp Wani Iga 
 were expected to attend a special prayer function for peace and healing that 
May. Or ga nized by the South Sudan Council of Churches, a source close 
to the ssCC shared that the event would be held in Juba and presided over 
by church leaders, including Catholic archbishop Loro and the Anglican 
Church’s Daniel Deng Bul. A source familiar with the program disclosed 
that prayers would usher in the new cabinet and scriptures would be em-
ployed to lessen mistrust between po liti cal leaders.57 The report concerning 
the aforementioned prayer breakfast was published in the Christian Times, 
a South Sudanese fortnightly newspaper that Anglican priest John Daau 
launched in 2004. Printed in Nairobi and with offices in Juba, it is also pub-
lished online.58
The following year Rev. General Mabil de Awar Yuot, the head of the 
National Police Chaplaincy Ser vice, visited the Juba office of Samaritan’s 
Purse (an evangelically minded organ ization that, as of 2018, operated re-
lief proj ects from five primary bases in the country). Yuot wanted Samari-
tan’s Purse to train his chaplains. The first training was held months  later 
in Aweil state, and  others  were  later held in Juba and Mundri. In the latter 
two sessions, Samaritan’s team trained more than one hundred government 
leaders, including officials, members of the military, police chaplains, and 
 others. The Reverend Moses Telar, director general of the Ministry of Re-
ligious Affairs, stated, “Let us take the Bible instead of the gun,” and “Our 
country needs to change, even our minds need to change. As chaplains, it is 
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your role. Let us disarm the heart. God is with us.”59 In 2018, the warring par-
ties negotiating in Addis Ababa called on the ssCC to help them overcome 
their differences (something the igAd, working as mediator, had failed to 
accomplish).60
The council’s work points to other work that the church conducted dur-
ing the war. From the outset priests, pastors, and nuns protected civilians 
from extremists on both sides and occasionally stood up to armed men while 
unarmed themselves. Bishop Emmanuel Murye of the Anglican Diocese of 
Kajo Keji acknowledged that several partners had supported them in educa-
tion, trauma- healing workshops, empowerment for girls who had dropped 
out of school, and other areas. The ssCC— which, according to John Ash-
worth, “took a breather to rebuild and repair”  after the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement— had a renewed impetus that included implementing an 
Action Plan for Peace, recognizing the need for a long-term peace pro cess to 
resolve both the current conflict and unresolved effects of previous conflicts. 
The ssCC shared that this plan could continue for as long as twenty years.61
Perhaps the most compelling actions taken by clerical figures occurred 
in the arena of discourse. Clergy urged civilians not to blindly follow the 
warlords, lamented politicians’ disregard for  those who had died, called the 
nation’s leaders “dry bones” that required spiritual renewal, and termed the 
fighting “evil.”62 The decision to spiritualize the vio lence in a negative light 
is par tic u larly significant given a similar strategy employed by Llewellyn 
Gwynne de cades  earlier with re spect to ethnic conflict. In December 2016, 
Bishop Isaiah Dau of the Pentecostal Church of Sudan spoke during a 
Christmas cele bration or ga nized by the Presbyterian Evangelical Church 
in Hai Jalaba, Juba. Warning South Sudanese and politicians to cease all 
vio lence, Bishop Dau told a cheering congregation, “Shedding blood is the 
work of the devil and anybody who is killing  people is  doing the work of the 
devil.” Peace, he declared, could not be achieved through donors but only if 
 people reconciled with God and one another. “Men and  women who do not 
have peace with God try to make peace[;] that is why  there is no peace.” He 
identified love of God as the medicine for the nation’s tribalism. The same 
Christian Times piece that reported Dau’s fiery sermon noted that Awien 
Mawien, deputy speaker of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly, 
said that South Sudan was suffering  because of its  people’s sins.63
Dau was joined in his condemnation of vio lence by a seminarian whose 
piece, “ ‘No More of This!’ Jesus’ Condemnation of Vio lence and the War,” 
appeared in the Christian Times in March 2018. The writer referenced the 
Gospel passage in which po liti cal and religious leaders sent armed men to 
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arrest Christ on Holy Thursday (Mark 14:43). After recounting the facts 
that Jesus was found in the garden, Judas identified him with a kiss, and the 
soldiers subsequently led him away, the writer opined:
This is similar to what is happening in South Sudan  today. Leaders are 
seeking to protect their power or gain power by shedding innocent blood. 
Soldiers are arresting and targeting  people in the nighttime. Though 
they call Jesus “teacher,” they honor his name falsely, just as Judas did. 
They have robbed hungry villa gers, raped innocent schoolgirls, forced 
boys to commit atrocities . . .  such brutal vio lence is not from God. On 
the contrary, it is from the devil who “was a murderer from the begin-
ning” (John 8:44).
Further on, the seminarian referred to the episode when Peter attempted to 
protect Christ by cutting off the ear of one of Jesus’s arresting soldiers. Not-
ing Jesus’s command for Peter to put his sword away, the writer offered that 
“in this, South Sudan’s hour of darkness, we must trust in God, not in weap-
ons. Our example is Jesus, a healer and a peacemaker— not a killer. Though 
the darkness may last for ‘an hour,’ Jesus  will shatter it and conquer death.”64 
Three years  later, none other than Salva Kiir would make a public declara-
tion of forgiveness in the postwar state. During the fall of 2018, thousands 
of  people cheered around Juba’s John Garang Memorial Park celebrating a 
new peace deal. Machar, returned from exile, took the stage with Kiir.  After 
the president reiterated that the war had ended, Kiir promised that he had 
forgiven his rival and that Machar had returned the  favor. “To forgive,” Kiir 
told the crowd, “is not an act of cowardice. It is a Christian obligation.”65
In Daniel Deng’s 2015 Christmas message, the Anglican archbishop ex-
plained that peace was needed in Sudan and South Sudan and that it simply 
was not pos si ble without God. “We need to liberate this country spiritu-
ally from the moral decay. . . .  It is better to be peace builders and makers 
than being destroyers of God given peace. . . .  God  will heal our land and 
us. . . .  We are hostile against each other. Time has come to rediscover love 
of God[,] the source of our healing.” By asking for God’s forgiveness, Deng 
stated, they opened themselves for his love, compassion, and grace. He, like 
Fr. Attiyah during the second war against Khartoum, used Galatians 3:28 
to state that Christ broke down the barriers that divided them “racially, 
tribally and ethnically; no Jew or Gentile, slave or  free, male or female[;] all 
are one in Christ.”  Later on in the message, however, Deng commented on 
ethnicity’s relationship with the divine in a way that echoed Archbishop 
Loro’s words four years  earlier. “Let us celebrate our diversity,” he said, “by 
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honoring one another. Our diversity is a God given  thing; we did not make 
ourselves to be who we are in our vari ous ethnic groups.”66 In this way, Deng 
used Galatians to confirm the overarching unity of faith that transcended 
ethnicity while affirming that none other than God had created diversity, 
diversity should be celebrated, and such cele bration is done by honoring 
one another.
partisan readings
Kong Tut used scripture to levy his dis plea sure with the president in “Theo-
logical Reflections on Juba Nuer Massacre.” Posted shortly  after Christmas 
2014, Tut’s essay cited Herod’s killing of infant boys as an occasion to draw 
a direct parallel to the ethnic killings in Juba that had initiated the con-
flict. While Herod ordered the infanticides to kill Jesus, Kiir— according to 
Tut— ordered the killing of innocent Nuer out of hatred and as a means to 
hunt down “the demo cratic reformer” Machar. Tut added that the book of 
Revelation stated that while Christ was in the desert, the beast attempted to 
destroy Jesus with his messenger but to no avail. Machar, according to Tut’s 
logic, represented the baby Jesus, while Kiir was the beast, and Museveni the 
messenger. To this end, the Egyptian desert was analogous to Unity, Jonglei, 
and Upper Nile. While Jesus began his ministry in the Gospels of Matthew 
and Luke by proclaiming the nearness of God’s Kingdom and removing all 
oppression, “reflections have it that Riek Machar’s address of Pagak Confer-
ence marks the road forward to the end.”67  There are moments, to be sure, 
where the accuracy of Tut’s biblical references must be called into question; 
namely, Christ’s appearance in the desert in the book of Revelation and the 
appearance of the beast and messenger in the Nativity story. Nevertheless, 
it is useful to recognize his attempt to provide spiritual strength  behind his 
benevolent pre sen ta tion of Machar and villainous portrayal of Kiir.
Prorebel supporters like Akol and Tut  were countered by Joseph de 
Tuombuk and Elhag Paul, who have each been published in online ven-
ues, including the Sudan Tribune, Pachodo . org, Gurtong, and South Sudan News 
Agency.68 Tuombuk wrote a piece, “Tribalism in South Sudan: Let’s Read 
from Matthew 7:1–5,” published on Gurtong in January 2015, in response 
to an article by Machar spokesperson James Gatdet Dak. Tuombuk stated 
that tribalism in South Sudan was a fact of life and that every one hailed 
from some tribe; indeed, “even the Israelites had twelve tribes.” The prob-
lem, according to Tuombuk, begins “when highly educated  people like 
Riek Machar . . .  try to use our cherished diversity as a way to short- circuit 
132 Chapter 5
the demo cratic pro cess and access power through illegal means.” He cited 
the fact that the rebellion’s top command was 92  percent Nuer and that 
Machar had relied heavi ly on anti- Dinka sentiment to rally a Nuer sec-
tion “to his unholy cause.” On the other hand, Kiir had an administration 
that was unpre ce dented for its diversity. As Machar and his supporters had 
killed Nuer who stood up for their country rather than their ethnic group, 
Tuombuk returned to the Matthew scripture and charged that “Riek has 
lost the moral high ground to call Kiir’s administration some kind of a tribal 
entity led by corrupt ‘Dinka clan.’ Riek has demonstrated that he can use 
tribal politics as a means to an end: destroying our nascent democracy.”69
Tuombuk was joined in his anti- Machar criticism by Elhag Paul. Paul 
accused Machar of wearing layers of disguise, which  were gradually being 
peeled off to reveal his true character. Though Machar offered hope by em-
bracing democracy and federalism, Paul noted that he was now out for his 
own personal gain, used dictatorial approaches, and had no intention to 
deliver on promises to some of the country’s oppressed  people. “The say-
ing that a leopard can not change its spots,” Paul contended, “seems to 
be true in the case of Machar and the splm leaders. . . .  Machar can not 
change. . . .  He has once again squandered a golden opportunity for him to 
wash himself clean from his controversial past to emerge as a true leader.”70 
Paul informed me that the leopard phrase was a common expression that 
was suitable for his article and not necessarily used  because of any biblical 
roots.71 However, the leopard- spot idiom is found in the book of Jeremiah 
13:23 (niv): “Can an Ethiopian change his skin or a leopard its spots? Neither 
can you do good who are accustomed to  doing evil.”
*  *  *
“The blood of the tribe,” remarked Bishop Tombe in 2014, “has become 
thicker than the blood of the Christ.”72  After five de cades of racial and re-
ligious conflict with North Sudanese, South Sudan’s early in de pen dence 
years  were wracked by internal vio lence rent along ethnic lines. Any notion 
that southerners felt a sense of pan- Christian solidarity strong enough to 
subsume ethnicity or prevent ethnic tension was violently debunked. And 
yet, the war— rather than spurring widespread disavowals of Chris tian ity— 
produced a dynamic crucible of religious thought. From contextual inter-
pretations of specific scriptures to more general theological applications 
to fit the situation, a diverse array of lay and clerical figures used similarly 
varied media to make their expressions known. As one sign of the differing 
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opinions that emerged from the war, Tombe’s aforementioned comment 
contrasts with Bishop Murye’s message, that “though we are a multi- tribal 
nation, we are one in Christ,” and Bishop Deng’s 2015 Christmas plea:
Christ welcome[s]  every tribe and nation  because God has purchased us 
all with His blood. . . .  God created and placed us  here in South Sudan to 
live together in peace and harmony. . . .  [W]e have been prisoners of our 
own ethnic vio lence and wars. . . .  Let pride of tribe or clan or class . . . 
not obscures [sic] our focus on the  future for this nation. . . .  As we cel-
ebrate the birth of Christ, let us celebrate one another, as one  family 
of God. . . .  Let us celebrate our diversity by honoring one another. Our 
diversity is a God given  thing; we did not make ourselves to be who we 
are in our vari ous ethnic groups.73
While the in de pen dence years have been largely destructive, the period has 
nevertheless witnessed a vibrant environment for religious discourse.
The religious thought examined in this chapter contains ele ments that il-
lustrate not only the post- CpA period’s unique nature but also its constituent 
position within the region’s longer train of po liti cal theology. As with  earlier 
periods, Christian po liti cal imagination was not  limited to ordained clergy 
but was formulated by lay politicians and civilians alike. What makes the 
post- CpA period diff er ent in this re spect, however, was the efflorescence of 
ideas that could be found online. No longer  limited to physical print spaces 
like personal correspondences or newspapers, venues like the Sudan Tribune and 
Christian Times continued online in the tradition of the SPLA Update as spaces 
where  those throughout the Sudanese diaspora could make their expressions 
known (though to a potentially wider audience than the Update ever could).
A second observation gleaned from this period is the endurance of 
an idea expressed by Gwynne and Nugent School staff during the condo-
minium era: that intergroup fighting was a spiritual “evil” and that unit-
ing  under God was the solution to this prob lem. Yet, unlike the move that 
Thomas Attiyah previously made in the Update (that, borrowing from 1 
Corinthians,  there was no more Dinka or Nuer but simply  those in Christ), 
Bishops Deng and Loro affirmed the value of ethnicity as a God- given iden-
tity even as tribalism was tearing the young nation apart. Rather than ap-
proaching Christian identity as one meant to completely subsume ethnic 
identity, they instead presented it as a pan- ethnic framework that not only 
can but must accommodate ethnic diversity. South Sudanese Christians, in 
this paradigm,  were a chosen  people religiously and chosen  peoples ethni-
cally, a venerable “mixed multitude” like their figurative pre de ces sors.74
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Fi nally, the church’s evolving but consistent proximity to po liti cal hap-
penings mirrored the way in which po liti cal theology similarly evolved but 
remained consistent. As South Sudan’s internal conflict was not racialized 
or religionized in the oppositional manner that the wars against Khartoum 
 were (Arab v. Black, Christian v. Muslim), vari ous intellectuals related par-
tic u lar scriptures and theologies to the situation. While Arabs, Muslims, 
and the Sudanese government  were no longer the targets of religiously in-
fused language, Kiir, Machar, and the South Sudanese government filled 
this void in some re spects. The Exodus narrative so previously lionized was 
replaced by far more references to the New Testament. Despite a frame-
work that differed from the twentieth- century civil wars, religious thought 
still operated as a po liti cal technology.
 Conclusion
inheriting the wind
We must rise to defend our liberation credentials and bring hope to our 
 people who pinned their  future on the historical legacy of this party. We 
must rise so that the words of Prophet Isaiah ring true. splm must lead, the 
splm must inspire, splm must unleash its liberation zeal and captivate the 
imagination of our  people yet again.
— Salva Kiir, 2018
This book has examined theology’s role in the ideological construction 
of the South Sudanese nation- state. The condominium period was criti-
cal for the institutionalization of mission work in the South, administra-
tive attempts to insulate the South from Arab- Islamic influences, and the 
cultivation of an English- speaking, biblically literate elite. That period was 
followed by the First Civil War, which witnessed the emergence of a black 
liberation theology that buttressed arguments for southern liberation. 
Foundational to this theology was the sense that southerners  were God’s 
 people and that he was concerned with liberating them from their north-
ern, Arab, and Islamic “oppressors.” This stream of thought was revived 
during the Second Civil War in the SPLM/A Update to contribute a sense 
of spiritual destiny to the war effort and serve as a unifying mechanism in 
the face of internal division. Thus, the religious nationalism displayed at 
in de pen dence in 2011 did not emerge spontaneously but was merely another 
chapter in a genealogy of thought.
136 Conclusion
This religious thought is noteworthy for its endurance and racialized na-
ture, with a black/African “chosen” and “oppressed” and Arab “oppressors.” 
While John Mbiti identified southern Africa as a context in which black 
theology could exist, this study sugests that South Sudan was also a space 
where religious ideology was heavi ly informed by racialized po liti cal realities. 
Unlike South Africa (and a host of other African contexts), the population 
framed as “oppressive” was not white and Christian but Arab and Muslim. 
Far from being isolated from or insensitive to the sociopo liti cal realities 
of the times, religious thought in South Sudan has historically served as 
an arena for thinkers to define and respond to their circumstances. Rather 
than the historical North- South conflict being whittled down to race or re-
ligion, religious thought was an impor tant space in which racial differences 
and be hav iors  were defined.
Race’s centrality in the theological paradigm, however, must not over-
shadow the religious approaches taken to interethnic relations— relations 
that, since December 2013, have been openly and violently broadcasted for 
the world to see. This study has shown that from a Christian perspective, 
approaches to ethnicity have been ambivalent. During the condominium 
the state was bent on preserving, rather than eliminating, indigenous cul-
tures. The Cms Nugent School encouraged ethnically driven competition, 
and moments of division  were lamented. Oliver Allison, John Parry, and 
 others contended that Chris tian ity was needed for interethnic amity to 
exist, while the Catholic Messenger newspaper published one editorial that 
told its readers that “Chris tian ity is now your tribe,” a sentiment that could 
only be read as an argument for the supremacy of one’s Christian identity 
over ethnic heritage. While Fr. Thomas Attiyah would  later use scripture 
to inform his SPLA Update readers that  there  were no longer ethnic differ-
ences but only  those in Christ, Archbishop Paolino Loro offered in 2011 that 
ethnicities  were gifts of God and not to be feared.  There has never been an 
overwhelming sense that ethnicity should be repudiated in  favor of Chris-
tian ity or, conversely, that ethnic identity should reign supreme.
While  there has been ambivalence on that point, one ele ment has been 
particularly consistent— that South Sudanese, in blending their Christian 
and po liti cal imaginations, rarely offered  wholesale demonization of Islam. 
While Muslim individuals and Islamizing governments and policies may 
have been the targets of rebuke, Islam as a world religion was not altogether 
vilified in the print mediums—at least, most notably, not by the Sudanese 
writers quoted in this study. The same cannot be said of the Eu ro pe ans and 
Americans who, in the first half of the twentieth  century, discussed Islam 
Inheriting the Wind 137
in antagonistic, martial terms. Thus, despite the real ity that religion cer-
tainly was a pivotal  factor in the twentieth- century civil wars, the South 
Sudanese intellectuals  under study did not generally frame the conflict as 
a war against Islam itself. This real ity is not only imperative for  those who 
would wish to clothe the civil wars as “Chris tian ity v. Islam” strug les but 
also illustrates the capacity for adherents of one religion to marshal that 
faith for their own po liti cal (and perhaps revolutionary) purposes without 
castigating the faith(s) of their po liti cal enemies.
iMplications for sudan and Beyond
I believe that the narrative presented in this study holds several implica-
tions for the study of religion and politics in Africa and beyond. To begin, 
I believe that one of this book’s most critical interventions is the fact that 
South Sudanese did not stop using the Bible and Christian theology for po-
liti cal purposes  after the end of the war in 2005 or the attainment of in-
de pen dence in 2011; on the contrary, such thinking has continued during 
the post- CpA era. The primary danger of limiting one’s focus on southern 
religious politics to the civil war years with the North is the inaccurate pre-
sumption that southerners only appropriated Chris tian ity in opposition to 
Islam (and, consequently, that Chris tian ity was no longer po liti cally expe-
dient or useful with the removal of the northern threat). Such a reading 
would connote that  those southerners  under study had a narrow objective 
when invoking God and scripture. The fact that po liti cal theology has con-
tinued in South Sudan testifies to the more compelling real ity that south-
erners have not forsaken the idea that the spiritual is intimately connected 
with the material, or that scripture is a useful po liti cal resource with a per-
tinent word for  every situation. Given this state of affairs, it would be use-
ful to compare the nature of religion in other national contexts that have 
emerged  after lengthy periods of conflict. In what ways does the manner of 
religious ideation change when states transition from war time to postwar 
status? Charting such changes—or consistencies— across time and space 
can expand our knowledge about religion’s use as an instrument of war, 
mouthpiece, resource, and building block for nationalism.
The SPLA Update’s use of scripture and theology to interpret enemies and 
justify vio lence can lead us to consider other communities that similarly 
invoked biblical narratives. In Uganda, the Lord’s Re sis tance Army (lRA) 
wants to establish a theocratic state based on Old Testament and Acholi tra-
dition. With Joseph Kony believing himself to be God’s spokesperson and a 
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medium of the Holy Spirit, the lRA began from the remnants of the Holy 
Spirit movement, which fought against the Ugandan state in the late 1980s.1 
Hutu preachers in Rwanda used the memory of King Saul and his divinely 
sanctioned actions against the Amalekites (killing  every man,  woman, and 
child) to justify Tutsi destruction.2 It  will be imperative to note if and how 
biblical passages are or have been invoked to stoke vio lence in conflict be-
tween Christians and Muslims in places like the Central African Republic.3
Beyond the use of scripture in a bellicose environment,  there is also the 
broader  matter of state appropriations of the Bible or Chris tian ity for par-
tisan purposes. How have African and non- African states used religious 
rhe toric to encourage peace or policy agendas? Amid the war on terror, 
President Donald Trump’s Muslim ban, and the terrorist attacks that have 
hit France, this question is particularly relevant and revealing for the con-
temporary geopo liti cal climate. While one could argue that we are living 
in an era similar to the late nineteenth  century (when some envisioned a 
global “Chris tian ity v. Islam” strug le), a sign I encountered on the lawn of 
a Minneapolis church reading “Jesus was a Refugee” in the wake of Trump’s 
ban reinforces the need to look for dissenting undercurrents of religious 
thought. Just as po liti cal theology in Sudan has contained a diversity of ap-
propriations, one must look for the multiplicity of ways that state, non-
state, church, and secular actors use scripture to address issues like the 
US immigration crisis, global warming, abortion, and all forms of state vio-
lence against marginalized communities. How, for example, are Catholic im-
migrants from South and Central Amer i ca using theology to bolster their 
claims for access to US citizenship? How are Black Lives  Matter activists 
using religion to buttress arguments for social, economic, and po liti cal en-
franchisement? How are Muslim citizens in France, the United States, and 
South Sudan using the Koran as a basis from which to petition  those respec-
tive governments for equal status in  those countries?4 The South Sudanese 
case proves that religion can function as a productive and dynamic technol-
ogy with which to empower, encourage, and enlighten  those in the midst of 
a violent, revolutionary strug le. Similarly, work must be done on the ways 
in which clerical and lay theologians the world over are marshaling religion 
to advance sociopo liti cal proj ects in spaces that are defined not by military 
warfare but instead by more seemingly pacific conflicts.
The international nature of Sudan’s civil wars can help students and 
scholars to think in diff er ent ways about religion’s mobility in the diaspora. 
Religion is a space where individuals can stake claims in communities that 
are much larger than their own. Conversion to Chris tian ity and Islam in 
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Africa has been described as an entry way into a “global system” that revital-
izes Yoruba religion’s “vital core,” and in sub- Saharan Africa in de pen dent 
churches rejuvenated African identity by making “inter- ethnic and trans-
cultural associative networks” that are linked by “overarching symbols and 
doctrines.”5 While Matthew Kustenbauder once noted that mobile phones, 
airplanes, and news media linked seemingly isolated refugee camps and vil-
lages to the wider world system, I believe that one of the more fascinating 
dimensions of my study is the way in which po liti cal theology is shown ad-
vancing from diasporic print mediums like the Voice of Southern Sudan and 
SPLA Update to online venues like the Sudan Tribune. How, then, are refugees, 
immigrants, and all  others who are geo graph i cally distant from their homes 
using the internet as figurative pulpits to moralize domestic issues? The 
internet has made it easier than ever for po liti cally attentive laypeople to 
broadcast their views to a global audience, making the authorship of  those 
disseminating religiously infused civic messaging more egalitarian. Build-
ing off work that Timeka Tounsel and D. S. Williams have done on black 
 women, I believe that by inserting biblical language into online articles and 
blogs, po liti cal discourse can become the stuff of everyday hermeneutics, 
revealing both the capacity for clerical and lay citizens to express their in-
terpretations through public discourse and their willingness to do so.6 The 
study of African religious politics stands to be strengthened by seriously 
considering the internet as a venue for religious expression.
Perhaps one of the more curious implications of this study concerns 
the use of religion in arguments for diversity and inclusion. One may walk 
away from this book believing that South Sudanese Christians used their 
faith as a weapon against the North Sudanese racial and religious Other. 
Such a reading would frame the theology that infused the liberation effort 
as not only partisan but essentially divisive and exclusive, an ideology that 
encouraged separatism rather than reconciliation across racial, religious, 
and po liti cal lines. Such a conclusion, however, would be problematic for 
several reasons. First, it flies in the face of the real ity that this theology 
never demonized Islam or Muslims  wholesale. Second, it would fail to ac-
count for the ways in which theology was used to encourage peace during 
South Sudan’s internal conflict. Third, it would fail to account for the se-
vere pressures that southerners faced in their strug les against Khartoum. 
The religious ideations presented in this book  were created by  people living 
with crushing circumstances, and that such theology could emerge from 
such extraordinary circumstances sheds light on Joseph Taban’s assertion 
that “If  there’s a book the South Sudanese cannot remove from their lives, 
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it’s the Bible.” Rather than viewing their theology as one that was essentially 
antagonistic, it would be more accurate to take note instead of their abil-
ity to make positive meaning of themselves and their  futures despite their 
perilous circumstances.
Fi nally, the competing contentions that “Chris tian ity is now your tribe” 
and that tribes are “gifts from God” are fascinating to think about when 
considering other contexts in which intergroup relations— whether racial, 
ethnic, or national— are controversial. Should religions that propose them-
selves to be predicated on love ( whether Chris tian ity or other wise) justify 
the inherent value of distinct identities in a world where identity politics 
are so fraught? Should the priority, conversely, be to accentuate sameness, 
shared values, and communal identities? While  these questions are bound 
to conjure polarizing answers depending on one’s experiences and perspec-
tives, I think that  there is something right, compelling, and even urgent 
about Loro’s claim that ethnicities are gifts from God. While religious iden-
tities may be essentially transcendent by their connection with the divine, 
it is dangerous to consider identity politics in a zero- sum manner. Celebrat-
ing one must not mean relegating another. On the contrary, seeing that 
 there is intimate connection between one’s faith, race, ethnicity, and gen-
der can open the door for honest dialogue and mutual understanding. I pose 
the same questions for South Sudan that Kristin Anderson did for race in 
the United States. Is colorblindness good for  people of color? In a multicul-
tural and multiethnic South Sudan, what does it mean for  people to ignore 
ethnicity in their interactions? If ethnicity  matters in society and in every-
day life, what are the implications of not seeing it?7 The decision not to see 
one’s race or ethnicity comes with the consequences of ignoring the beauty, 
pain, culture, and history that accompanies  those identities.
closing thoughts
It has been a singular time in which to produce a book on South Sudanese 
history. Since work for this study began in 2010, South Sudan has transi-
tioned from being a part of the Republic of the Sudan to in de pen dence to a 
nation that has emerged from its own civil war. While the history of south-
ern nationalism— and indeed, the history of the nation—is still evolving, 
some conclusions can be drawn at this par tic u lar moment.
Despite the temptation to marvel at the fact that an internal war erupted 
less than three years into in de pen dence, the recent conflict did not occur 
spontaneously. Nor does the vio lence signify a total failure of the national 
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proj ect, a turning away from the long- standing racial and cultural identifica-
tions with blackness and Africanness. This study shows how race, in response 
to conflicts with North Sudanese, came to dominate identifications of self 
and community. Changing times call for changing responses, however, and 
race in the current environment has become less salient than ethnicity. Still, 
the appalling ferocity of ethnic vio lence since 2013 raises some legitimate 
questions. How effective was Chris tian ity’s contribution in encouraging a 
sense of cross- ethnic nationalism? How should one assess the true impact 
of the Biblical idioms that infused po liti cal rhe toric before and  after the 
CpA? In a religious thought that placed such importance on race in defin-
ing oppressor and oppressed, how does the current state of ethnic division 
complicate ideological understandings of the South Sudanese nation- state?
South Sudan is not a singular case. Almost  every nation has had to con-
tend with existential disputes, prob lems, and civil wars that threatened their 
princi ples and existences. One needs to look no further than the Sudan, 
which had to deal with the consequences of the Torit Mutiny mere months 
before its 1956 in de pen dence.  Others might argue that South Sudan’s cur-
rent trauma proves that Frantz Fanon wrote with prophetic accuracy in the 
following excerpt from The Wretched of the Earth:
Nationalism, that magnificent hymn which roused the masses against 
the oppressor, disintegrates in the aftermath of in de pen dence. Nation-
alism is not a po liti cal doctrine. . . .  If we  really want to safeguard our 
countries from regression, paralysis, or collapse, we must rapidly switch 
from a national consciousness to a social and po liti cal consciousness. 
The nation can only come into being in a program elaborated by a revo-
lutionary leadership and enthusiastically and lucidly appropriated by the 
masses.8
It is tempting to conclude that South Sudan proves Fanon correct that, 
upon in de pen dence, the aims and utility of religious nationalism  were 
achieved but never actually possessed the power to construct and preserve 
national peace and unity. Gordon Buay’s critique of government attempts 
to push the Cush moniker on the new nation illustrates the tenuousness 
of biblical insertions in the construction of national identity. He raises le-
gitimate questions about South Sudan’s exclusive claims to being the Land 
of Cush and the educational and theological backgrounds of the military 
officers who tried to insert Cush into the national anthem. What value, 
then, does the infusion of religious idioms into national identity have if 
 those connections are thin or inaccurate? Is it mere propaganda—as Buay 
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termed Garang’s actions—or is it constructive? The veracity of the claim 
that religious (and other) nationalisms are not fit to sustain the nation- state 
may also be proved by the civil war’s dead, refugees, and shattered dreams.
And yet, the utility of religious thought in the nation’s po liti cal sphere 
historically or moving forward cannot and should not be wholly rejected. 
On the contrary, recent years have shown that the Bible’s continued appro-
priation in po liti cal claims making is an outgrowth of longer-term be hav iors. 
Biblical borrowings since the CpA have been used to celebrate, discuss, and 
critique South Sudanese authority and nationhood. One of my interview 
participants, Bishop Anthony Pogo, authored Come Let Us Rebuild: Lessons 
from Nehemiah (2013). He looks to the book of Nehemiah to provide lessons 
for the construction of South Sudan. While he was still in the writing pro-
cess, Pogo shared his reasoning  behind the proj ect with me:
I’m looking at . . .  the lessons that we learn from Nehemiah on build-
ing the nation, and so a number of  things that are in my view are rel-
evant to [the] South Sudan context. . . .  We need to be Nehemiahs to be 
able to build this nation. . . .  Nehemiah was patriotic . . .  a pray- er . . .  a 
planner . . .  patient in the face of the challenges that he faced. . . .  We are 
talking of lessons and princi ples that we can learn from the word of God 
that can be useful and impor tant.9
A  couple of months before the war’s first shots  were fired, I met with two 
students from the Juba Diocesan Model Secondary School and was taken 
aback by their use of the Old Testament to express their hopes and wishes 
for the government. One of the students, Grace, called on government min-
isters to come to church, pray, and ask God to give them wisdom so that 
they could rule wisely. She noted that the fear of the Lord is the begin-
ning of wisdom (Prov. 9:10), and that if leaders go to church and fear the 
Lord, “ they’ll do good.” The other student, Diana, mentioned that when 
God asked Solomon what he desired, the king responded with wisdom. She 
also quoted from Proverbs 21:1, stating that the king’s heart is in the Lord’s 
hands. With  these thoughts in mind, she expressed her wish for the authori-
ties to come to the Lord. “If they did not call on the Lord to come and guide 
our country,” Diana opined, “it  will be in vain. . . .  They should call on the 
Lord and then they can be in control. God  will be the one guiding them . . . 
just following his footsteps.”10 Even anthem- critic Gordon Buay illustrated 
the continued potency of biblical borrowings when he responded to claims 
about his loyalty to the Kiir regime. Appointed by Kiir as an ambassador 
in 2014, Buay was alleged to be involved in a coup plot. He dismissed the 
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charge and was quoted in early January 2015 as likening his relationship 
with the president to that between “Jesus Christ and Jehovah.”11
South Sudanese have repeatedly found the Bible to be a critical source 
for sociopo liti cal power, dissent, defense, and meaning making.  Whether 
biblical Cush was or was not  limited to South Sudan’s modern bound aries 
means  little in comparison to the power of being able to claim that one’s 
tribulations and liberation  were prophetically foretold. It does not  matter 
that ele ments of the Moses- Joshua narrative are inconsistent with John 
Garang and Salva Kiir; it is the script that allows southerners to envision 
themselves as moving  toward and reaching the promised land, what ever 
that place might be. The Bible, in South Sudan as elsewhere, has provided 
a script for action, a lexicon for re sis tance, a vehicle for defining “us” and 
“them,” and ways to understand and respond to vari ous circumstances. Its 
mutability in South Sudanese history is rivaled only by its endurance as a 
po liti cally relevant text.
Continued appropriations of biblical symbolisms and themes in south-
ern po liti cal discourse warrant continued study on the meanings of such 
invocations. Rather than symbolizing the failure of religious thought in the 
national proj ect, this period of conflict could prove to be yet another in a list 
of chapters in which Christian thought is appropriated to fit con temporary 
circumstances. Rather than the traditional Arab  enemy and black African 
oppressed, new heroes and villains are bound to emerge to fit a new type 
of theology. Regardless of what the  future may hold, the Bible— with its 
characters, narratives, themes, and symbols— will continue to be a source of 
po liti cal inspiration, argument, and vocabulary to address and define issues 
facing the nation.
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Sources and Methodology
The nature of my inquiry and the agents in my narrative largely dictated 
the primary source base for this study. I envisioned this history of nation-
alism as a history of discourse, ideology, and thought. As my chronologi-
cal scope stretched from the condominium to Sudanese in de pen dence to 
South Sudanese nationhood, the ideologies that form the basis of my inves-
tigation  were espoused by agents that varied in nationality, profession, reli-
gion, period, race, and a host of other socioeconomic indexes. Furthermore, 
the means by which their views  were expressed  were fashioned in vari ous 
media, including newspapers, magazines, speeches, government and eccle-
siastical correspondences, private letters, song, poetry, and sermons. Given 
the international scope of government and mission work in the Sudan, re-
search necessitated visits to government, religious, and university archives 
in South Sudan, Egypt,  England, Italy, and vari ous American locations (the 
complete list of archives can be found in the bibliography). While each 
research site contributed to the formulation and construction of my proj-
ect, the most significant archives proved to be the South Sudan National 
Archives (ssnA), Durham University’s Sudan Archive (sAd), and Rome’s 
Comboni Mission Archive (CmA).
The ssnA is a government archive flush with official documents from 
the Anglo- Egyptian administration and early Sudanese governments. Hold-
ings include government and missionary correspondences, mission school 
inspection reports, official government newspapers, and a host of other 
memoranda. Mission school reports  were particularly useful for gaining in-
sight into condominium educational curriculums, student body makeups, 
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and socio- pedagogical priorities. Authored primarily by British adminis-
trators like resident inspector A. G. Hickson,  these documents also offer 
private insights and clues regarding British positions on the social objec-
tives and ramifications of their work. The archive’s holdings concerning the 
aftermath of the Torit Mutiny allowed me to chart and analyze accounts 
from individuals who participated in the vio lence. Many of the early in-
de pen dence documents pertain to the controversial pro cess of Arabization 
and Islamization, and of chief importance are  those materials produced by 
Ali Baldo, the governor of Equatoria during the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Indeed, the ssnA is a critical resource with which to chronicle official di-
mensions of the Sudanese government’s cultural and religious objectives in 
South Sudan during the early years of Sudanese in de pen dence.
For any work that seriously interrogates Sudanese Catholic history, Rome’s 
Comboni Mission Archive is a collection of the first magnitude. With pri-
marily English- language materials (along with  those in Latin and Italian), 
the CmA proved to be the most impor tant repository I visited with re spect 
to primary sources produced by Sudanese Catholic priests and refugees. 
Letters written by priests and other refugees afforded me the opportunity 
to trace the ideological and spiritual contours of refugee experiences. What 
biblical narratives, for example, did refugees reference in their letters? How 
did they recognize God in the midst of their suffering? Other CmA docu-
ments of  great use included  those concerning the Anyanya movement and 
foreign press coverage of developments in the country. In many re spects, 
perhaps the most pleasant surprise from the CmA was the Sudanese Catholic 
Clergy volume that is kept downstairs in the Comboni Library. The sCC 
contains not only mini- biographies of Sudanese clerics but also contact in-
formation with which I was able to track down and connect with several 
priests through questionnaires and during my 2013 trip to Juba.
Durham University’s Sudan Archive combines the best ele ments of the 
ssnA and CmA by offering a prodigious amount of religious and govern-
ment materials. Like the ssnA it contains documents authored by colonial 
officials concerning vari ous spheres of administration (including a compre-
hensive roll of annual reports and Sudan government gazettes), as well edi-
tions of periodicals, including the Grass Curtain, splm/A Update, and Sudan 
Diocesan Review. Unlike the CmA, whose church/mission holdings are over-
whelmingly Catholic, the sAd  houses an abundance of materials pertaining 
to Protestant church work. This includes, for example, the Oliver Allison 
papers and materials concerning the Church Missionary Society. I was for-
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tunate enough to visit Durham shortly  after the library had received the 
translated collection of Kuku- Balokole songs I mention in Chapter 3.
Following in the vein of Daniel Magaziner, my focus was not  limited to 
 people and organ izations; I also studied circulating texts and ideas that allow 
me to chronicle change over time. This entailed looking at poems, songs, 
letters, sermons, prayers, speeches, and newspapers crafted by southern and 
Euro- American individuals and organ izations. My heavy use of newspapers 
published in South Sudan and throughout sites in the Sudanese diaspora 
enabled me to note the evolution of thought concerning vari ous Khartoum 
governments, treatment of church and missionary institutions, and south-
ern self- determination. Examining poetry in newspapers and magazines al-
lowed me to examine po liti cal views, laments, and thoughts from contribu-
tors around the world as well as to put their ideas in conversation with  those 
of  others of varying professional, personal, and geographic backgrounds. By 
incorporating voices throughout the diaspora, I show the ways in which South 
Sudanese religious and po liti cal thought was not just developed within the 
po liti cal borders of South Sudan but evolved and proliferated throughout 
the Sudanese diaspora.
In addition to archival work, I gathered interviews with clerical and non-
clerical figures during my trips to Juba. As I was very much interested in the 
southern church’s po liti cal actions and thought both historically and pre s-
ent, many of my participants  were southern clergy. This notwithstanding, I 
prioritized the inclusion of laypeople and non- Sudanese clerical figures who 
have spent time in the country. Participants included a member of parlia-
ment; vari ous church  brothers,  sisters, priests, and bishops; the former gen-
eral secretary of the Sudan Council of Churches; a man who has since been 
appointed as an ambassador; employees at Juba’s Catholic Radio Bakhita; an 
Anyanya veteran; an splA chaplain related to John Garang; the president of 
the  Mothers’ Union; and several Lost Boys. Life histories and stories passed 
down from elders resulted in my receiving intimate perspectives on some of 
the most formative ele ments in my study, including the Juba Conference, 
the Torit Mutiny, refugee experiences, education, Anyanya, and splA- 
church relations. What I heard was beautiful, macabre, and transformative. 
While my questions varied depending on  factors like age, background, and 
experience, I invariably sought to capture the ways in which they related or 
could relate the history of South Sudan to the providence of God. While I 
did not include  every interview or questionnaire in this study,  those used 
allowed me to complement archival research— that dealt, for all intents and 
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purposes, with southern history pre-2006— with thoughts and memories on 
more recent developments.
While I contend that the diversity of my print and oral sources equipped 
me to craft a rigorous history of religious nationalism,  there must naturally 
be room for source critique. To begin,  there is the  matter of who produced 
the sources and for whom they  were intended. Print media like the Sudan 
Diocesan Review  were intended for a generally Christian audience and may 
have had an implicit (or explicit) bias in their description of the govern-
ment, Muslims, Christian churches, and/or their adherents. Yet and still, 
they provided a look into the daily life of the Nugent School and the per-
spectives of figures like Ian Watts and Llewellyn Gwynne. The Sudan Diocesan 
Review’s information on interethnic conflict allowed me—in conjunction 
with reports from the ssnA—to paint a more comprehensive portrait of 
interethnic relations at the school. The splA Update was a decidedly propa-
gandist medium, and though I did not use it as an authoritative information 
source on the Second Civil War, it is still an enlightening and relevant lens 
into the splA’s public use of Chris tian ity. Its nature as propaganda, further-
more, actually enhances its importance as a partisan repository of religious 
rhe toric during that conflict.
My decision to rely heavi ly on Christian clerics as interview participants 
was the fruit of the access I had to them as a result of my stays at the Epis-
copal Church of Sudan’s guest  house in Juba. Standing in the shadows of All 
Saints Cathedral, Anglican bishops from throughout the country regularly 
frequented the guest  house (note, however, that I also interviewed Catho-
lics during my research). Rather than representing a privileged minority 
class of South Sudanese Christians, my interviews and questionnaires with 
clerics allowed me to better understand their lives as laypeople during the 
history  under study, their subsequent experiences as Christian leaders, and 
their insight on providence in South Sudanese history. Not simply clerics, 
they brought a diversity of perspectives to their interactions with me— they 
 were former refugees, witnesses, students, and sons (and grand sons) with 
 family history to share. Given the attention that I give to clerics throughout 
the book (their public and private writings provide a healthy share of the 
po liti cal theology I highlight), engaging with con temporary clerics allowed 
me to offer a more comprehensive examination of the words and actions of 
ordained southerners for the better part of the last half- century.
Last but not least,  there is my decision to rely on En glish sources. I do not 
work in Arabic, and given the fact that many southern activists are primar-
ily Arabic speakers and that the North was a major theater of southern ac-
Sources and Methodology 149
tivism (particularly during the second civil war), I acknowledge that certain 
slices are missing from this study. How, for example, did Arabic- speaking 
southern Christians inject Christian thought into their po liti cal dialogue in 
Arabic print media? Aside from primarily Arabic- speaking South Sudanese, 
the class and gender dynamic is impossible to ignore; En glish was taught 
in schools that a relatively low percentage of the population attended, and 
of that population, most  were boys. In this way, my focus on En glish print 
media necessarily means that the primary subjects of study are  those who 
had privileged access to published and proliferating En glish print media—
educated southern men.
While demographically  limited in one sense, the global archival network 
of twentieth- century Sudanese history is fraught with English- language 
materials written by and about South Sudanese Christians. As a language 
that representatives of the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Catholic denomina-
tions each conversed in (and one encouraged at the expense of Arabic for 
religious reasons), En glish has a focal role in the history of Sudanese Chris-
tian ity. Many refugee letters, mission/church and secular publications, and 
materials that circulated internationally  were written in En glish and were 
written by southerners. My approach to En glish secular sources is an attempt 
to expand the scope of the sources we can examine to interrogate the injec-
tion of religious thought into the public po liti cal sphere. As such, this study 
can be placed in conversation with other works that are principally con-
cerned with Sudanese Chris tian ity from a local, ethnic, or anthropological 
lens to paint a fuller picture of po liti cal Chris tian ity in South Sudan.
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